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ABSTRACT 
Family economics uses economic concepts such as productions and decision making to 
understand family behavior. Since Gary Becker introduced household decisions into family, 
economists began to place emphasis on the rule of families on labor supply, human capital 
investment, and consumption. In a household, the members choose the optimal time 
allocations between working, housework and leisure, and money between consumption of 
different members and savings. One-Child policy and strong inter-generational connections 
cause unique family structure in China. Households of different generations provide income 
transfer and labor support to each other. Households consider these connections in their 
savings, labor supply, human capital investment, fertility and marriage decisions. Especially, 
strong intergenerational relationships in China are one cause of the high level of young 
female labor supply and high saving rate. I will investigate the rules of intergenerational 
relationships on household economic behavior.  
 Affirmative Action allocates college seats to a separate group. To evaluate the 
distribution effects of AA on discrete groups, we need to study household's strategic 
reactions on the rule of college seats allocation. The admission system of National College 
Entrance Examination (NCEE) in China is a type of AA. That distributes college seats by 
regions. I will use the rapid expansion of Chinese college enrollment as a natural experiment 
to check the households' reaction on AA and college expansion. 
Media economics utilizes economic empirical and theoretical tools to figure out the 
social, cultural, and economic issues in media industries. The impact of online piracy on 
genuine products sales is under debate, because people cannot find representing proxies to 
evaluate piracy levels. I will use Chinese data to study the effects of online piracy on 
theater revenue. 
  
ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to extend our warm appreciations and gratitude to the following persons 
for making this project possible. Their supports, inspirations, criticisms, comments and 
suggestions contribute a valuable strength to make this paper presentable and 
knowledgeable. 
I would to acknowledge our helpful and over-supportive committee, Prof. Daniel 
Silverman, Prof. Natalia Kovrijnykh, Prof. Gregory Veramendi, and Prof. Matthew 
Wiswall, gave us the ideas to find the best solutions to our dilemma and taught us on how 
to make a good paper. I would also like to thank them for motivating me to do our best 
shot as well as for her pieces of advice on how to improve it. 
To my dear parents, wife and children, who are supporting me of having group 
activities outside and inside the campus and for lending us financial support for the 
printing matters. Moreover, they showed their love and gave us words of encouragement 
that pushed us to do these well. I’m also immensely grateful to my friends and classmates 
for their comments on my manuscript and presentations. Any errors are my own and should 
not tarnish the reputations of these esteemed persons. 
To those who are not mentioned but whose help are truly contributing in adding some 
significant information will not be forgotten, I thank you. 
 
  
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
                                                               Page 
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................   vi 
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................   viii 
CHAPTER 
1 INTERGENERATIONAL CONTRACTS AND FEMALE LABOR 
SUPPLY .................. .................. .................. ...............................   1 
Introduction .................................................................................. 1 
Literature ..................................................................................... 7 
Background ................................................................................. 10 
Theoretical Model ....................................................................... 12 
Estimation .................................................................................... 26 
Data ............................................................................................. 40 
Life-Cycle Fit ............................................................................... 45 
Policy Analysis ............................................................................ 55 
Conclusion ................................................................................... 60 
 
2 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND HOUSEHOLD EDUCATION 
INVESTMENT ...............................................................................  62 
Introduction .................................................................................. 63 
Literature ...................................................................................... 65 
Background ........................................................................... 68 
Theoretical Model ...…………………..........................................  71 
Empirical Strategy .................................................................... 77 
iv 
CHAPTER                                                       Page 
Data ……….…………...……….................................................... 82 
Main Results …………………..................................................... 87 
Robustness Check ……………………......................................... 89 
Mechanisms …………………...................................................... 93 
Conclusion……………………...................................................... 97 
3 HOW DOES ONLINE PIRACY AFFECT FILM REVENUE IN 
CHINA? ...........…………….....................……………...................    99 
Introduction …………………….................................................. 99 
Literature ..…………………....................................................... 102 
Background …………………...................................................... 105 
Data ……….…………...………................................................... 108 
Model ……………….................................................................... 112 
Empirical Results …………………............................................ 116 
Discussion ……….……………………......................................... 126 
Conclusion……………………..................................................... 130 
REFERENCES ……….....................................................................  133 
APPENDIX                                           
  A FIGURES AND TABLES ......................................................... 
 
 143 
  B PROOF ......................................................................................  186 
  
v 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table                                                             Page 
1 Individuals and Household characteristics ………………………….. 160 
2 Estimated parameters …………………………..…………………….. 161 
3 Actual vs. predicted choices and select measures ………………….. 162 
4 Province level education resource information ……………………... 163 
5 Enrollment information …………………..…………………..………. 164 
6 Individual and Household Characteristics …………………..……… 165 
7 Main results …………………..…………………..…………………… 166 
8 2SLS results …………………..…………………..…………………… 168 
9 The first stage of 2SLS results …………………..………………….. 169 
10 Other education investment …………………..…………………….. 170 
11 Robustness check on different age groups …………………………. 171 
12 Robust check on different type of households ……………………... 172 
13 Other NCEE enrollment variables …………………..……………... 173 
14 Return to education …………………..…………………..…………. 174 
15 The influence of local public education level …………………..….. 175 
16 Factors affect enrollment ratio …………………..………………….. 176 
17 Signal effect of enrollment information …………………..………… 177 
18 Individual income, education and college enrollment ratio ………. 178 
19 The Summary of Box Office and Other Information ……………… 179 
20 Estimation results …………………..…………………..…………….. 180 
vi 
Table                                                             Page 
20 Estimation results …………………..…………………..…………….. 180 
21 Main Results …………………..…………………..…………………… 181 
22 2SLS Regression of “Name Download” Search Amount on Baidu ... 182 
23 DDD with Hong Kong Market …………………..…………………... 183 
24 Regression of the Mechanisms …………………..…………………… 184 
25 Distributor and Producer's Influence ……………………………….. 185 
  
 
 
  
vii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure                                                     Page 
1 Female working time by age …………..………………..……………. 145 
2 Wage structure by age cohort in simulation …………..…………… 145 
3 Average income transfer and support by age …………..………….. 146 
4 Average death rate by age …………..………………..……………… 146 
5 Simulation results: working hour by age …………..……………….. 147 
6 Simulation results: Average asset level by age …………..…………. 147 
7 Simulation results: Net transfer from parent to grandparent …….. 148 
8 Experiment: grandparent initial saving is 125,000 …………..…….. 148 
9 Simulation results: Labor supply of different types of households .. 149 
10 Policy experiment: Child/elder care subsidy and labor supply ....... 149 
11 Policy experiment: Labor supply after Delay retirement age …… 150 
12 Policy experiment: Labor supply and saving with Inheritance tax  150 
13 Timeline of NCEE …………..………………..………………..……… 151 
14 # of exam takers and # of student enrolled in NCEE ……………. 151 
15 Urban-Rural Disparities in High School Promotion Rate ………… 152 
16 Score distribution of Yunnan in 2014 …………..…………………… 152 
17 College seat allocation example …………..………………..………… 153 
18 Example: Human capital investment level …………..……………... 153 
19 Enrollment rate of different school level in China …………..…….. 154 
20 College enrollment rate …………..………………..…………………. 154 
viii 
Figure                                                     Page 
21 College enrollment rate …………..………………..…………………. 155 
22 High school enrollment ratio …………..………………..……………. 155 
23 Middle school enrollment rate …………..………………..………….. 156 
24 The Consumers’ Choices …………..………………..………………… 156 
25 The Hunger Games Baidu Search …………..………………..……… 157 
26 Predicted box office from estimation …………..……………………. 158 
27 The Box Office Distribution Over Year …………..………………… 158 
28 Opening Lag Distribution …………..………………..………………. 159 
29 Pirate Resource Available Day Lag …………..………………..……. 159 
  
CHAPTER 1.
INTERGENERATIONAL CONTRACTS AND FEMALE LABOR SUPPLY
The strong intergenerational relationships in China are one reason of the high level
of young female labor supply and high saving rate. In Chapter 1, I examine how inter-
generational relationships between parents and grandparents a¤ect females labor supply
and households savings. I develop a non-altruistic dynamic contract model using economic
benets such as a bequest, coinsurance, and cheaper care service to sustain such relation-
ships in the face of long term incentive problems. I then estimate the parameters of the
model using Chinese household surveys. I evaluate the labor and income reallocation e¤ect
throughout the relationships. I nd that intergenerational relationships increase the labor
supply of younger females by 32% but reduce the labor supply of older females by 21%,
while increasing older femaleshousehold savings by 13%. My policy experiments produce
the following predictions: delaying retirement age reduces the labor supply of young fe-
males; raising inheritance taxes increases the labor supply of young females and savings of
both parents and grandparents. Therefore, I nd that public policy a¤ects the households
attached to the target group through intergenerational relationships.
1.1 Introduction
This article examines the inuence of intergenerational relationships on femalesla-
bor supply decisions and householdsreactions to a number of policies. Intergenerational
relationships build economic connections between households of various generations. In the
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relationships, households of di¤erent generations provide income transfer, child care and el-
der care to each other. These activities a¤ect householdslabor supply and saving decisions
by redistributing labor and income across generations. Furthermore, economic ties matter
in evaluating the e¤ects of government policies. Through intergenerational relationships,
public policies are not only a¤ecting the target groups, but also a¤ecting the households
attached to the target groups. In countries without strong social welfare programs1, inter-
generational relationships are the main way to provide elder support, child care and family
insurance. For example, 66% of the Chinese elderly (aged 65 and over) provides child care to
their grandchildren (Wu et al., 2014), 45% of the Chinese elderly live with their children and
22% of their income come from their children (National Survey Research Center, 2014). In
these countries, intergenerational relationships substantially reshape householdsdecisions
on savings and labor supply, as well as policy implications of various public policies.
I construct a theoretical framework to analyze the incentive problems in intergen-
erational relationships. In an intergenerational relationship, households exchange income
and labor service in di¤erent periods. The exchange is not balanced within each period.
Without incentives to keep households committed to the relationship at each stage, the
sequential exchange will not happen from the beginning. For example, grandparents take
care of their grandchildren to exchange parentselder support in the future. However, when
grandparents are old, parents refuse to support grandparents, if they cannot get benets
from it. Without the conrmation of payback, grandparents will not help parents from the
1Table 5 in the Appendix compares intergenerational relationships across countries.
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beginning. Considering intergenerational relationships provide incentives for the sequential
exchange is a prerequisite for evaluating the impact of intergenerational relationships on
household behavior. I build a dynamic contract model using economic benets to keep the
households in the relationships.
I quantify the e¤ect of intergenerational relationships on femaleslabor supply over
the life cycle. The relationships reallocate labor across generations by a¤ecting households
child and elder care decisions. Furthermore, grandparentshelp free young parents from
child care and enable them to stay in their jobs. However, to assist parents, grandparents
may work less and leave their jobs early. Moreover, as grandparents grow old, parents
provide elder care service to grandparents and work less. An intergenerational relationship
has various e¤ects on femaleslabor supply at various stages. I use a structural model to
estimate the labor reallocation e¤ects of each stage of the relationship.
I measure the spillover e¤ects of public policies through intergenerational relation-
ships. The spillover e¤ects can change the policy implications of public policies. For exam-
ple, a government delays the mandatory retirement age to increase seniors labor supply.
Then, grandparents, who used to take care of their grandchildren, need to get back to work.
As the result, parents reduce their working time to take care of their children. Thus, delaying
mandatory retirement age reduces the labor supply of young females through intergenera-
tional relationships. Ignoring the economic connections between generations could lead to
incomplete forecasts of the impact of some policy change. I conduct policy experiments to
evaluate various public policies with the existence of intergenerational relationships.
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The rst contribution of the article is to develop a non-altruistic dynamic contract
framework that uses economic benets to sustain long term intergenerational relationships.
The contract model is built by adding labor supply and preference for child and elder care, as
well as bequest to the Kocherlakota (1996) environment2. The dynamic contract framework
solves the incentive problems of the relationships and creates Pareto improvements for the
two households by exchanging income and labor service. The economic benets from labor
allocation, risk sharing, and bequests give households utility values higher than those of
outside options at any stage. Furthermore, the Pareto gains provide incentives for the
households to remain in the relationships. The model also reveals the e¤ects of incentive
problems on household behaviors. In the contract without incentive problems, households
have the same behaviors as that in an altruistic model. The contact gives a constant
utility weight on each household and allocates the endowment according to the weight. In
the paper, I use the contract without incentives problem to show households behaviors
in altruistic models. I can use the dynamic contract framework to derive of the rules of
income and labor service reallocation in intergenerational relationships. On the basis of
the rule, I identify the e¤ect of intergenerational relationships on savings and labor supply.
These expressions enable the formal identication proof and promote the estimation of the
structural parameters.
The second contribution of the article is to quantify the e¤ect of intergenerational
2Kocherlakota (1996) built a dynamic risk sharing problem between two risk averse agents living in
innite horizon and facing idiosyncratic income shocks. In the paper, risk sharing is limited by two-sided
lack of commitment to the insurance contract.
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relationships on the female labor supply in China. I implement the identication strategy
and estimate the model using data from Chinese household surveys. I choose these surveys
for three major reasons. First, China has strong intergenerational relationships. Observing
and estimating the inuence of relationships on householdsdecisions is easy. Second, sev-
eral major social policy changes have occurred in recent decades. These changes provide
enough variations to identify the e¤ects of economic condition changes on intergenerational
relationships is easy. Finally, these surveys have detailed information about income transfer,
child care and elder care. The information enables us to identify the economic connections
between households. I can use this information to measure the extent to how households
conduct child and elder care, as well as transfer decisions. The results show that grandpar-
ents taking care of their grandchildren increases the labor supply of parents by 32%, but
decreases the labor supply of grandparents by 21% in the earlier stage of the relationships.
In providing elder care to grandparents, parents reduce their labor supply by 13% at the
later stage of the relationships. The wage structure in China contributes to the strong
e¤ects of intergenerational relationships on labor supply. Given that younger generations
have a higher wage rate, the total income of two households increases when grandparents
take care of their grandchildren and free parents to work. I also compare the di¤erences of
householdsbehavior between the contracts with and without incentives problem. I found
a bad income shock for grandparents, for example, can increase the transfer and support
from parents to grandparents in coming periods in the contract without incentive problems,
but decreases that in the contract with incentive problems.
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The third contribution of the article is to evaluate the spillover e¤ects of various
policies through intergenerational relationships. My policy experiments reveal the e¤ect of
social welfare programs on female labor supply and savings as well as on householdstransfer,
elder and child care decisions. I impose a 20% subsidy on the child care and elder care
services from market. I nd that 20% of child care subsidy increases grandparentslabor by
41% and 20% elder care subsidy increases parentslabor supply by 13%. I then increase the
inheritance tax from 0% in benchmark to 30%. The direct e¤ects of inheritance tax reduce
grandparentsbequests in exchange for parentslabor service and income transfer. Parents
reduce the income transfer and labor support to grandparents. Grandparents increase their
savings to maintain the bequest incentives. The change increases grandparentssavings by
20% and increases parentslabor supply by 9%. Finally, I delay the mandatory retirement
age from 60 in benchmark to 65. I nd that pushing back the mandatory retirement age
reduces the parents labor by only 8% at the delaying period when grandparents have
a lower wage rate than parents. The wage structure determines that grandparents are
always the child care providers before and after the policy change. Then I change the wage
structure by reducing the wage gap between parents and grandparents. I nd that delaying
mandatory retirement age decreases the labor supply of parents by 43% at the delaying
period. With the new wage structure, grandparents no longer provide child care. Therefore,
the spillover e¤ects through intergenerational relationships change the implications of these
public policies.
6
1.2 Literature
Motives of Intergenerational Relationships Since Barro (1974) and Becker (1974), researchers
mainly use altruism3 to address the incentive problem in intergenerational relationships.
Altruism sustains long term intergenerational relationships, but cannot explain several phe-
nomena. For example, parents account for the relative economic positions of their children
and transfer wealth to or share their inheritance with their children unequally (Schanzen-
bach & Sitko¤ 2008). Although altruistic parents are expected to give more to their less
well-o¤ children, bequests tend to divide equally among siblings (McGarry 2001). As al-
truism is morally charged, it should be independent of institutions and economic factors.
Many studies have found that family ties in countries with weak social welfare programs
tend to be stronger than those countries with strong programs (Bonsang 2007; Hank &
Buber 2008). Altruistic models fail to explain the relationship of intergenerational ties with
these economic factors. I use a non-altruistic model to emphasize the functions of observable
economic factors on intergenerational relationships.
Some studies use non-altruistic forces to address the incentive problem in intergener-
ational relationships. Researchers have argued that households enforce the intergenerational
ties through a self-enforcing constitution4 (Cigno 2006), demonstration e¤ect (Jellal & Wol¤
3Altruism indicates that a parent (child) can derive utility from the consumption of his child (parent).
4Cigno (2006) relies on social norms explain long-term relationships. Families can be viewed as com-
munities governed by self-enforcing constitutions. In the OLG framework, if people do not support their
parents, their children will be not willing to support them. In this environment, the dominant strategy of
individuals is to provide transfer and help to other people.
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2005) or nurtured altruism (Stark & Zhang 2002). However, these studies ignore the direct
economic benets from intergenerational relationships. Direct economic benets can sustain
intergenerational relationships. Intergenerational relationships improve labor allocation ef-
ciency by allowing those who are more productive to work (Geurts, van Tilburg, Poortman
& Dykstra 2015). Furthermore, assets after unexpected death are an important source of
bequest (Lockwood 2014). Accidental bequest has no direct e¤ect on parentsutility, but is
used in exchange for childrens transfer and support. The Pareto improvement through risk
sharing, cheap care service and bequest creates economic benets for intergenerational re-
lationships. My model combines these direct economic benets to sustain intergenerational
relationships.
Female Labor Supply A¤ected by Intergenerational Relationships The provision of child
and elder care reduces femaleslabor supply. Mothers face the problem of reconciling work
and child care responsibilities. Grandparents may substitute for mothers in doing child care
work and thus mothers become free to work. Grandparentsassistance strongly increases
younger parentslabor supply (Posadas & Vidal-Fernandez 2012; Compton & Pollak 2014,
Battistin, Nadai &Padula, 2015). Within intergenerational relationships, the question of
who provides child and elder care is primarily determined by individualshealth and in-
come conditions. Working grandparents use more money to subsidize their grandchildren
rather than provide care directly (Luo, LaPierre Hughes & Waite, 2014). Grandparents
with newborn grandchildren are more likely to provide care for their grandchildren, and
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married grandparents are also more likely to work and to provide nancial help (Ho 2015).
In the later periods of intergenerational relationships, children provide income support and
physical care to their parents. In most developing countries, most of the elderly population
receives nancial support from their adult children (Hamaaki, Hori & Murata 2014). Par-
ents who provide care for grandparents cause the great reduction of female labor supply at
midlife (Johnson & Sasso 2006). The literature focuses mostly on the e¤ects of intergener-
ational relationships in a single period. Conversely, this article determines the inuence of
intergenerational relationships on femaleslabor supply throughout the life cycle.
Formal care service and social welfare programs can substitute for intergenerational
relationships by providing the same service to households. The expansion of public child
care provokes a large positive e¤ect on maternal employment (Bauernschuster & Schlotter
2015). Married womens labor supply decreased with the ascending cost of formal child care
(Blau & Kahn 2005). Elder care giving decreases female work intensity and the impact de-
creases after the launch of the market oriented elder care insurance (Sugawara & Nakamura
2014). The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program undermines intergenerational
support (McDonald & Armstrong 2001). The implementation of National Health Insurance
in Taiwan in 1995 decreased the likelihood of intergenerational coresidency (Hsieh, Chou,
Liu & Lien 2015). In this article, formal care service and social welfare programs a¤ect the
outside options of intergenerational relationships.
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1.3 Background
China has a high female labor force participation rate. The high female labor force
participation rate is a legacy of the Communist Partys rule that women are equal to men in
all spheres of life (Yu & Liu, 2010). Yet, since the 1980s, the transition to market economy
has widened the gender income gap5. Between 1990 and 2014, Chinese femaleslabor force
participation rates declined from 77% to 64%. But, the rate is still higher than the world
average of 50% (World Bank 2016).
Strong intergenerational connections increase the labor supply of young females
(Chen & Liu 2009). Grandparents who care their grandchildren are common in most fami-
lies in China (Chen, Liu & Mair 2011). Grandparents provided child care to grandchildren
in 35% of family setups in rural China (Silverstein, Cong, & Li 2006). In 2010, about 66%
of people older than 60 years of ages have provided care for their grandchildren (Melen-
berg & Zheng 2012). The provision of child care by grandparents a¤ects both parentsand
grandparentslabor supply decisions. For example, the participation of daughtersin the
labor force is one major reason why grandmothers provide child care (Chen, Liu, & Mair
2011). Traditionally, children in China bear the ultimate responsibility for taking care of
their aging parents (Chen & Liu 2009). An adult child faces criminal charges for refusing
5According to National Bureau of Statistics of China, in 1990, the average females wage rate was 78%
in rural area and 79% in urban area of that of the average male. In 2013, the ratio declined to 67% in urban
areas and 57% in rural areas. .
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to support an aged parent6. In China, elders in most areas do not have a formal safety net.
The majority depends exclusively on their children for support (Cong & Silverstein 2012).
About 45% of people older than 60 years live with their children and 22% of their income
comes from their children (National Survey Research Center, 2014).
The low fertility rate caused by the one child policy7 contributes to the high female
labor participation rate. In a unique "four-two-one" family8, the only child receives child
care from four grandparents in childhood, and also bears the responsibility of supporting
two parents and, sometimes, four grandparents in their old age. Since the enforcement of
the one child policy in 1980s, the fertility rate in China decreased from 3 in 1980 to 1.6 in
2015, which is lower than the world average of 2.6 (World Bank 2015). The low fertility rate
reduces femalesburden of child care and causes a high female labor market participation
rate.
Weak institutionalized care and social welfare programs also contribute to the high
female labor participation rate. After Chinas economic transition in the 1980s, publicly
funded care9 and elder care10 is largely eliminated, and market care service is either too
6The Chinese constitution of 1982 proclaims the obligation of adult children to support their elderly
parents.
7The one-child policy, introduced in 1979, only allowed families to have one child each. Since 1984, a
rural family can have a second child if the rstborn is female (Chen, Jin & Yue 2010). Since 2014, all couples
can have second children. See Figure 6 in the Appendix for the details of the fertility rate change.
8 In a "Four-two-one" family, the child is the only child for two parents and the only grandchild for four
grandparents.
9The number of publicly funded kindergartens dropped from about 150,000 (an 83% market shares) in
1998 to about 43,000 (a 24% market share) by in 2012 (National Bureau of Statistics 2016).
10China has just about 2% of people ages sixty-ve and older living in residential care facilities. (Feng,
Liu, Guan & Mor 2012).
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expensive for most households to a¤ord or su¤er from low quality (Zhang & Maclean 2012).
In 2003, accordance with the National Research Center on Aging, only 2% of the population
aged 65 and over use institutionalized care. In addition, only 46% of urban employees
were covered by a pension plan in 2004 (Trinh 2006), and only 12% of the rural labor
force participated in the old age social insurance programs scheme in 2006 (Wang 2006).
Without strong institutionalized care and social welfare programs, households can only rely
on intergenerational relationships to provide child care and elder support.
1.4 Theoretical Model
In this section, I present a dynamic contract model of inter-household decision mak-
ing. Households can live independently, or join a contract through the mutual provision of a
series of state contingent income transfers, elder care, and child care to each other. I dene
the case without interactions as the autarky case, and that with interactions as contracts.
Households remain in the contract, purely because of economic benets they can gain. In
contrast to the existing literature, the model does not take altruism into consideration. Ig-
noring altruism does not mean denying the importance of altruism, but doing so highlights
the functions of observable economic factors in intergenerational relationships.
The model has two agents: parent and grandparent. The parents household has one
child, who makes no decisions and needs child care service. To simplify, I only look at the
female supply decisions, and take the males labor supply and income as exogenous. For
notational convenience, I denote the age of the parent and the calendar year by t: I assume
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the grandparent is 6 periods older than the parent. At period t, the parents age is t and
the grandparents age is t+6. An agent lives for 20 periods at most. At age t, an agents
death rate is %t. At time t, the parents death rate is %t and the grandparents death rate
is %t+6: In simplifying the model, the parents death rate is 0 before period 14. The parent
will not die before the grandparent. The agent needs child care from age 1 to 4. From age
11 to 20, the agent needs elder care: The agent retires after period 9. After age 10, the
agent no longer provides elder and child care as well as work11.
Preferences Household i has preference on consumption cit; leisure l
i
t; child care hours K
i
t ,
and elder care hours N it : Child care service can come from the parent k
p
t ; the grandparent
kgt , or an outside service k
m
t ; with K
i
t = k
p
t + k
g
t + k
m
t : Elder care service can come from
parent npt , and outside service n
o
t , with N
i
t = n
p
t + n
m
t :  represents the preference over
leisure. t represents the preference over child care. t represents the preference over elder
care. t and t; the tastes over child care and elder care service, change over time. t
equals to 0 after age 4. t equals to 0 when the household is younger than age 10. At time
t, the parents utility parameters are t; t; t and t; the grandparents utility parameters
are, t+6; t+6; t+6; and t+6: Agent is current-period utility function at age t is:
Uit(c
i
t; l
i
t;K
i
t ; N
i
t ) = ln c
i
t +  ln l
i
t + t lnK
i
t + t lnN
i
t (1..1)
11Retired agent can still provice child care at age 10.
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Budget Sets Households take the price of outside child care and elder care service pkt and
pnt , wage rate w
i
t; and the interest rate Rt; as given. The budget constraint
 
BCit

is:
cit + s
i
t+1 + p
k
t k
m
t + p
n
t n
m
t + T
i
t  Rtsit + withit + ikt;8i 2 fp; gg (BCit)
The money endowment is from asset Rtsit; wage income w
i
th
i
t, which is determined by
wage rate wit and working hours h
i
t; and a random income shock
12 ilt: 
i
jt with probability
ptj ;
JP
j=1
pjt = 1; and 
p
jt 2

p1t; :::; 
p
Jt
	
; gz with probability 
g
zt;
ZP
z=1
gzt = 1; and 
g
zt 2
g1t; :::; 
g
Zt
	
: I assume, wpt + 
p
1t > 0;and w
g
t + 
g
1t > 0. The assumption avoids corner
solutions. Household i spends the money on consumption cit; saving for the next period
sit+1; outside child care k
o
t and elder care n
o
t ; and net transfer to the other household T
i
t :
Time Allocation Each households overall time is 1. Household i can spend time on work
hit, leisure l
i
t; elder care n
i
t and child care k
i
t: The time constraint
 
TCit

is:
1 = hit + l
i
t + n
i
t + k
i
t;8i 2 fp; gg : (TCit)
Autarky Case I dene the en-ante value function in autarky case and call this autarky value
V autit (s
i
t). After the income shock is realized, each household makes an optimal allocation of
current-period consumption, individual savings sit+1; carried on to the next period, labor-
force participation decision hit, child care decisions k
i
t and k
o
t ; and elder care decisions n
i
t and
not , which solves the following optimally constrained problem. Dene the set of decisions
12 In this paper, income shocks are from the uncertainty of not working income and health spending. For
example, a man has a certain probability of getting a disease every year. If he gets sick, he needs to pay for
medical treatment, which is a bad income shock for him. If he is healthy, he doesnt need to spend money
on medical treatment, which is a good income shock for him.
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made as 
ti =

sit+1; h
i
t; n
i
t; k
i
t; n
o
t ; k
o
t
	
. The Bellman equation of the autarky case is13:
vt(s
i
t; 
i
kt) = max

ti
Uit(c
i
t; l
i
t;K
i
t ; N
i
t ) + 
 
1  %it+1

V autt+1 (s
i
t+1);8i 2 fp; gg (1..2)
subject to budget constraint BCit and time constraint TC
i
t . In this case, the solution to
the problem above yields the following expected value function for the household at the
beginning of period t. The autarky value is:
V autit (s
i
t) =
JX
j=1
ijtvt(s
i
t; 
i
jt) (1..3)
The Optimal Contract A contract determines on bequest, punishment, income transfer,
child and elder care, savings and consumption. A contract can end in two cases. If one side
breaks the rule of the contract, the contract will end as a punishment. If the grandparent
dies in the contract, the contract will end. At the same time, the parent receives the
grandparents savings as a bequest and lives in the autarky case. In the contract, each
household leaves the relationship at any time. I call this the no-commitment case. I also
dene a special case that neither household can leave after both households join in the
contract. I call this the full-commitment case. No incentive problems exist in this case.
I use full-commitment contract as a benchmark to show the rst-order importance of the
incentive problems.
In the initial period t=0 of a contract, both households choose to either join in the
contract or live alone. If households cannot reach an agreement, each household will live
in the autarky case forever after period 0. If they reach an agreement, they go to the next
13%it+1 is the death rate of agent i, with %
p
t+1 = %t+1 and %
i
t+1 = %t+7:
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period. Before period t=1 and onwards, the death shock happens. If the grandparent dies,
the parent receives the all the savings of the grandparent and lives in the autarky case.
If neither household dies, both households enter the contract of the period. Taking the
income as given, the contract gives the promised support and transfer to each other, as
well as makes the consumption, time allocation and savings decisions. (see Figure 1 in the
Appendix for the timing of the contract)
The rule of income and labor service allocation is adjusted to an allocation that
lies on the Pareto frontier. The state space is comprised of each households asset sit and
the grandparents promised value Gt: I dene the parents value function Pt(s
p
t ; s
g
t ; Gt). In
solving for the optimal contract, one maximizes Pt(s
p
t ; s
g
t ; Gt) subject to delivering at least
Gt the grandparent. Following Spear and Srivastava (1987), one can rewrite the sequence
problem corresponding to the optimal contract in recursive form, with the promised value as
a state variable, and continuation values to the grandparent as control variables. Essentially,
the promised value summarizes the previous history of the play.
No-commitment Case A contract determines the net transfer T itjz, with T
p
tjz =  T gtjz, child
care support kgtjz; and elder care support n
p
tjz in the state with income shocks 
p
j and 
g
z. I de-
ne the set of decisions made on support and transfer as  tjz =
n
nptjz; k
g
tjz; T
p
tjz
o
: According
to the contract, contracts makes an optimal allocation of current-period consumption cptjz
and cgtjz, as well as the time allocations to each household such as labor-force participation
decision hitjz, child care decisions k
i
tjz and k
m
tjz; elder care decisions n
i
tjz and n
m
tjz. I dene
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the set of decisions made on care giving as ztjz =
n
hgtjz; n
m
tjz; h
p
tjz; k
p
tjz; k
m
tjz
o
: In addition,
the contract determines the individual savings sit+1jz; and the promised value G
t+1
jz . I dene
the set of decisions made on state variables as 
tjz =
n
sgt+1jz; s
p
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz
o
. The Bellman
equation is:
P t(spt ; s
g
t ; G
t) = max
fztjz ;
tjz ; tjzg
JX
j=1
ZX
z=1
pjt
g
zt[Upt(c
p
tjz; l
p
tjz;K
p
tjz; N
p
tjz)
+
 
1  %t+7

P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz ) + %t+7V
aut
pt+1(s
p
t+1jz + s
g
t+1jz)]
subject to budget constraints BCpt and BC
g
t , time constraints TC
p
t and TC
g
t , the promise
keeping constraint at period t:
JX
j=1
ZX
z=1
pjt
g
zt
h
Ugt(c
g
tjz; l
g
tjz;K
g
tjz; N
g
tjz) + 
 
1  %t+7

Gt+1jz
i
 Gt (PKgt )
the incentive constraints14 given any income shocks at period t:
Ugt(c
g
tjz; l
g
tjz;K
g
tjz; N
g
tjz) + 
 
1  %t+7

Gt+1jz  vautgt (sgt ; gzt); for8j; z (ICgt )
and
Upt(c
p
tjz; l
p
tjz;K
p
tjz; N
p
tjz) + 
 
1  %t+7

P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )
+%t+7V
aut
pt+1(s
p
t+1jz + s
g
t+1jz)  vautpt (spt ; pjt); for 8j; z (ICpt )
the participation constraints at period t+1:
Gt+1jz  V autgt+1(sgt+1jz); for8j; z (PCgt+1)
14The incentive constraints are indeed the ex-post participation constraints. To simplify the notation, I
call these constraints as incentive constraints.
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and
P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )  V autpt+1(spt+1jz); for 8j; z (PCpt+1)
The promise-keeping constraint (PKgt ) ensures that the contract delivers the promised
level of discounted utility to the grandparent. It plays the role of a law of motion for the
state variables. The incentive constraint for household i (ICit) is the incentive compatibility
constraint ensuring that the household i gets a higher ex-post utility value from the contract
than it could from the autarky case. The participation constraint for household i (PCit+1) is
the incentive compatibility constraint ensuring that household i gets a higher ex-ante utility
value from the contract, than it could from the autarky case in the next period.
Full-commitment Case In a full-commitment case, no incentive problems exist. The Bellman
equations of no-commitment contract doesnt have participation constraints, and incentive
constraint.
Characterization of the Optimal Contract
Full-commitment Case This section characterizes the optimal contract. t is the Lagrangian
multiplier associated with promise keeping constraint of the grandparent household. Using
the envelope theorem, I get:
Gt :
@P ft(spt ; s
g
t ; G
t)
@Gt
=  t (ET1)
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The rst order conditions for the optimal contract problem are:
T pt :
cgtjz
cptjz
= t (FOC2)
Gt+1jz :
@P f;t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )
@Gt+1jz
=  t (FOC3)
Proposition 1 In the full-commitment case, both households fully share the income risk.
The consumption ratio is a constant through the all periods.
cgtjz
cptjz
= t; with t is a constant,
for 8t 2 [1; T ] ; 8pjt and gzt:(see Appendix for proof.)
Two households fully share risks in full-commitment case. Equation ET1 denes
the ex-ante income and labor service allocation rule. Equation FOC2 denes the ex-post
income and labor service allocation in the state with income shocks gzt and 
p
jt. Equation
FOC3 denes the ex-ante income and labor service allocation rule of at time t+1. The three
equations show that the full-commitment case always gives constant utility weights tt+1
to the grandparents utility, and 1t+1 to the parents utility at any state of any period. In
addition, t = 1 for 8 t. The utility weight on each term is a constant over time. To give
an intuition of the result, consider two households maximizing their ex-ante utilities. The
contract allows the household in a relatively good state to transfer its income and labor
service to the household that is in a relatively bad state. Two households smooth their
consumption by allocating a constant portion of the income and labor service to each other.
Fully risk sharing increases both householdsex-ante utility values.
An optimal contract with full-commitment is equivalent to a single household prob-
lem with special altruistic preferences. In the single household problem, the parent and the
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grandparent have the same preference for the parents utility relative to the grandparents
utility. The preference for each household becomes:
t = Upt(c
p
tjz; l
p
tjz;K
p
tjz; N
p
tjz) + 1Ugt(c
g
tjz; l
g
tjz;K
g
tjz; N
g
tjz) (1..4)
The incentive problems in intergenerational relationships cause the di¤erences of households
behaviors between the intergenerational contract model and altruistic models. Without the
incentive problems, households in an optimal contract behave like altruistic households.
The only di¤erence between the contracts with full-commitment and altruistic problems is
on the initial utility weight 1. 1 Is endogenous chosen in contract, but exogenous given
in the problem with altruistic households. In this paper, I use the optimal contract with
full-commitment to demonstrate householdsbehavior with altruistic preference.
No-commitment Case I characterize the optimal contract using the rst order conditions
and envelope theorem. t is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the grandparent
households promise-keeping constraint. pjt
g
ztjz
 
1  %t+7

are the Lagrangian multipliers
associated with grandparents participation constraint. pjt
g
ztjz
 
1  %t+7

are the La-
grangian multipliers associated with the grandparent households participation constraint.
pjt
g
zt{jz are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the parent households partic-
ipation constraint. pjt
g
zt!jz are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the parent
households incentive constraints. Using the envelope theorem, I get:
Gt :
@P t(spt ; s
g
t ; G
t)
@Gt
=  t (ET2)
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From the rst order conditions (see Appendix for details) for the optimal contract problem,
I get:
T pt :
cgtjz
cptjz
=
t + {jz
1 + !jz
(FOC4)
Gt+1jz :
@P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )
@Gt+1jz
=  t + {jz + jz
1 + !jz + jz
(FOC5)
Equation ET2 denes the ex-ante rule of income and labor allocation. Equation FOC3
gives the ex-post rule of income and labor allocation, when the income shocks are gzt and
pjt. Equation FOC5 denes the law of motion of the rule of income and labor allocation at
time t+1. Di¤erent from the full-commitment case, the utility weights are no longer xed.
Income shocks change the ex-post utility weights of the current period and the ex-ante
utility weights of the future. I obtain the optimal choices vectors fztjz;
tjz; tjzg from
the optimal contract. I dene the ex-post utility values of the optimal contract, given the
income shock pjt and 
g
zt, as follows:
pt

spt ; s
g
t ; 
p
j ; 
g
z; G
t

= Upt(c
p
tjz; l
p
tjz;K
p
tjz; N
p
tjz) + %t+7V
aut
pt+1(s
p
t+1jz + s
g
t+1jz)
+
 
1  %t+7

P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz ) (1..5)
and
gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
z; 
p
j ; G
t

= Ugt(c
g
tjz; l
g
tjz;K
g
tjz; N
g
tjz) + 
 
1  %t+7

Gt+1jz (1..6)
Proposition 2 A contract is a process of Pareto improvements. At least one household is
better o¤ ex-post in the contract. Two incentive constraints cannot be bind at the same time.
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At least one household is better o¤ ex-ante in the contract. Two participation constraints
cannot be bind at the same time. (see Appendix for proof).
Households in the contract can gain surplus by beneting from bequest and labor
allocations. Even without any transfer or support, a bequest increases the parentsexpected
utility. The Pareto gain from the bequest benet means at least one household can get a
higher utility value from the contract. Because of the incentive constraints, each households
utility value is no worse than the autarky case. As one incentive constraint is binding, the
other will get all the surpluses from the contract and has a higher utility level.
Proposition 3 If the market service price is lower than that of both the parents and
the grandparents wages, such that pkt = minfwpt ; wgt ; pkt g or pnt = minfwpt ; wgt ; pnt g; then
households only get care service from market, with npt = k
p
t = k
g
t = 0: If the parents wage
is the lowest then the parent is the primary elder care (child care) provider, with npt > 0
(kpt > 0): if the grandparents wage is the lowest, then the grandparent is the primary child
care provider, with kgt > 0. (see Appendix for proof)
Wage structure and market service price determine the methods to be used to help
the other household. Households choose the most inexpensive way to take care of elders
or children. If the market service price is higher than that of both wages, all the care
service will from the market. A household with wages higher than those of the service
price uses pecuniary transfer rather than labor to help the other household. If a household
provides child or elder care to help the other household, the intergenerational relationship
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directly reduces the households working hour. In the contract, both households choose the
most inexpensive way to provide child or elder care. If both wages are higher than those
of outside service price, two households will use income transfer only to help each other.
In one period, transfer and support exist at the same time. One household uses income
transfer in exchange for the other households labor support.
Proposition 4 In an optimal contract, the expected substitution rate of marginal utility
of the next period is equal to the substitution rate of the marginal utility of current period.
For 8 gzt and pjt; there is:
cgtjz
cptjz
=
JX
m=1
ZX
n=1
pt+1n
g
t+1m
cpt+1mn
=
JX
m=1
ZX
n=1
pt+1n
g
t+1m
cgt+1mn
(See Appendix for proof)
This proposition shows the trade-o¤ of todays and future utilities. The right term
of the equations is the expected substitution rate of marginal utility of period t+1. The left
term is the substitution rate of the marginal utility at time t. Two numbers are equal in
the optimal contract. However, as one household has relatively low marginal utility and the
other has relatively high marginal utility, the two households agree to exchange income and
labor service with a relatively low marginal utility for the others income and labor service
until the substitution rates of marginal utility are equal for two periods.
Proposition 5 If both householdsincome shocks are neither too large nor too small, two
households will fully share the risk. Given pjt(
g
zt); 9 gkt (plt) for 8 gzt < gkt (pjt > plt),
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with ICpt binding, and 9 glt (pkt) for 8 gzt < gkt (pjt > pkt), with ICgt binding. Between
the two extreme values, both households fully share the risk and no incentive constraints are
binding. (See Appendix for proof)
The proposition denes the marginal value separating the income shocks leading to
full risk sharing and partial risk sharing. When the parents income shock is xed, a unique
marginal value exists with the parentsincentive constraint binding and the consumption
ratio equaling to t. If the shock is larger than the marginal value, keeping the consumption
ratio equal to t will cause the parentsutility value lower than the one in autarky case.
When the parents income shock is xed, another unique marginal value exists, with the
grandparent incentive constraint binding and the ex-post consumption ratio equaling to t:
If the shock is smaller than the marginal value, keeping the consumption ratio equal to t
will cause the grandparentsutility value to be lower than that in the autarky case. In this
case, the parent receives all the surplus of the contract. Both households fully share the
income risk between the two extreme values. If the income shock ratio gzt=
p
jt is too small,
the parents incentive constraint is binding and the grandparent receives all the surpluses. If
the income shock ratio gzt=
p
jt is too large, the grandparents incentive constraint is binding
and the parent get all the surplus. If the income shock ratio gzt=
p
jt is neither too large nor
too small, no incentive constraints bind. and two households fully share the risk.
Proposition 6 In the no-commitment cases, a large income shock for the grandparents or
a small income shock for the parents will cause a small consumption ratio
cgtjz
cptjz
. Fixed pjt; if
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gmt > 
g
nt, then
cgtjm
cptjm
 c
g
tjn
cptjn
. Fixed gzt; if 
p
kt > 
p
lt, then
cgtkz
cptkz
 c
g
tlz
cptlz
:(See Appendix for proof)
As one side receives a small income shock, the other household helps as much as it
can, until the incentive constraint binding. A small income shock will reduce the households
consumption share, if it causes the other households incentive constraint to be binding. A
small income shock ratio gzt=
p
jt causes a small consumption ratio
cgtjz
cptjz
. The consumption
ratio determines the transfer and support intensity households give to each other. A high
consumption ratio means the grandparent receives a large share of the total endowment.
Proposition 7 In the optimal contract, a small income shock from one household cause
low discount utility values and consumption of both households. If gmt > 
g
nt, then
gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

 gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

;
and
pt

spt ; s
g
t ; 
p
jt; 
g
mt; G
t

 pt

spt ; s
g
t ; 
p
jt; 
g
nt; G
t

:
If pk > 
p
l , then
gt
 
sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
kt; G
t
  gt  sgt ; spt ; gzt; plt; Gt ;
and
pt
 
spt ; s
g
t ; 
p
kt; 
g
zt; G
t
  pt  spt ; sgt ; plt; gzt; Gt :
(See Appendix for proof)
Households fully share income risk in the cases with no incentive constraint binding
in contracts. In these cases, a small income shock from one side causes low utility values
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and consumption of both households. Households partially share income risk in the cases
with one incentive constraint binding. In these cases, the household with a relatively large
income shock helps the household with the relatively small one as much as it can until the
incentive constraint binding. A small income shock form one household causes a low utility
value and consumption level of the household, and leaves the others unchanged.
1.5 Estimation
In this section, I discuss the identication of several key parameters of the model.
The key parameters related to householdschoices are wage rate wit; non-working income
shock it; utility weight on leisure ; utility weight on child care t, utility weight on elder
care weight t and death rate %t. In the estimation, I assume that the working income rate
and non-working income are exogenously given. I also assume in the model that only one
grandparent household exists for each parent household. Due to the models complexity,
the arguments are mainly heuristic. Using the detailed time allocation and consumption
information from my data, I identify the parameters of the preference. With information
on work and income, I identify the parameters for income process based on households
characteristics. Then, I identify the parameters of value function in the following manner.
I rst discuss the identication on the law of motion in consumption ratio. Given the law
of motion of consumption ratio across the period, the contract makes decisions in dividing
the income and time into the current utility gain and savings for the future. I use an
interpolation method to obtain the parameters for the value functions.
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Income Process In the data, income comes from working income and non-working income.
Households make decisions on working time. I dene wit as females individual working
income rate. I normalize the overall time equal to 115. The individuals working income Iit
is the annual overall income from working, and it consists of income from wages, agricultural
activities and business. I dene the income rate wit = Iit=hit: The income rate follows the
rules like.
lnwit = 	Xit +Dyear +Dregion + it; (1..7)
with Xit as the control variable, consisting of education level eduit; age ageit; and age
squared age2it: Dyear are the year dummies that capture the time trend. Dregion are region
dummies that control the regional xed e¤ects. I use ordinary linear least squares regression
to obtain 	, from which I can derive everyones income rate prediction at various ages. I
get the working income rate, which satises the following:
lnwit = lnwi0 
 
1  ageit + 2  age2it

; (1..8)
where 1 and 2 are from the estimated 	. w0t is determined by education, gender, year
and region.
In the non-working income part, I treat health spending as one kind of negative
non-working income. Overall household health spending Hit is dened as overall spending
in the previous year on health care service and medicine. Iht is the working income from a
husband and other household members. Non-working income Nit is dened as the overall
15 I dene the working time as hit =(annual work month/12)(daily work hour/14)(weekly work day/7).
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household income from pension, subsidy, and another non-work income source. I dene net
non-working income as follows:
Pit = Nit  Hit + Iht: (1..9)
Using the information on health spending, non-working income, and individual working
income, I can obtain each households net non-working income distribution at various ages
from the data. Non-working income for the individual is as follows:
Pit = Xit +Dyear +Dregion + "it; (1..10)
I use ordinary least squares regression to obtain  and the distribution of "it, from which I
derive each age groups non-working income rate prediction at various ages.
Preference Parameters I estimate the utility function parameters of preference, which con-
sists of utility weight on leisure ; child care t; and elder care t: I dene the opportunity
cost of time spending on child care wkt or elder care wnt, which is the last marginal unit of
time spending on child or elder care. I normalize the child care and elder care time to 116.
I get the spending on child care Kit =
P
j k
j
twkt and elder care 
N
it =
P
j n
j
twnt; j is the
household member. The value of time spending is Lit = w
l
itl
j
t , with w
l
it = wit if i spends on
working or the last unit of elder/child care is from i; wlit = w
j
t ; if i provides child care, but
the last unit is provided by j; wlit = pt; if i provides child care but the last unit is provided
16For example, child care provided by j is kjt =(annual child care month/12)(daily child care
hour/14)(weekly child care day/7).
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by the market. I dene household is overall endowment17 spending on period t is:
Eit = Rts
i
t +
X
h
wlht + 
i
l   sit+1   T it
+
X
h
 
nihwnt + k
i
hwkt
 X
l
 
nilwnt + k
i
lwkt

(1..11)
Here, h is the household member belonging to the household i, and l is the household mem-
ber not belonging to the household i. The rst part, Rtsit +
P
hw
l
ht + 
i
l is the household
endowment before transfer and support, sit+1 is the saving for the next period. T
i
t is the net
transfer from household i to the other household.
P
h
 
nihwnt + k
i
hwkt
 Pl  nilwnt + kilwkt
is the net child care and elder care support from household i to the other household. The
overall household consumption Cir is the households overall spending on food, clothes,
transportation, durable goods, utility, fuel, entertainment, education, beauty, and other
consumption goods. Dene the vector of spending it =
 
Cit ; 
K
it ; 
N
it ; 
L
it
0
and the para-
meters vector it = (1; it; it; i)
0, I get:
it =
itE
i
t
1 +  + t + t
(1..12)
Dene the vector of spending yi =
 
Kit ; 
N
it ; 
L
it
0
and the parameters vector it = (it; it; i)
0,
I get:
yi = it
C
ir (1..13)
To capture preference heterogeneity, I use a random coe¢ cient model to estimate
parameter distribution. Namely, the parameter vector it is specied as it = t + it;
17Endowment consists both time and money values. I get the value of the time endowment by using the
overall time times the opportunity cost of the time.
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i =  + 

it; and it = t + 

it; where t = (t; t; )
0 is a vector of constants, and
it` = (

it; 

it; 

it)
0 is a vector of stationary random variables with zero means and constant
variancecovariance. I use two steps generalized least squares regression (GLS) to get the
preference parameters (see Appendix for details). I get
~

g
it =

xTii
~
w
 1
i xi
 1
xTi
~
w
 1
i yi: (1..14)
Here, the weight
~
wi equals to the variance
~
t estimated in the rst step:I then get the
sample mean
~

g
t and sample variance 
g
t of
~

g
it.
~

g
t captures the average utility weight in
each utility term and gt captures the heterogeneous preference distribution.
However, heterogeneity increases the state variable dimensions and causes the curse
of dimensionality for the dynamic problem. If it is continuous, the state variable space
is innite and impossible to solve. To reduce its dimensions and simplify the problem,
I assume it as discrete rather than continuous in the simulation. I dene two types of
it in this simplied version of heterogeneous preference: Namely, the parameter vector
it = (it; it; i)
0 is specied as it 2

1it; 
2
it
	
,i 2

1it; 
2
it
	
and it 2

1it; 
2
it
	
: The
two types are specied as 1it =
 
1it; 
1
it; 
1
it
0 and 2it =  2it; 2it; 2it0. I dene  it =
it
1+i+it+
i
t
;
it
1+i+it+
i
t
; 
i
1+i+it+
i
t

, for i 2 f1; 2; gg. I draw N (N=10,000) pair of gi ;
git and 
g
it from the parameter distribution of the estimation. I dene the sample means
it = (
i
t; 
i
t; 
i
t); the sample variances 
i
t =
 
it; 
i
t; 
i
t

and the sample covariance
qit =
 
qit; q
i
t; q
i
t
0
; for
 

i
t: The probability that iis type 1 is  and that i is type 2 is
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1  : I get the moments:
gt = 
1
t + (1  )2t (1..15)
gt = 
 
1t
2
+ (1  )  2t 2 (1..16)
and
qgt = 
21t
1
t + (1  )2 2t2t + [(1  )1t2t + 2t1t] (1..17)
Using generalized moment method, I obtain the seven parameters (see Appendix for details).
I use a two-type preference model for the following reasons. (1) The two-type model captures
part of the preference heterogeneity. (2) The two-type model and continuous-type model
have the average utility weight on leisure, child and elder care. (3) Adding more discrete
types increases dimensions causes the calculation time and memory to grow exponentially
with the dimensionality.
Discrete-type and continuous-type models have the same average spending share
on leisure, child care and elder care. The time spending on child care is, for example,
Kit =
Eitt
(1++t+t)wkt
; which is determined by two factors: the share of spending it1+i+it ;
and the shadow price Eit=wkt. The setting of preference type distribution cannot a¤ect the
average share spending on child care. I test the goodness of t of the two-type model by
comparing it with the one-type model and the continuous-type model.
First, I compare the simulation results from the two-type model with the ones from
the one-type model. The one-type model spends more on child care and leisure than the
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two-type model. In autarky case, the average labor supply in one type is 0.25. The average
labor supply in the two-type model is 0.25 in the rst four periods. The di¤erence between
them is approximately 1%. The average labor supply after period 5 is 0.39 in the one-
type model and 0.38 in the two-type model. In the no-commitment case, the average labor
supply in the one-type model is 0.34, and that in the two-type model is 0.34 in the rst
four periods. The di¤erence between them is approximately 1%. The average labor supply
after period 5 is 0.33 in the one-type model and 0.34 in the two-type model. Reducing
types causes the underestimation on the e¤ects of intergenerational relationships on child
and elder care, leisure and labor supply.
Second, I check the goodness of t of the utility weight of the two-type model on
the continuous type model. Therefore, I estimate the average weight on child care in the
continuous distribution and in the two-type model with the estimation results. The utility
weight on it satises a truncated lognormal distribution, and i also meets the truncated
lognormal distribution. In this part, I use a F-test (see Appendix for details) to check
the goodness of the two-type preference model. I obtain the following results: F is 0.69;
F-value is 11,126 and p value is 0. Using the same method, I obtain the value of the F
statistic on leisure F = 0:73; and on elder care F at around 0.49-0.72. All the values have
p values of less than 0.05. The two-type model ts the continuous type model well.
Substitution of Care Service between Market and Household The real price of outside service
is not the entire opportunity cost of using an outside service. In this part, I calculate the
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substitution rate of elder care provided by household members and outside service. The
wage rate paid for the services is not the entirety of this service cost and service quality
varies among di¤erent suppliers. With the information on child and elder care, I obtain the
substitution rate of elder care provided by household members and outside service. I dene
an outside service using dummy oit - if the household uses outside child or elder care service,
the number is 1; if the household uses child or elder care service from household members
but not from the outside market, the number is 0. The substitution rate is , I parametrize
the choice as:
oit =
8>><>>:
1; if pt  wit
0; otherwise
(1..18)
I use maximum likelihood estimation method to estimate the probit model (see Appendix
for details).
Death Rate The household death rate in period t is dened as that the probability that
everyone dies in period t, when the household with at least one household member alive at
period t-1. I use two steps to calculate the household death rate (see Appendix for details).
Parameters for Intertemporal Decisions In this section, I estimate the form of the value
functions in the dynamic problems, by using an approximation method based on simulation
and interpolation. I assume each period represents four years. Grandparents retire at age
4 and parents retire at age 10.18
18According to the Survey on Fertility and Birth Control in China the average age at which females have
their rst child had increased from 22 in 1991 to 28 in 2010. In the model, therefore, grandparents are 24
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Autarky Case The dynamic model is solved by backward recursion19. First, I draw the
asset value and random shocks. I create an asset, wage and price space by drawing 5,000
grids of age varying vectors. Then for each asset level, I use the Gauss-Hermite quadrature
method20 to draw 10 quadrature nodes of income shocks (1t; :::10t) from the estimated dis-
tribution from Equation 1..10. These nodes are chosen by dividing the support of the normal
distribution into 10 equiprobable intervals and then nding the conditional means within
each interval. The quadrature nodes (1t; :::10t), lie in the domain of normal distribution,
and the quadrature weights (W1t; :::W10t) are assigned appropriately to the approximate of
the expected value.
As the problems for the subsequent periods are fundamentally the same, I discuss
only the problem in period t. The basic logic is as follows: I use the estimated expected
value function from the previous period to set up the agents objective function to solve the
problem. After obtaining the solutions, I calculate the autarky value for each asset draw.
Using these coe¢ cients, I construct the estimated expected value function which is used to
solve the t-1 period problem. Then I solve the problems in the same fashion backward until
t=1. The idea is stated formally as laid out below.
Suppose I have already solved for the emax function for age t+1 and the functional
form of the value function V autt+1 (s
p
t+1) is already solved. Given the quadrature nodes, I
calculate vautt (s
p
t ; kt) with respect to s
p
t and kt. Furthermore, in integrating for each value
years older than parents. Parentsfertility age is 28 on average.
19This is the standard approach in this literature. For example, see Keane & Wolpin (1997).
20This method follows the Gauss-Hermite rule in Chapter 7 of Judd (1998).
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of the shock vector, I get the optimal consumption, labor supply, elder care and child care
to derive vautt (s
p
t ; kt): The autarky value is given by:
V autt (s
p
t ) =
10X
k=1
vautt (s
p
t ; kt)Wkt (1..19)
By solving each asset draw, I get the relationship between V autt (s
p
t ) and s
p
t . Then I
use a linear model to approximate the expected value function:
 
V autt (s
p
t ) = $
t
0 +$
t
1 log s
p
t +$
t
2 log p+$
t
3 logw
i
t + t (1..20)
Using linear regression, I obtain the coe¢ cients and the t value. Using backward induction,
I solve the optimization problem for every period. After solving the dynamic problem, I
obtain a sequence of coe¢ cients for value functions. I use such a simple regression form for
two reasons: (1) This simple form captures the fact that the value function is concave; (2)
There is a trade-o¤ in choosing the form of regression. On one hand, making the regression
more complex could possibly improve the predictable power of the regression; on the other
hand, the complex form of regression would make the rst-order conditions for t-1 period
problem quite complex, which is very di¢ cult to solve.
No-commitment Case In the no-commitment case, asset levels sgt and s
p
t ; and consumption
ratio t (Gt)21, are the state variables in period t. A contract places the utility weights
1
t+1
on the parents utility and tt+1 on the grandparents utility before the realization of
income shocks. After the income shocks, the contract allocates income and labor service
21t denes the ex-ante share of the endowment of each household gets. Unique t exists for each Gt;
given sgt and s
p
t ;
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according to the ex-post utility weight, which is determined by the ex-ante utility weights
and incentive constraints. In each state, the contract allocates total endowment according
to the ex-post weights.
I follow the backward recursion method to estimate the value function. Since the
problem for each period is fundamentally the same, I only discuss the problem in period t and
assume that households know the form of the value functions in period t+1. In period t, I
create an asset space by drawing 5,000 pairs of age overall varying assets sgt+s
p
t , consumption
ratio t, and wage rate. Then, for each draw, I use the Gauss-Hermite quadrature method
to draw 10 quadrature nodes for the parent (p1t; :::
p
10t) and 10 quadrature nodes for the
grandparent (g1t; :::
g
10t): For each income shock combination of 
p
lt and 
g
mt, the weight is
WltWmt: The basic logic is as follows: in step 1, I match s
g
t =s
p
t with s
g
t + s
p
t and t; in step
2, I set up the agents objective function and obtain the optimal choices at each state; in
step 3, I calculate the value function of the agent for each asset draw, and identify the form
of value functions. The second and third steps follow the same estimation method in the
autarky case.
The rst step reduces the number of state variables from three to two by matching
sgt =s
p
t , with s
g
t + s
p
t and t: In proposition 4, the ex-post marginal utility ratio of period t is
equal to the ex-ante marginal utility ratio in period t+1, such that:
cgtjz=c
p
tjz = E
 
1=cpt+1

=E
 
1=cgt+1

(1..21)
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and
t = E
 
1=cpt+1

=E
 
1=cgt+1

(1..22)
which dene the law of motion of the consumption ratio. A unique sgt =s
p
t exists for each
pair of sgt + s
p
t and t. Using the two equations and incentive constraints, I can identify
the ex-post utility weight in each state, and match sgt =s
p
t with s
g
t + s
p
t and t. The state
variables of the contract become sgt +s
p
t and t. I then dene the ex-post consumption ratio
on the grandparent jzt, so that
jzt =
@P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )
@Gt+1jz
; (1..23)
and
jzt = c
g
tjz=c
p
tjz; (1..24)
with income shocks pkt and 
g
kt: In the optimal contract with s
g
t and s
p
t , a lower bound  jzt
exists, with the grandparents incentive constraint binding; and a higher bound
 
jzt exists,
with the parents incentive constraint binding. Between the two bounds, jzt = t:  jzt
is
strictly increasing and
 
jzt is strictly decreasing on s
g
t =s
p
t : Since jzt is a function of s
g
t =s
p
t ,
I get:
m (sgt =s
p
t ) =
10X
l=1
10X
m=1

WltWmtjzt=c
g
tjz

=
10X
l=1
10X
m=1

WltWmt=c
g
tjz

  t (1..25)
Using the moment m (sgt =s
p
t ) = 0, I use GMM method to nd the unique s
g
t /s
p
t for each pair
of sgt + s
p
t and t.
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The second step is to solve the agents objective function for each pair of pkt and
gkt: First, without taking incentive constraints into consideration, I set the ex-post con-
sumption ratio
~
jzt = t: I use
~
jzt to get the utility value weight on each household and
use a rst order approach to solve the problem. With the solution, I get
~
gt(s
p
t ; s
g
t ; 
p
kt; 
g
kt) and
~
pt(s
p
t ; s
g
t ; 
p
kt; 
g
kt). I then take the incentive constraints into consideration. If
~
gt(s
p
t ; s
g
t ; 
p
kt; 
g
kt) <
vautgt (s
g
t ; 
g
kt); I set the grandparents incentive constraint binding, and the parent gets all
the Pareto gain. If
~
pt(s
p
t ; s
g
t ; 
p
kt; 
g
kt) < v
aut
pt (s
p
t ; 
p
kt); I set the parents incentive constraint
binding, and the grandparent gets all the Pareto gain. Otherwise, gt(s
p
t ; s
g
t ; 
p
kt; 
g
kt) =
~
gt(s
p
t ; s
g
t ; 
p
kt; 
g
kt); and pt(s
p
t ; s
g
t ; 
p
kt; 
g
kt) =
~
pt(s
p
t ; s
g
t ; 
p
kt; 
g
kt). In this step, I get gt(s
g
t ; s
p
t ; t; 
g
z; 
p
j )
and pt(s
g
t ; s
p
t ; t; 
g
z; 
p
j ) for each pair of 
p
kt and 
g
kt:
The third step is to calculate the ex-ante value functions for each pair of assets and
consumption ratio, and get the function form. With the gt(s
g
t ; s
p
t ; t; 
g
z; 
p
j ) and pt(s
g
t ; s
p
t ; t; 
g
z; 
p
j )
from solved from the previous step, the value functions for each asset and consumption ratio
draw is the following:
Gt (sgt ; s
p
t ; t) =
10X
l=1
10X
m=1
h
gt(s
g
t ; s
p
t ; 
g
z; 
p
j )WltWmt
i
; (1..26)
and
P t (sgt ; s
p
t ; t) =
10X
l=1
10X
m=1
h
pt(s
g
t ; s
p
t ; 
g
z; 
p
j )WltWmt
i
: (1..27)
I get the expected value functions for each pair of sgt+s
p
t and t. By solving each asset draw,
I get the relationship between value functions and state variables, given the income shock
38
distribution. I then use a log linear function to approximate the expected value function:
Gt (sgt ; s
p
t ; t) = '
t
0 + '
t
1 log(s
g
t + s
p
t ) + '
t
2 log t
+'t3 log p+ '
t
4 logw
p
t + '
t
5 logw
g
t + 
g
t (1..28)
and
P t (sgt ; s
p
t ; t) = 
t
0 + 
t
1 log(s
g
t + s
p
t ) + 
t
2 log t
+t3 log p+ 
t
4 logw
p
t + 
t
5 logw
g
t + 
p
t (1..29)
Using regression, I get the coe¢ cients and t values. Starting at t=20, I use backward
recursion to solve the problems.
Full-commitment Case The full-commitment case chooses a constant utility weight on each
household in every state. The estimation of a full-commitment case model is the same as
the estimation of a no-commitment case model, but the consumption ratio is xed. For each
period, I create an asset space by drawing 5,000 pairs of age overall varying asset sgt + s
p
t ,
consumption ratio t, wages, and price, and estimate the form of value functions.
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1.6 Data
Data and Sample Selection I use data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey22
(CHNS) and the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS)23 to perform
structural estimation.
The CHNS is a longitudinal survey project collected 11 waves since 1989. The survey
took place over a 3-day period using a multistage, random cluster process to draw a sample
of about 4,400 households with a total of 26,000 individuals in nine provinces that vary
substantially in geography, economic development, public resources, and health indicators.
In addition, detailed community data were collected through surveys on food markets,
health facilities, and other social services. A multistage-random cluster process was used
to draw the samples surveyed in each of the provinces. Counties in the 15 provinces24 were
stratied by income (low, middle, and high), and a weighted sampling scheme was used to
randomly select 4 counties in each province. A provincial capital and a lower-income city
were also selected when feasible. CHNS tracks the households that in previous samples. In
the summary statistics, I divided the whole sample into 2 periods. Group 1 is the 2000-2004
sample and group 2 is the 2006-2011 sample. I use group 2 in my estimation. I restrict the
22CHNS data is an international collaborative project between the Carolina Population Center
at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the National Institute for Nutrition and
Health at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. The o¢ cial website of CHNS is:
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china
23CHARLS is a project of China Center for Economic Research. The data is based on the Health and
Retirement Study and related aging surveys such as the English Longitudinal Study of Aging and the Survey
of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe. The o¢ cial website of CHARLS is: http://charls.ccer.edu.cn/en
24The provinces are Beijing, Chongqing, Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu,
Liaoning, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanghai, Yunnan, and Zhejiang.
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analysis to females who are at least 20 years old. I use the CHNS data to identify the utility
weight on child care and leisure, wage rate, and the non-working income distribution.
CHARLS is a biennial survey that aims to represent of the residents of China aged 45
and older, with no upper age limit. The national baseline sample size is 10,287 households
and 17,708 individuals, covering 150 counties in 28 provinces. The baseline of the CHARLS
pilot took place in two provinces in fall of 2008. The rst national baseline wave was
elded from 2011 to 2012. Wave 2 was elded in 2013. The household survey includes
demographic background, household information, health status and functioning, health care
and insurance, work information, household and individual income, expenditure and assets.
I use CHARLS data to identify the utility weight on elder care, health spending distribution,
and age patterns of transfer and support.
The death rate data are from the National Population and Reproductive Health
Science Data Center25. I use the data of 2005 to get the death rate for the data before 2008
and the data of 2010 to get the death rate of the years following 2008 (see Appendix for
details)..
Descriptive Statistics Table 1 describes the working and income information. The data on
female working choices indicates that, between 2000 and 2011, the average working rate
decreased from 72% to 62%. Figure 1 reports the average female working time by age for
25The National Population and Reproductive Health Science Data Center calculated death rate by
using the data from the National Census of Population in 1982, 1990, 2000, and 2010. The center
calculated death rate the average death rate by age for each gender in China. Data retrieve from:
http://www.poprk.org/metadata/detail/254
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various periods. The result indicates that females in urban areas decrease their working
time before they reach the age of 50, which is much earlier than the legal retirement age.
These households in the CHNS data are getting older and give a higher weight to the
older population, which reduces the average employment rate. The rst graph in Figure 2
shows the income rate distribution by age cohort. The development of education system
enables the younger generations to receive better education than their parents. The younger
generations are more productive and less likely to work in the agricultural sector. Therefore,
they have higher incomes than the older generations. In the sample, 7,950 females between
the age of 20 and 70 have both working time and working income information. Table 1
shows that the average working time is 0.33 and the average female income rate is about
50,000 yuan.
Table 1 contains summary statistics on transfer, child care and elder care (see Table
7 in the Appendix for details). About 15% of people older than 60 years old age take care of
their grandchildren during the survey period. Only 19% of households use outside child care
service. Figure 3 reports the change in transfer and support change by the grandparents
age. Both support and transfer from parent to grandparent increase as the grandparent
gets older. Grandparents take care of their grandchildren before the age of 60 and are
being taken care of by parents after age 70. The net value of transfer at age 45 is 0, and it
increases to about 12,000 yuan at age 90.
Table 1 also describes the household characteristics (see Table 8 in the Appendix for
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details). For most households, the most important asset is house. The average asset26 level
is 423,270 Yuan in CHARLS and 455,223 Yuan in CHNS. The average consumption level is
30,316 Yuan in CHARLS and 31,774 Yuan in CHNS. CHARLS have more information about
asset level and consumption27. Therefore, the consumption level in CHARLS is higher than
that in CHNS. I use the mean and variance of the net non-working income28 distribution
in CHNS data to draw the net nonworking income in simulation. Using the information on
non-working income, working income and health spending, I calculate the household net
non-working income of 27,495 yuan on average.
Parameter Values This section reports the estimation results. The initial female working
income rate is given in Table 2. In period 1, the average parents wage rate is 55,457 yuan
and the average grandparents wage is 59,519 yuan. Grandparents wage is higher than that
of parents on average. After the second period, As wages grow, the average wage of parents
is higher than that of grandparents. To draw the wage rate in the simulation, I estimate
the correlation between each pair of wage rates wp0 and wg0 by matching the households
of the parent and grandparent in the CHNS data. The correlation I nd between wp0 and
wg0 is 0.46. I use the wage growth rate from 2006 to 2011 to obtain the predicted wage rate
in the benchmark simulation. From the regression of the working income rate (see Table
26Figure 4 in the Appendix reports asset levels by age. In the data, the asset level reaches its highest
point at age 55.
27CHNS does not have information about nancial assets and household spending on clothes and trans-
portation. CHARLS has all the information.
28Table 2 in the Appendix reports the distribution of net non-working income of various age groups.
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9 in the Appendix for details), the coe¢ cient on age is 0.056; the coe¢ cient on age square
is -0.0007. The highest working income rate among all age cohorts in this period is age
40. I use the wage growth rate from 2000 to 2004 as the second wage structure to verify
to the e¤ect of the wage structure on labor supply. The coe¢ cient on age is 0.082 and the
coe¢ cient on age square is -0.0008. The highest working income rate among all age cohorts
in this period is age 50.
Table 2 presents the main estimation results of the preference parameters. The
rst set of columns shows the results of the random coe¢ cient linear regression model
specications. The rst and second columns are the mean and variance of the vector of
constants t, and the third column is the vector of stationary random variables it: Table 2
shows that the utility weights on elder care increase by age. t is 0.06 before 72, increases
to 0.20 from 72 to 80, and is 0.52 after 85. The utility weight on child care is 0.31 and
that on leisure is 0.88. The second and third set of columns shows two types of preference
results from linear regression model specications. Type 1 households have less weight in
leisure, but more weight in child care and elder care than type 2. The estimation result
shows that 42% of households are type 1 and 58% are type 2. So, in both no-commitment
and full-commitment cases, 34% of parents and grandparents are type 1; 18% are both type
2; 24% have type 1 grandparents and type 2 parents; and 24% have type 1 parents and
type 2 grandparents. Table 2 also reports that the substitution rate between outside child
care service and household child service is 2.5, and the substitution rate between outside
elder care service and household elder service is 1.9. I assume that the discount factor  is
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0:97, which corresponds to a rate of time preference of 3% per year. I assume that the real
interest rate R is 1.01, which corresponds to the average interest rate in China from 2006
to 2013 (World Bank 2016).
1.7 Life-Cycle Fit
In this part, I use simulation to predict householdsdecisions on savings and labor
supply along the life-cycle. The parameters have been presented in the previous section.
The simulation focuses on household choices within the intergenerational relationship. So,
in the section and policy analysis section, I only consider the household behavior within the
contract. The estimated results indicate the average number of the entire sample.
Simulation Procedure To create the simulation sample, I draw a random sample of 5,000
pairs of savings according to the parametrization described above. Using the simulation
results, I o¤er some economic intuition related to the life-cycle proles of household labor
supply, transfer, support and savings from the model. From the CHNS data, I draw the
initial wage rate wp0 of parents using the wage rate distribution of females ages 20 to 23 and
draw the initial wage rate wg0 of grandparents using the wage rate distribution of females ages
from 41 to 45. The correlation between wg0 and w
p
0 is 0.46. Using the parameters from the
wage growth equation, I obtain individual is predicted wage rate wit at time t. The average
real child care and elder care market service cost is 62,500 yuan29. The non-working income
29By calculation, I get the average child care price is 24,889 Yuan, and the average elder care price is
31,903 Yuan. The substitute rate between outside child care service and household child service is 2.5, and
the substitution rate between outside elder care service and household elder service is 1.9. I assume both
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is drawn according to the distribution of the net non-working income30. From the CHNS
data, I draw parentsinitial asset level sp0 using the asset distribution of females ages 20 to 23
and draw grandparentsinitial asset level sg0 using the asset distribution of females ages from
41 to 45. In period 0, the average initial asset level of grandparents is 375,000 yuan, while
the average initial asset level of parents is 75,000 yuan. The correlation between sg0 and s
p
0 is
0.53. For everyone in the sample, the simulation uses: three xed individual characteristics
(working income rate, non-working income distribution, and care service price), three initial
state variables (parentssavings, grandparentssavings and consumption ratio).
The initial consumption ratio is dened by assuming both households divide the
ex-ante Pareto gains equally before they join the contract:
1 = argmax

G1   V aut1 (sp1)
 1
2

P 1
 
sg1; s
p
1; G
1
  V aut1 (sg1) 12 (1..30)
In each period, I draw the income shock from the net non-working income distribution of
each pair of households. I then solve the optimal contract, given the consumption ratio and
the savings: Next, I nd out the consumption share in period t according Equations 1..23
and 1..24. Using Equation 1..11, I get:
sgt+1 + s
p
t+1 =
A1 (E
p
t + E
g
t )
jztA2 +A3
(1..31)
Here A1 = 
 
1  t+7
  
jzt'
t
1 + 
t
1

+ tt+7$
t
1

is the weight on overall saving; jztA2 =
jzt
 
1 + t+6 + t+6 + t+6

is the weight on the grandparentsutility level; A3 = 1+t+
prices are 62,500 yuan.
30The distribution of net non-working income by age is shown in Table 2 in the Appendix.
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t + t is the weight on parents utility level. By Equations 1..12 and 1..13, I can get
the spending on each term. By matching sgt+1=s
p
t+1 with s
g
t+1 + s
p
t+1 and jzt;according
to Equations 1..21 and 1..22, I get sgt+1 and s
p
t+1; and go to next period. Using the same
method, I get the predicted values from period 1 to 20.
No-commitment Case Fits Data Better The no-commitment case model ts the data better
than the full-commitment case and the autarky case. To illustrate this point, I compare
the actual average working time, savings, child care, and elder care choices from the data
predicted by the no-commitment model. Table 3 presents the actual and predicted values
of the no-commitment case on labor and savings as well as other measures. The dynamic
model reasonably predicts the working, leisure, transfer and saving choices. The chi-square
goodness of t tests does not reject the null hypothesis that these values are di¤erent.
The no-commitment case ts the data on labor supply. The autarky case fails to
explain the age pattern of female supply. The decline in the female labor supply before
retirement age does not occur in the autarky case. Figure 1 shows that the female working
time of the rural31 population aged 40-45 decreases from about from 0.4 to 0.1, which
is about 5 years earlier than the legal retirement age. Figure 5 displays the simulation
results on labor supply32. In the autarky case, the labor supply of grandparents decreases
smoothly until the legal retirement age. In both the no-commitment and full-commitment
31 I dene rural households and urban households by the householdsHukou. A Hukou is resident recording
systems required by law in China. Hukou o¢ cially identies a person as a resident of an area, and rural or
urban resident.
32Table 3 in the Appendix shows the simulated value of the labor supply by age.
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cases, grandparents work less to provide more care for their grandchildren from period 1 to
period 433, and parents work less to provide more elder care from period 5 to period 1034.
The combination of the two e¤ects causes the decline in labor supply before retirement age
in the data. Labor support through intergenerational relationships changes the labor supply
of both parents and grandparents. In addition, in the autarky case, parents provide child
care and work less. The scenario is not shown in the data and the no-commitment case,
because grandparents take care of grandchildren in both settings. Without intergenerational
relationships, the autarky case cannot explain the age patterns of female labor supply. The
no-commitment case under predicts the e¤ect of intergenerational relationships on the labor
supply before retirement age. The second graph in Figure 5 compares the age patterns of
labor supply from the simulation and data. In reality, parents also need to take care of
their own grandchildren. My model ignores the problems on grandchild caring on the
part of parents. Without the grandchild care problem, the labor supply of parents from
simulation is larger than that in the data at around age 50.
The no-commitment case ts the data on saving. The full-commitment case can-
not make predictions on the savings of a single household. In the full-commitment case,
which is free of incentive problems, only the overall savings and consumption ratio matter
33Figure 1 in the Appendix compares the female labor supply of the households with and without children.
In this part, I dene the female without children, as a household that does not have children and whose
householdsmembers were at least 35 years old before 2004. 1,465 females meet this standard and 9,415
females have at least one child.
34Figure 2 of Appendix compares the female labor supply of the households with and without parents alive.
In this part, I dene the female without a parent as a household that does not have parents or parents-in-law.
1,565 females meet this standard, while 6,923 females have at least one living parent or parent-in-law.
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in the allocation of income and labor. Without a bequest tax, the saving allocation of
the two households has no e¤ects on working, child care, and elder care decisions in the
full-commitment case. In the no-commitment case, a single households saving determines
the outside option of the contract and a¤ect the endowment allocation between house-
holds; a unique savings-share rate exists in each state. Without a single households saving
information, I can only identify the labor supply, child care, and elder care decisions in
full-commitment contract. The no-commitment case model predicts saving35 better at the
later stages of the relationship. The second graph of Figure 6 compares the age patterns of
saving from simulation and data. The simulation results of the no-commitment case t the
data well in the later stages of the relationship. In the data, some parents cohabitate with
the grandparents and thus their assets cannot be separated. Therefore, parents are given a
high average asset level during the earlier periods of the relationship.
Choices of Transfer and Support across Periods Householdssavings and wage rates deter-
mines the choices and intensity of support and transfer. Figure 7 illustrates the simulated
net transfer and support value36 by age in the no-commitment case. At the early stages,
parents are less motivated to use transfer exchange bequests, because the grandparents
death rate is low. Without a bequest incentive in the rst three periods, the net transfer
and support values are only above zero. But as the grandparents grow older and are more
35Figure 4 in the Appendix shows the simulated value of saving by age.
36The net transfer and care support value are dened by net transfer plus labor support value. Labor
support value is dened by the support hour time support opportunity cost.
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likely to die, bequests are more likely to occur. During the rst three periods, parents pay
transfers to grandparentschild care. After period 4, bequest incentives are mainly changed
by two forces: the grandparentsdeath rate, which increases by age, and asset level, which
decreases by age after period 4. From period 4 to period 10, the rst force dominates the
second force. The bequest incentive increases and the net transfer value grows from period
4 to period 9. After period 10, the second force dominates the rst force, and the net
transfers and support value decreasing by age. The age patterns of endowment composition
t the actual data well, as showed in Figure 3. The endowment composition determines the
intensity of support and transfer.
Figure 7 also indicates the composition change of transfer and support by age. The
bequest incentives and coinsurance a¤ect the overall net transfer and support value in the
contracts. The composition of transfer and support changes across the periods. The wage
structure determines whether the household chooses support or transfer to help one another.
At the early stage of the relationship, because grandparentswage rates are lower than those
of parents and the outside care service rates, grandparents become the primary child care
providers. Parents use transfer to pay for the support. After period 5, when grandparents
need elder care and parentswage is lower than the service price, parents use an outside elder
care service and transfer in exchange for future bequests. After period 10, when parents
are no longer able to provide elder care and work, they only use transfers in exchange for
bequests. The age patterns of the intensity of transfer and support t the actual data (see
Figure 3).
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E¤ect of Wage Structure on Labor Supply Wage structure a¤ects labor supply by deter-
mining the choices of child and elder (see Table 10 in the Appendix for details). Figure
5 describes the simulated results of labor supply of the no-commitment, autarky, and full-
commitment cases. Given the wage structure and service price, in the autarky case, parents
provide child care by themselves and grandparents acquire elder care service from the mar-
ket. In the no-commitment and full-commitment cases, parents use grandparentschild care
service and grandparents use parentselder care service. Figure 5 presents the di¤erence
in the labor supply between the full-commitment and no-commitment cases. In the full-
commitment case, households provide more assistance to each other. Grandparents provide
more child care and parents give more elder care in the full commitment case than the
no-commitment case. In the full-commitment contract, the labor supply of parents is about
5% higher before period 4 and 5% lower after period 5 than that in the no-commitment
case. Grandparents substitute the parents for child care in the contract, parents labor
supply increases by 26%, and grandparent labor supply decreases by 19% in the rst 4
periods, compared to the autarky case. However, when grandparents grow older, parents
labor supply is 13% less than that in the autarky case.
The wage structures inuence labor supply by a¤ecting the householdselder care
and child care choices. To help understand how the wage structure changes the labor supply
behavior, I add a new wage structure, which is presented in the second graph in Figure 2. In
the new wage structure, parents become the primary child care providers (details see Table
10 in the Appendix). In the contracts, parents labor supply does not vary signicantly
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compared with that in autarky case in the rst 3 periods. The wage structure determines
who the primary care providers are, which a¤ects whether or not the substitution a¤ects
on labor supply exist in intergenerational relationships. In a fast-growing economy, such as
China and India, younger generations have higher wages rate than the older ones. In these
countries, intergenerational relationships have greater e¤ects on the labor supply than other
countries.
Richer Gets More Transfer and Support Richer households have more resources for exchange
in intergenerational relationships than poor households. Grandparents use bequests in
exchange for parents income and labor service in contracts. Bequest motives encourage
grandparents to save more in the contracts than in the autarky cases. Figure 6 describes the
simulated results of savings. Grandparents save more in the no-commitment case than in the
autarky case. Besides, grandparents obtain a higher utility level of securing less expensive
elder care, greater income and labor service from the intergenerational relationship, and
therefore greater saving more money to save. Grandparents save, on average, 19% more in
the no-commitment case than the autarky case (see Table 10 in the Appendix for details).
Bequests discourage parents to save in the no-commitment case. Parents save 6% less
on average in the no-commitment case than in the autarky case. In the no-commitment
case, when grandparents die, bequests increase parentssavings in future. Bequests reduce
the marginal utility of savings, and reduce parents motivation to save. Bequests increase
grandparentsbut decrease parentssavings.
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To conrm the e¤ect of the incentive problem on household decisions, I conduct two
experiments. In the rst experiment, I change the average initial asset level of grandparents
from 375,000 to 125,000 and leave parents initial saving unchanged. Grandparents have
small bequest in exchange for parentsincome and elder care service. Figure 8 presents the
change in transfer and labor supply brought about by the adjustment. The rst gure shows
the new predicted values of transfer and support. The average net transfer and support
value decreases from around 15,000 to around 5,000. The transfer value is negative in some
periods. Grandparents use both bequest and transfer in exchange for parentselder care
support, as bequests are not enough to meet the demand for elder care. Parents works
more, when the grandparents have only a small savings. The second graph in Figure 8
indicates the e¤ect of the asset change on labor supply. In the rst 4 periods, grandparents
provide more child care than the benchmark setting. Parents receive more child care from
grandparents, thus increasing their working time. After period 4, the bequest incentive is
weakened by low level asset level. Parents working time increases by about 10%. In the
second experiment, I leave the initial assets and other parameters unchanged. I select a
pair of grandparent and parent by drawing the initial assets and wage rates level from the
distributions. I set a xed income and asset path before period 5. I assume 2 cases in period
5. In the no-commitment case, grandparents with good income shock obtains 13% greater
elder care service from parents than those with a bad income shock. The good income shock
increases the labor supply of parents by 7%. In the full-commitment case, the grandparent
with good income shock gets 3% less elder care service from parent than those with bad
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income shock. The good income shock decreases the labor supply of parents by 2%.
The motive source a¤ects households transfer and support behavior in intergen-
erational relationships. In the no-commitment cases, coinsurance and bequest a¤ect the
amount of support and transfer that households provide to one another. These factors es-
tablish the intensity of mutual aid and the size of the e¤ects on labor supply. Households
transfer money and support one another in exchange for current or future income, and
labor service of others. In poor economic conditions, households with smaller endowments
exchange transfer and support from other households. Thus households with fewer assets
obtain less support and transfer in the no-commitment contracts. The result is opposite to
the prediction of the standard altruistic models, in which poorer households obtain more
help in intergenerational relationships37. In the altruistic models, households help others
to increase their own utility level by increasing other households utility. Households with
fewer assets obtain more help from the others. The di¤erences in the motives for transfer
and support cause the di¤ering predictions of the two models.
Heterogeneous Responses Intergenerational relationships have a greater inuence on house-
holds with more demand on care service than on those with less. Figure 9 shows the changes
in labor supply change caused by intergenerational relationships between type 1 1 house-
holds (in which both households are type 1) and 22 households (in which both households
are type 2). Intergenerational relationships have a more signicant e¤ect on the labor sup-
37Parents account both for the individual and relative economic position of their children and give them
transfers or sharing of inheritance to their children unequally (Schanzenbach & Sitko¤ 2008).
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ply of type 1  1 households, because type 1 households need more child and elder care
than type 2 households (see Table 10 in the Appendix for details). In periods 1 to 4, inter-
generational relationships increase the labor supply of type 1 1 parents by 40%, increase
that of type 2 2 parents by 2%, and decrease that of type 1 1 grandparents by 7%, and
increases that of type 2 2 grandparents by 19% .
The demand for child care and elder care inuences the e¤ect of intergenerational
relationships on labor supply. Intergenerational relationships have great impact on the labor
supply of households with a high utility weight on child care or elder care.
1.8 Policy Analysis
To illustrate how household labor supply, savings, child care, elder care and transfer
rates change as the public policies, I calculate the percentage changes in these measures as
I impose the policies. The settings of death rate, income process, and wage structures are
the same as the benchmark settings in the previous section.
Child Care and Elder Care Subsidies This section shows the e¤ect of child care and elder
care service subsidies on labor supply decisions. Keeping other parameters and settings
constant, I compare the choices of households facing zero subsidy, 10% subsidy, and 20%
subsidy on elder or baby care service purchased from the market and a 20% subsidy on
both elder and child care service (see Table 11 in the Appendix for details).
The 20% care service subsidy has a much greater impact on labor supply than the
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10% care service subsidy. Figure 10 illustrates the simulated e¤ects of the subsidy on both
kinds of care services. With a 10% care subsidy, the service price remains higher than most
of femaleswages. However, with a 20% subsidy, most parentsand grandparentswages
are higher than the price of outside service. The 10% care subsidy increases parentsand
grandparentslabor supply by only 6%. The 20% care subsidy increases the grandparents
labor supply by 41%. Child care subsidy a¤ects grandparentslabor supply in the earlier
stages. Elder care subsidy a¤ects labor supply at the later stages of the contract. The
20% child care service subsidy increases the labor supply of younger females by 24% in
the autarky case and by 10% in the no-commitment case. The subsidy increases the labor
supply of older females by 39% from period 1 to period 3. The 20% elder care service
subsidy increases the labor supply of younger females by 13% in the no-commitment case
after period 4.
Child care and elder care subsidies a¤ect the labor supply of both households. When
grandmothers are the primary child care providers, the low-cost market service can substi-
tute for grandmothers in the provision of child care. The substitution increases the labor
supply of old females. An elder care subsidy can a¤ect the labor supply of parents. When
the mothers are the primary elder care providers, the low-cost market service substitute for
the mothers in the provision of elder care. Moreover, the labor supply of young females also
increase. Child care and elder care service subsidies reduce the demand for support through
intergenerational relationships by encouraging households to utilize the formal care service.
The subsidies increase the femaleslabor supply, when the subsidized service price is lower
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than the care providerswages.
Delay Mandatory Retirement Age This section presents the e¤ects of delaying the manda-
tory retirement age on labor supply and saving decisions of households. Keeping other
settings unchanged, I delay the retirement age from age 9 to 10. The mandatory retirement
ages of females are between 55 and 60 years old in China (see Figure 7 in the Appendix for
the details). In 2015, Chinas Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security announced
a new retirement plan to delay the mandatory retirement age to 65 years old in the 2020s
38. Therefor, female labor supply is predicted to change because of the new retirement plan
(see Table 11 in the Appendix for details).
With the benchmark wage structure, retirement delay causes a insignicant e¤ect
on labor supply. In this part, the working income rate follows the growth rate of age as
described in Table 4. Figure 11 shows the simulated e¤ects on retirement delay. In the
benchmark wage structure, grandparentswage is lower than parentswage and the service
price. Before and after the policy is changed, grandmothers are always the primary child
care providers. Delaying the retirement age has limited e¤ects on the baby care choice, as
well as the labor supply of grandparents and parents. The policy reduces the parentslabor
only by 8% with the benchmark wage structure.
As I narrow the wage gap between parents and grandparents, the retirement delay
38The Chinese government plans to take pressure o¤ the nations increasingly strained pension system by
gradually raising retirement ages for the nations millions of workers between 2017 and 2022. The nations
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security has declared that eligibility ages for men, women, urban
workers and farmers will be raised in steps by adding "several months every year" to the age which pension
payments can begin. (Shi, Xu, Zhang & Yao 2015)
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causes a large e¤ect on labor supply. The wage structure39 has a small wage gap between
young and old females. The retirement delay has di¤erent e¤ects on the new wage set-
ting. Delaying the mandatory retirement age remove grandmother from child care. The
retirement delay decreases parentslabor supply and increases grandparentslabor supply
in period 4. Delaying the retirement age reduces parentslabor supply by 43% in period 4.
The wage structure determines the e¤ect of delaying the mandatory retirement age.
In an economy with rapid human capital growth, younger generations have higher human
capital level and wage rate than the elders. Elder females reduce their labor supply before
the legal retirement age, to provide child care to their grandchildren. Delaying retirement
age only has limited e¤ects on femaleslabor supply. In an economy with slow human capital
growth, the wide wage gap between old and young recedes. Delaying the retirement age
removes the retired grandparents from child care, and parents decrease their labor supply to
provide child care. Delaying the retirement age has great e¤ects on reducing young females
labor supply.
Inheritance Tax This section states the e¤ect of inheritance tax on household labor supply
and saving decisions. In the benchmark setting, households face zero inheritance tax40.
Keep the other parameters and setting unchanged, I estimate the households responses
with the 30% inheritance tax.
39The structure experiment uses the wage structure of 2000-2004, in which 50 years old has the highest
income rate among all ages.
40China proposed inheritance tax law in 2004 but has not yet been able to introduce it due to widespread
opposition.
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Inheritance tax increases grandparentssavings in no-commitment cases. Figure 12
shows the simulated e¤ects of inheritance tax on saving and labor supply. As the death
rate before the period 4 is small, bequest is not likely to occur during these periods. The
inheritance law only has few e¤ects on householdssaving labor supply behavior. However,
after that period, with fewer bequest from grandparents, parents provide less elder care and
transfer than the benchmark case. The inuence of intergenerational relationships on labor
supply is less than that in the benchmark case. The policy increases parentslabor supply
by 9%. Taxation weakens the crowd out e¤ects of bequest on saving, therefore parents save
about 17% more than the benchmark case. Inheritance tax also reduces grandparentsex-
pected consumption level by reducing the exchanged support and care service from parents.
Grandparents save about 19% more than the benchmark.
By weakening the bequest incentives, inheritance taxes a¤ects households saving
behavior and indirectly a¤ects labor supply decisions. Bequests give incentives for parents to
transfer money and provide elder care to grandparents. Inheritance tax reduces the net value
of the bequest in exchange for parentssupport and transfer. It causes less transfer and elder
care from parents to grandparents. The tax indirectly increases the labor supply of parents
at the later stage of the relationship. Grandparents increase their saving rate to maintain
bequest incentives. It may o¤set part of the direct labor supply increasing e¤ects caused
by inheritance tax. In contrast to the no-commitment case, inheritance tax increases the
intensity of transfer and support in the full-commitment case. In the full-commitment case,
grandparents prefer to transfer all the money to parents before death to avoid inheritance
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tax. Without incentive problems, inheritance tax increases the transfer from grandparents
to parents at the early stages and the transfer from parents to grandparents at the late
stages. Grandparents save more to sustain the bequest incentive for parents to provide
transfer and support after introducing the inheritance tax.
1.9 Conclusion
This article develops a non-altruistic dynamic contract to analyze how intergenera-
tional relationships a¤ect householdslabor supply and saving behavior in the presence of
idiosyncratic income shocks and death uncertainty. A distinguishing feature of the model
is the use of economic benets only to sustain intergenerational relationships. From closed
form equilibrium allocations, it is straightforward to derive rule of income and labor ser-
vice allocations within the relationship across time. This article adopts a rst step toward
showing how do the economic factors of intergenerational relationships a¤ect households
behavior throughout a life-cycle. The framework can be extended to incorporate fertility
decisions and life cycle human capital development. The theoretical framework sheds light
on a range of questions in which marriage, child care, elder care and fertility are central to
the analysis.
My empirical results suggest that intergenerational relationships increase young fe-
maleslabor supply by 32% and decrease elder femaleslabor supply by 21% in China. The
choices of support and transfer depend on wage structure and market care service price on
extensive margins. Householdssavings and wage rates determine the intensity of support
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and transfer of intensive margins. The rapid human capital level growth contributes to
the strong intergenerational relations and high labor market participation rate in China.
The article ignores human capital development and migration decisions for simplication
purposes; this condition may underestimate the e¤ects of intergenerational relationships
on labor supply. Strong intergenerational relationships contribute the over-investment on
childrens education and large scale temporary migration in China. Studying the e¤ects
of intergenerational relationships on human capital investment and migration decisions is
promising direction for future research.
A further step I take is to quantify the spillover e¤ects of public policies through in-
tergenerational relationships. I discover that child care subsidies increase the labor supply of
grandparents and that elder care subsidies also increase the labor supply of parents. Inher-
itance taxes increase householdssavings rate by reducing the bequest incentives. Delaying
mandatory retirement age only has limited e¤ects on female labor supply when grandmoth-
ers are the primary child care providers, but has big e¤ects when mothers are the primary
child care providers. These ndings illustrate the importance of modeling intergenerational
relationships and household decisions simultaneously. Ignoring the connections between
households of di¤erent generations can lead to incomplete forecasts of the e¤ects of some
policy changes.
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CHAPTER 2.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND HOUSEHOLD EDUCATION
INVESTMENT
To evaluate the distribution e¤ects of AA on di¤erent groups, we have to understand
households strategic reactions on the rule of college seats allocation In Chapter 2, using a
Chinese household survey and a dataset of college enrollment information, I exam how do
households with heterogeneous talent and endowment to compete for di¤erent level of college
seats, and check the impact of on human capital inequality between and within region. I
investigate householdsschooling investment responses to AA and college expansion. Using
a Chinese household survey data and a college enrollment data, I examine the manner in
which households with heterogeneous talents and endowments compete for separate levels
of college seats. Using the number of new colleges and the number of college enrollment in
the neighboring provinces as the instrument variables for the provincial enrollment ratio, I
nd that on average, higher enrollment ratios encourage households to invest in education.
The e¤ect of encouragement is greater for advantaged households with better education
level and higher income level. In the long-term, college expansion has a signicant e¤ect
on improving advantaged householdseducation level and income level. I nd that AA and
the college expansion widen the education and income disparity within each region.
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2.1 Introduction
his article studies householdseducation investment responses to AA. AA in college
admissions provides di¤erent educational opportunities to diverse groups. The existing lit-
erature has not considered the implications of AA for households reactions to changes in
educational opportunities. Universities allocate seats according to studentsexamination
scores and other human capital outputs. Households invest money and time on education,
accordance with their income, abilities, and competitorsconditions. The di¤erence in edu-
cational opportunities as results of AA shapes householdseducation investment decisions.
Within an AA targeted group, students and households have considerable di¤erences in tal-
ent and endowment. Households in the same group may have di¤erent reactions to changes
in educational opportunities. The reactions of households depend on the strategic moves
of competitors, as well as the endowment and talent distribution within each group. Thus,
this study addresses the following questions:
1. How do householdseducation investment decisions respond to the changes in educa-
tional opportunities or AA?
2. How do households respond to changes in educational opportunities change with re-
spect to their endowment and talent?
3. How do the changes in educational opportunities or AA a¤ect the education and
income disparity within each group?
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This study uses the college expansion in China after 1998 as a natural experiment to
study the manner in which householdseducation investment decisions respond to changes
in educational opportunities. The admission system of the National College Entrance Ex-
amination (NCEE) is an AA system that allocates college seats by region. The college
expansion provides an exogenous change in educational opportunity. This study uses the
variations in the expansions across regions and time to identify the e¤ects of changes in the
enrollment ratio on education investment. I have concluded that generally, increasing the
college enrollment ratio increases education spending. Households with better education
level, and higher household income level or urban Hukou1 are more sensitive to changes in
enrollment rate. In the long term, college expansion and AA widen the education and the
income gap within each province.
Using Chinese data to investigate these topics has several advantages. (1) The signal
of educational opportunities is clear. The college students enrollment system is a centralized
enrollment system. The Education Department announces the enrollment plan before the
NCEE and the enrollment information after the NCEE of the year. Households can easily
obtain the information on colleges quality2 and the number of enrollments in each college.
Compared with an independent enrollment system, the enrollment ratio is signicantly
1Hukou is resident recording systems in China. Hukou o¢ cially identies a person as a resident of an
area. The two types of Hukou, namely, urban and rural, pertain to urban and rural population, respectively.
Urban Hukou entitles its holders to better schools and welfare programs. (Hukou system, wikipedia)
2Four college ranks exist: top four years universities, other four years universities, regular three years
universities, other regular three years universities and technical colleges. Higher rank colleges enroll students
rst. After the higher level nished their enrollment, the next level colleges begin their enrollment.
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clearer for households. (2) The enrollment rule is simple. The sole factor that determines
the enrollment decision is the studentsrank in the examinations. A college sets a score
threshold according to the score distribution of the students applying for college. The
college enrolls students who garner scores that are higher than its score threshold. (3) The
demographic and economic di¤erences across regions are observable. NCEE allocates college
quota by region, and not by race or other demographic characteristics. The Education
Department provides each province with enrollment quotas. Students in di¤erent provinces
have di¤erent enrollment ratios. Compared with the AA based on race, economic or social
status, the endowment and talent di¤erences in the AA based on regions are easier to
capture. (4) College expansion was an exogenous shock to household behavior. The central
government announced the college expansion plan in 1997. Thereafter, the enrollment ratio
increased from about 30% to 75%. The rates of college expansion are di¤erent across
regions, which lead to the di¤erences in the changes of enrollment ratio. I use variations
of the enrollment ratio of the di¤erent regions to study the e¤ect of the education chance
change on householdseducation investment.
2.2 Literature
This study follows the theoretical framework of Bodoh-Creed and Hickman (2015)
and Cotton, Christopher, Hickman and Price (2015). Both studies use all-pay auctions to
characterize the competition for university admissions. In an auction, a students education
investment is the bid. The payo¤ is the seat of colleges with di¤erent qualities. Bodoh-
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Creed and Hickman (2015) develop a theoretical model that can track the college seats
assignments with AA by matching a continuum set of university seats with a continuum of
students. I present a simpler version of their model focuses on aspects of the market that
is most readily testable using linear regression. In the current study, I use the continuum
setting and the pure rank of the human capital to set the prize for the competition.
The current study contributes to the literature on the e¤ects of educational oppor-
tunity and AA on household incentives to make human capital investment. Coate and
Loury (1993) regard AA as a mandated equal assignment rate- that has di¤erent e¤ects
on minority workersincentives in a job assignment market. Moro and Norman (2003) nd
that AA may increase the minority workers incentive to invest in learning but diminish
the others. Furstenburg (2003) builds an AA model of college admissions, and nds that
AA admissions rule to enhance the academic quality of its class. Fu (2006) nds that AA
encourages the non-minority to respond to the AA admissions more aggressively, which
tends to widen the test score gap in terms of race. Ferman and Assuncao (2011) nd that
test scores among black students decreased because of an AA admissions quota in top uni-
versities in Brazil. Antonovics and Backes (2014) nds a modest e¤ect in the abolition
of AA at the University of the California system on the GPA of college-bound students.
Hickman (2015) builds a structural empirical model and nds that AA increases the human
capital level of the minority compared with color-blind admissions, representative quotas,
and American-style preference-based AA. Cotton, Hickman, and Price(2015) conduct a eld
experiment to mimic essential aspects of competitive investment prior to the college mar-
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ket. The study nds that AA increases average human capital investment and examination
performance for the majority of disadvantaged students targeted by the policy. Estevan,
Gall, and Morin (2016) nd that AA increased the targeted groups chance of entering
colleges-but nd limited evidence of behavioral reactions to the AA policy, in terms of test
performance or application decisions. The study uses Chinese household survey data and
NCEE enrollment information to estimate the e¤ect of college enrollment ratio change on
householdseducation investment. I have concluded that generally, increasing the college
enrollment ratio decreases education spending.
As households or individuals have heterogeneous responses to changes in educational
opportunity, AA changes the distribution of human capital level within the targeted group.
For example, Bertrand, Hanna and Mullainathan (2010) uses the AA program for "lower-
caste" groups in engineering colleges in India and nds that the lower-caste applicants obtain
more college seats but caste-based targeting reduces the number of females entering college.
Yeung (2013) nds that the college expansion in China will benet households with higher
levels of education to enter college and liminate or even reverse the gender gap in college
attendance. The study nds households with better education level, and higher household
income or urban Hukou are more sensitive to changes in enrollment rate. In the long term,
college expansion and AA widen the education and the income gap within each province.
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2.3 Background
NCEE is an annual academic examination. It is a prerequisite for entrance to all
of the colleges and universities in China. A students overall mark is a sum of the subject
marks. The maximum possible mark3 varies widely from di¤erent years and from di¤erent
provinces. The students need to to choose their majors in NCEE. After the exam, colleges
and universities enroll students separately in two majors. Students can take either a set
of art and humanities subjects, or a set of science and engineering subjects, based on their
choice of majors. Chinese, mathematics and a foreign language are mandatory subjects.
The applicants of the science and engineering majors need to take a science-integrated test,
and the applicants of the art and humanities majors need to take a humanities integrated
test.
For each student, preparations for the NCEE start at least two years before the
examination. Figure 1 shows the time line of NCEE each year. Local educational institution
announces the enrollment plan in September before the year of the examination. Each
student registers the exam and chooses a major in November. Students take the exam in
June- and obtain their score by the end of the same month. They make their decision
on which college they will attend in July. In other places, students list their university
3Figure 4 is examples of the score distribution. The rst one is the score distribution of Yunnan in 2014. I
labeled the score threshold to apply di¤erent level of universities. There are several hundreds of students get
0 each year, who give up the exam even they register it. The distribution is a relatively normal distribution
if I drop the 0 score. Because the exam is not standard and the di¢ culty level is changing every year, the
score distribution is changing every year. The number of students who took the exam is also changing every
year because the population of the age cohort is changing.
68
or college preferences prior to the examination, after the examination, or after they nd
out their scores4. Applications are given to several tiers (including early admissions, key
universities, regular universities, and technical colleges), each of which can include around
4 to 6 choices of institutions and programs. In some places, students list applications of
separate tiers at di¤erent times (Zou, 2013). Usually, a students choice of is made about
two years before taking the NCEE. After making the choice, the students focus on studying
the relevant set of subjects.
Admission quotas are distributed to each province. A university sets a xed admis-
sion quota for each province, which must be approved by the Education Department of
the central government5. After the approval, the Education Department will send the plan
to the local education department of each province. The NCEE is administered uniformly
within each province of China. In NCEE, test takers only compete with the students in
the same province (Gu, 2012). The college seats are distributed unevenly across China and
students are being discriminated during the admission process based on their geographic
regions. Unequal admission schemes for di¤erent provinces and regions might intensify com-
petition among examinees from provinces with fewer advanced educational resources(Gu,
2012). For example, in 2010, acceptance rate for students from Beijing, Shanghai, Shan-
4For example, in Shanghai, students list their applications for early admission, prior to the exam, but
students in other provinces do so after they nd out their scores.
5At the central government level, the Minister of Education and the National Development and Re-
form Commission (NDRC) jointly decides the total enrollment number of students every year, which then
is subdivided into 31 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, and these enrollment plans are
implemented at the local government level (Gu, 2012).
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dong and Henan who applied for universities of the rst-ranking category were 20%, 18%,
7% and 4% respectively. High acceptance rates are likely to appear in the most and least
developed cities and provinces.
The annual number of takers and the number of colleges to enroll in through the
NCEE are shown in Figure 2. The 3 big turning points are shown: the rst is in 1966, the
cultural revolution, when the NCEE was stopped; the second is in 1976, the restoration of
the NCEE; and the third is in 1998, when China began to expand the college rapidly after
this year. After the restoration of NCEE, from 1978 to 1998, the scale of higher education
kept increasing. The number of colleges increased from 598 to 1022, the number of new
college students enrollment increased from 0.4 million to 1.1 million, and the number of
college students increased from 0.9 million to 3.4 million (Li & Xing, 2010). In 1999, to
support economic growth, the Chinese government announced the rapid college expansion
policy6 targeted at expanding tertiary education dramatically to reach an enrollment ratio
of 15%7. The annual college enrollment increased from 1 million in 1998 to 6.3 million in
2009. In 1998, the ratio of people who enters the college among the age cohort was 9.8%;
in 2007, after the rapid expansion, the number was 23% (Yeung, 2013).
6The o¢ cial explanation of college expansions are: (1) the need for more talented personnel to sustain
the rapid development of Chinese economy; (2) the public demand for higher education is increasing and the
government has the obligation to meet their demand; (3) enrollment expansion can postpone employment
of high school graduates and increase educational consumption, which is an important means to stimu-
late domestic consumption and promote growth in related industries; (4) enrollment expansion will reduce
the pressure on high schools, discouraging test-oriented teaching and learning and promoting all-around
education in elementary and secondary schools (Wan, 2006).
7 In early 1999, the central government decided to increase the number of students admitted to tertiary
education by 0.22 million. In June, the central government and the Ministry of Education suddenly made
an announcement that a further 0.33 million new students will be admitted (Li & Xing, 2010).
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In the mid-1990s, the central government decentralized the administration of colleges
and universities. After the decentralization reform, the admission quota can be determined
at the provincial level. The allocation of admission quota often is biased toward local
students, even for the universities managed by the central government. Provinces with more
high education resources have a greater capacity to expand after 1999, and individuals from
these provinces are more likely to benet from the expansion policy (Yeung 2013).
2.4 Theoretical Model
In this section, I present an all pay auction model of education investment decision
to characterize householdseducation investment competition within each province. In an
environment wherein households with di¤erent level of talent have heterogeneous responses
to the change in college enrollment quota level. I show that the human capital level only
a¤ects the seat allocation and has no e¤ects on external options. Households invest in
human capital purely because they can gain economic benets from the examination. I
abstract from these features by focusing on education investment reactions to college seats
allocation. I assume that one dimensional talent exists and that two groups have di¤erent
talent distribution. Competition for college seats transpires among the students within the
same group.
Assumption Two groups exist, with i 2 f0; 1g. A continuum of heterogeneous students
exists within the two groups, with  population in group 0 and 1   population in group
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1. A household has talent type , which satises a distribution Fi() in each group. This
assumption implies di¤erent talent distributions of di¤erent group, such that ~Fi();  2
 ;
 


: I assume the following:
Fi(; i) =
8>><>>:
ie
 i; if   0
0; other
(2..1)
with i 2 [0; 1] and 1  0: In addition, I get the overall population distribution:
Fall() = (1  )F1() + F0() (2..2)
Seat Allocation Rules A continuum of college seats with p =

p
 
;
 
p

exists. It denotes the
quality of the college, which is drawn from distribution FP (p), such that:
FP (p) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0; if p < 0
p; if p 2 [0; 1]
1; if p > 1
(2..3)
Two methods are used to allocate college seats that exist: quota (q) case and no-quota (w)
case. Without quota, households in the two groups compete in the same auction. Only the
human capital rank determines the college seat allocation. I use the case without quota as
the bench mark case. In the quota case, I assume that the competition is found within each
group. The human capital rank and the group determine college seat allocation.
In the no-quota case, households in the two groups compete in the same examination.
Students in the two groups have the same chance of entering a university with the same
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human capital level. In the no-quota case, the college assigns students to seats in accordance
with pure rank order. The mechanism determines the quantile rank of si within the overall
human capital distribution and then matches student i to a seat at the corresponding
quantile rank. For example, the 50th percentile student, regardless of group, matches the
50th percentile college seats. Formally, student j from group i receives the seat assignment,
such that:
Pw
 
sij js j

= Gw1 (sj js j) = Gw0 (sj js j) (2..4)
Under the no-quota rule, student js seat depends on his human capital level relative to
all other students in both groups. Thus, household education investment behavior only
depends on households talent  and not on the group.
In the quota case, households compete within each group. College allocates di¤erent
quota to each province and allocates the seats within each group by rank ordering. The
mechanism still allocates  seats to group 0 and 1  seats in group 1. However, it provides
a greater fraction of high order seats to group 0 and more low order seats to group 1 than
the benchmark case. Formally, student j from group i receives the following seat assignment:
P qi
 
sij jsi j

= Gqi (sj jsi j) (2..5)
Under the quota rule, student js seat depends on the human capital level relative to the
other students in the same group. In other words, competition for college seats is found
73
within each group. Thus, a households education investment behavior depends on the
households talent  and the group.
I assume that the seat given to 0 has a distribution F0(p) = p ; and the seat give to
1 has a distribution F1(p) = p  p :  represents the policy bias on each group. A bigger
 means that the more good seats allocated to 1. If  = 1; then households in group 0
and 1 have the same opportunity to enter any college, which is exactly same with the case
without quota. If  > 1, then 0 is the province with a higher portion of students ending
up with a low p than group 1. Otherwise, 0 is the province with higher portion of students
ending up with high p than group 1. Figure 7 presents an example of seats allocation with
 > 1. The rst gure is the case without quota, and the college seats of each quality level
are allocated according to the population distribution. The second gure shows the case
with quota. If  > 1; then group 1 has a higher portion of students ending up with low p
than group 0.
Household Decisions Talent type  determines the marginal cost of human capital invest-
ment. I dene the human capital level s. To gain human capital s, students need to spend
C(; s); such that C(; s) = s: A payo¤ function P ij (s) is determined by the rank of the
seat within each group. I obtain the human capital distribution level in the equilibrium,
which is Gij(s); where j is the quota rule, and i is the province. When students go to a
college seat p, they obtain a utility U(p; s); with U(p; s) = ps1  and  2 [0; 1] : Taken
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the rule, FP (p); F0() and F1() as given, household is decision is:
ij(s; ) = maxsj
U

P xi (s
i
j jsi j); sj
  C(; sj) (2..6)
In the no-quota case, all the individuals join in the single tournament. In the case with
quota, two tournaments are held. Individuals join in the tournament within their own
province. The tournament is an all pay auction process, in which s is the bid and ij(s; )
is the payo¤.
Model Predictions In this section, I study the qualitative prediction on householdseduca-
tion investment choices and college seat allocation.
Proposition 8 Given the utility function, in the nal equilibrium, s() is continuous and
strict decreasing with :(see Appendix for proof)
The proposition provides useful insight into how competition shapes incentives. It
states that, given a xed set of college seats, the competition causes the most able students
to invest more on their human capital output, and the least talented students to decrease
their human capital output. When the marginal cost is equal to the marginal benet,
students get the optimal human capital investment level. Students with higher levels of
talent have a lower marginal cost to invest on human capital, for the same human capital
level. The most able student has a highest optimal human capital level and invests more.
Proposition 9 In the all pay auction game, all of the individuals payo¤s are equal to the
cost in the equilibrium. (see Appendix for proof)
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In the equilibrium, human capital level strictly increases on . The only stable
equilibrium allocation is that each households net payo¤ is zero. Otherwise, at least one
household can increase the human capital level and gain net benets from deviations from
the equilibrium.
Proposition 10 If  > 1; then every one in group 0 will take more s than no-quota
case. If  < 01 ; then everyone in group 0 will take less s than the no-quota case. If
 2
h
0
1
; 1
i
;9 2 [0;1] ; then anyone in group 0 with  larger than incentive will take
more s than the case no-quota case. Anyone in group 0 with  smaller than incentive will
take less s than the no-quota case
Figure 8 presents an example of the investment distribution in group 0. If  >
1; then everyone in group 0 will invest more on human capital than the no-quota case.
This statement implies that the reverse AA will increase disadvantage peoples investment
incentive. If  < 01 ; the everyone in group 0 will invest less on human capital than the
no-quota case. The statement implies that the high level AA will encourage disadvantage
peoples investment incentive. If  2
h
0
1
; 1
i
; then 9 2 [0;1] ;anyone one in group 0 with
 larger than incentive will invest more human capital than the no-quota case. Anyone
one in group 0 with  smaller than incentive will take less s than the no-quota case.
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2.5 Empirical Strategy
In this section, I present our empirical strategy to estimate the impact of college
enrollment rate on household educational investment. The objective is to devise a strategy
that controls for potential spurious correlation between the treatment and the outcome
variables.
I start by regressing household is education investment proxies in province j at time
t (Yijt) on college enrollment rate in province j at time t (Qjt). The model essentially
identies the average e¤ect of enrollment rate by comparing the households in di¤erent
regions and di¤erent periods. In particular, the rst model estimated is expressed as:
Yijt = 0 + 1Qjt + Xit + Zjt +Dpro +Dyear +Dpro Drural + "ijt (2..7)
where Yijt is the education investment variables for individual or household i at time t. In
this study, I use education spending, study spent studying, and whether the child dropped
out of school before graduating from high school, to evaluate the education investment level;
Xit is a vector the individual and household characteristics variables (including childs age,
gender, Hukou, household income, asset, household size, highest education level and other
household characteristics); Zjt is a vector of province characteristics (including provincial
teacher-student rate of di¤erent school levels, and provincial economic variables). Dpro
includes provincial dummies, which control the provincial level xed e¤ects; Dyear includes
year dummies, which control the time xed e¤ects. Drural is the rural household dummy.
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To estimate the di¤erent reactions of people with di¤erent endowment levels, I add
the intersection between the educational opportunity variables Qjt and the endowment
level variables Eit to check the heterogeneity of the reactions. The results in the following
equation:
Yijt = 0 + 1Qjt + 2Qjt  Eit
+Xit + Zjt +Dpro +Dyear +Dpro Drural + "ijt (2..8)
where Eit is the endowment level proxy. In this study, I investigate whether the household
has rural Hukou, whether the household has member who graduated from a high school,
and has a household income, and whether the households income level is lower the median
income level as the endowment level proxies. The inclusion of these large sets of controls
helps in eliminating potential confounding e¤ects that might lead to inconsistent OLS es-
timates. The center of interest includes the coe¢ cient 1 and 2; where Qit is measured
by the college enrollment rate in the province at year t. .For example, I use the rural
household dummy as the endowment proxy. In this specication, if 1 is positive, then an
average household will spend more on education if there is a better education chance if a
better educational opportunity is presented; if 1 is positive and 2 is negative, then rural
households are less sensitive to changes in educational opportunities.
Instrumental Variables To the extent that some economic and social changes a¤ect the col-
lege enrollment system and householdseducation investment, one might be concerned that
the OLS estimates of the model would be biased. In practice, though, even conditional
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on the large set of individual, household and regional observed characteristics, a simple
comparison of households with di¤erent educational change will not necessarily lead to con-
sistent estimates of the e¤ect of interest. As hinted at in the introduction, local economic
shock and local education policies - just to quote a few- are all likely to a¤ect both enroll-
ment ratio and householdseducation investment. For example, the governor of a province,
thought highly of education, may implement a series of education promoting policies. If
these policies can increase local college enrollment scale and encourage household educa-
tion investment at the same time, simple OLS estimates of enrollment rate on households
education investment are likely to lead to upward biased estimates of the e¤ect of interest.
To deal with this problem. I propose a set of instrumental variables that will only
inuence education investment indirectly through their e¤ect on the college enrollment
rate. The proposed instrument set is based on the college enrollment mechanism in the
Chinese college enrollment system where a college allocates more seats to the students
in their provinces and the neighboring provinces than to those in other region. Rapid
college expansion happened in 2000 through four methods: (1) building larger universities
by merging colleges and universities in the same region; (2) building colleges by upgrading
low level schools; (3) building new colleges; and (4) increasing the enrollment quota in each
of the universities and colleges. Usually the rst three methods create new universities
and colleges. However, merging of colleges decreases the number of colleges but increases
enrollment quota by return to scale.
Since the 1990s, the number of college in China has increased from about 1,000
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to 2,400. New colleges increase the number of enrollments. The number of new colleges
and the number of college enrollment capture the supply of local college seats, which is
a¤ected by local economic and social factors. In addition, this changes spillover e¤ects on
neighboring provinces by increasing the number of college enrollment in the neighboring
provinces. Therefore, the number of colleges and the number of newly enrolled students in
a province positively correlate the number of college enrollment in neighboring provinces
through NCEE.
In the main specication, I control the number of local college and the number of
newly enrolled college students in the province, which capture the common trend and local
e¤ect of college expansion. I use the number of new colleges and the number of college
enrollment in the neighboring provinces as the instrument variables of enrollment rate,
which capture the neighboring provincescollege expansion. Neighboring provincescollege
expansion is determined by the national level common trends and neighboring provinces
local level economic inuence. Controlled by the common trends in the model, they can be
considered to a¤ect local college enrollment ratio without directly inuencing households
education investment.
I propose two sets of instruments. The rst set of instruments is the number of
colleges in neighboring provinces, the number of new colleges in neighboring provinces in
the previous year, the number of new colleges in neighboring provinces in the three year
and the number of new colleges in neighboring province in the last ve year. The number
of colleges captures the college emergence trends of the neighboring provinces. The last
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three instrument variables capture the college building trends in neighboring provinces.
Emergence and the development of new colleges will increase the number of enrollments.
The second set of instrumental variable is the number of college enrollment in neighboring
provinces, which directly capture the college expansion in neighboring provinces. The Data
section below provides a complete description of the construction of these instrumental
variables. The main empirical strategy is to estimate of the equation presented earlier
through instrumental variables, where enrollment ratio is estimated through the following
rst stage regression:
Qjt = 0 + Zjt + 1Xjt +Dyear + jt (2..9)
where Zjt is a vector of instrumental variables that are excluded from the rst stage. The
set of variables Xjt are comprised of the number of college enrollment number and college
number at the provincial level. I estimate the results for all children aged 6 to 18.
Specically, I consider two neighboring provinces: A and B. Colleges in province A
increase the enrollment scale by 100. Students in province A obtain 75 new seats. Whereas
the students in province B get 25 new seats. The college expansion in province A increases
the number of enrollments through the NCEE in both provinces. However, the increase
in households education spending and college expansion in province A can be attributed
to the trends such as the increasing education return in province A. The unobserved trend
in province A causes the overestimation of the e¤ects of the increasing the enrollment
ratio. The variables of college expansion in province B captures the common trends of both
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provinces and the local trend of province B. The college expansion trends in province A
captures the local trend in province A and has spillover e¤ects on the enrollment ratio in
province B. The validity of the instruments relies on two assumptions: rst, the college
expansion of province -i must be correlated with neighbor is enrollment number; second,
these variables must be uncorrelated with province is preference on education.
2.6 Data
The data have three parts: provincial level local education information, province
level college enrollment ratio information, and a household survey information.
Provincial level education and economic information are taken from China Education
Yearbooks, the Statistics Yearbooks of every province and the Education Yearbooks of some
provinces. The China Education Yearbook (series) is compiled by the Ministry of Education
and provides detailed statistics on education. The Education Yearbooks of some provinces
are compiled by the Department of Education of each province and reports the informa-
tion of examinations and school information. The Statistics Yearbooks of each province
are compiled by the Statistics Bureau of each province, which reports each provinceseco-
nomic and social conditions. These yearbooks report GDP, population, the number of local
college students and teachers, and middle and primary school information since the 1950s.
The number of local colleges, the number of new college students, and all the high school
information since the 1990s are taken. China Education Examination Yearbook (series) is
compiled by the Ministry of Education Examination Center and provides detailed infor-
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mation on examination information about NCEE in all provinces. The China Education
Examination Yearbook (from 1997 to 2013) and China Education Yearbook (from 1988
to 2012) of each year report the enrollment information for NCEE in some provinces. In
addition, some of the education yearbooks of each province and provincial yearbooks also
report the NCEE information of the year. I nd the NCEE enrollment information (mainly
the number of examination takers and the number of enrolled students) after 1990 in these
resources.
NCEE enrollment information after 2005 is taken from China National Knowledge
Infrastructure8. I obtain each provincesannual NCEE summary reports compiled by each
provinces education department. This information contains the number of students that
took the examination for the four majors, the number of students enrolled in di¤erent level
universities, the score distribution, and the score threshold for the university level, the en-
rollment information of each university in each province, and the details of each universitys
enrollment plan and enrollment results. I collected the NCEE enrollment information be-
fore 2005 from the China Education Examination Yearbook and the Education Yearbooks
of some provinces. I found college enrollment information in the 1980s from a book called
the Composition of NCEE, which was published in 1988.
The household and individual data are taken from the Chinese Household Income
Project Series (CHIPS). The data were collected through a series of questionnaire-based
8This online database contains information from journals, important newspaper, yearbooks, and thesis.
The website is http://www.cnki.net/.
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interviews conducted in rural and urban areas in 1988, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2007 and 2008.
Individual respondents, reported on their economic status, employment, level of education,
sources of income, household composition, and household expenditures. CHIPS can repre-
sent the national population. For surveys of urban local households and rural-urban migrant
households, a total of the same nine provinces9 were selected. The rural household survey
also covered the nine provinces. CHIPS consists of three parts: the Urban Household Sur-
vey, the Rural Household Survey and the Migrant Household Survey. For example, the 2008
survey has 5,000, 8,000, and 5,000 households in the migration, rural, and urban samples,
respectively. However, the 2007 survey includes an additional 5,000 rural households and
10,000 urban households. The 1999 survey only has urban households. In this study, I use
individuals aged 6 to 18 as the study samples to study education investment decisions.
Using the province and year dummies, I match the CHIPS data with the provincial
level education and economic data set. The main outcome variables of interest are reported
education spending and household income. To construct my instrumental variables, I dene
the neighboring provinces as the provinces next to the province and the provinces without
boundaries but are found in the same regions. I use the sum of the number of neighboring
provincesenrollment and the number of colleges as the instrument variables.
Summary Statistics Table 1 shows the provincial level education resource information of 31
provinces in China. The data set includes local school, economic, and population informa-
9They are Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Guangdong from eastern China; Anhui, Henan, and Hubei
from central China; Chongqing and Sichuan from western China.
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tion since 1980. Figure 9 presents the average enrollment rate of di¤erent school levels in
China. The average enrollment ratio of elementary schools is higher than 99% after 198610.
With the elementary school enrollment ratio being almost 100% in all the provinces, I use
the number of elementary students as the population of di¤erent age cohorts. According to
the plan of the Chinese government, except for some extremely poor regions, the majority
of the population in China was covered by the nine year compulsory education programs in
1995
Table 2 describes the information of NCEE enrollment. It contains the number
of students who took the examination for the two big majors, the number of students
enrolled in di¤erent level universities, the score distribution and the score threshold at the
university level, and the enrollment information of each university in each province. I collect
the information from the local education departments of each province, which announces
the NCEE information of the province each year, and some NCEE service websites, which
provide the details of each universitys enrollment plan and enrollment results.
Table 3 presents the information of the instrumental variables. I nd that the number
of colleges decreased from 96 to 91 between 1995 and 2002. During this period, by merging
small colleges into large ones, China has built 431 new universities.11 The number of
college has increased from 1,071 in 1999 to 2,800 in 2015. At the same time, 678 three-year
universities were converted to four-year universities. The average number of new students
10 In1986, the Chinese central government started the nine year compulsory education program.
11From the report of Ministry of Education of the Peoples Republic of
China.http://www.moe.gov.cn/publicles/htmlles/moe/moe_1680/201005/xxgk_88440.html
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in neighboring provinces has increased from 167,000 to 1,475,800.
Figure 11 shows that the college enrollment ratio in the most advanced provinces was
about 80% before 1998. After the expansion, it reached almost 100% in these provinces. In
the most populous provinces, the enrollment ratio increased from less than 10% to about
40%. The average college enrollment ratio increased from 30% to 60% during the rapid
college expansion period around 2000. After that period, the increasing rate slowed down.
Enrollment ratios of some provinces declined after that period, because the number of test
takers increased signicantly in these years. Figures 13 and 14 present the enrollment ratio
of middle schools and high schools used as proxies for educational change. The high school
enrollment ratio did not increase as quickly as the college enrollment ratio during the college
expansion period.
Table 4 reports the information of householdsand individualscharacteristics. The
main education investment proxies are education spending per child, the time children spent
studying after school, and whether the child dropped out of school before graduating from
high school. The 1988 rural survey does not have education spending information. The
average education spending is about 6,000 Yuan. The average household income is 119,754
Yuan. Study duration information is only available in the data after 2000. The average
number of hours spent studying is 555 hours. I also considered whether the child worked
before 16 years old as another proxy for the reaction to the change in quota. Information
on study performance is available after 2000, which control the studentsability. About
42% of children have a good school performance.
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2.7 Main Results
In the regression, I keep the observations with college enrollment ratio information
and education spending information. I only keep the individuals aged 6 to 20. I use house-
hold education spending share and income as the dependent variables. I control for a long
list of individual and household attributes in Xit, partly because most of the demographic
variables are collected at the household level, and partly because human capital investment
decisions may be made by the household as a whole, instead of by each individual sepa-
rately. Within Xit , the key variables are age, gender, Hukou, number of family members
by age group (0-7 years, 7-16 years, 17- 20 years, 21-59 years, and 60+ years), household
income, and other household characteristics. In the regression, I also controlled for the year
dummies, provincial dummies, and provincial rural area dummies. The last three variables
capture the regional characteristics and time trends. For the controls, when the control
variable is missing, I dene a dummy based on whether the variable is missing and redene
the missing value to 0. Thereafter, I put both variables in the control list.
Table 5 reports the main results of OLS regression. The coe¢ cient 1 is positive when
I control for other variables. I nd that the coe¢ cient of college enrollment ratio is about
0.09. One consistent nding across Columns 3 to 7 is that the advantaged households who
have a better education level, and urban Hukou or higher income level, are more sensitive
to the increase in educational opportunities. The coe¢ cients of the number of age groups
show that households with more children spend more on education. I use the highest
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education level of the household as the proxy for the household education level. I nd
that households with better educational levels spend more on education. The coe¢ cient of
college enrollment ratio is about 0.09. As college enrollment ratio increases, households with
high school degrees or with higher income level are more likely to increase their educational
spending share. I also attempt the regression on education spending per child. The main
coe¢ cient is similar to the coe¢ cient of the education spending share regression. The
coe¢ cient 1 is positive when I control for other variables. Columns 3 to 7 shows that the
advantaged households with better education level or higher income level, or those that are
urban households, are more sensitive to the increase in educational opportunities..
Table 6 reports the main results of 2SLS regression. OLS regression tends to over-
estimate the e¤ect of enrollment ratio. The 2SLS regression results show that the e¤ects
of enrollment ratio on household education spending share are around 0.08. As the enroll-
ment ratio increases by 10%, education spending share increases by 0.8%. In addition, in
Columns 5 to 7, similar to the OLS regression results, advantaged households with better
education level, urban household, or higher income level, are more sensitive to the increase
of education opportunity. A thorough analysis using instrumental variables begins with a
demonstration of the strength of the instrumental variables proposed. Table 7 describes
the results from the rst stage of 2SLS regression from the equation, where the depen-
dent variable is the provinces NCEE enrollment rate in that year. The coe¢ cients of
instrument variables are signicant. Reducing the number of colleges increases enrollment
ratio. Merging of universities reduces the number of universities but increases the number
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of enrollments. AS more college students enrolled in colleges in neighboring provinces, the
number of enrollments through the NCEE increases. In the regression, the information on
the number of local colleges and the number of college enrollment control for the common
trends of college expansion.
On average, householdseducation investment increases as they gain a better chance
of entering college. College expansion and AA encourage the targeted groupto improve
their human capital level. Households with di¤erent endowment and talent levels have
heterogeneous responses to the change. Advantaged households with better education level
or higher income level or those that is urban households, are more sensitive to the increase
in the educational opportunity. College expansion and AA may widen the human capital
disparity within each group.
2.8 Robustness Check
The following robustness checks to ensure that the reported e¤ects of the change in
education opportunities are not driven by sample selection, or variable construction.
Other Reactions to Enrollment Change To address the concern stating that the overall
education investment does not increase and that households may spend more money but
less time in education. I attempt other educational spending proxies, that is- study duration
and the hour in which parents take care of their children, which are shown in Columns 1
to 6. The coe¢ cient of the enrollment ratio is similar to the main results. The regression
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on the number of hours spent studying after school shows that the 10% enrollment ratio
will increase monthly study hour from 0.7 to 1 and monthly hour of taking care of children
from 0.12 to 0.17 on average. Similar to the main results, advantaged households are more
sensitive to changes. On average, rural households only spend 0.2 hours more on study as
the 10% enrollment ratio increases. Households invest more money and time on childrens
education as college enrollment ratio increases.
I also checked for other household reactions to changes in enrollment. I regress on
the dummy on whether the student drops out of high school and the number of minutes
spending on entertainment per week. The results are shown in Columns 7 to 12 of Table 8.
The results show that high enrollment ratio makes students less likely to drop out of school
and spend less time on entertainment. Similar to the main results, urban households or
households with at least one member who graduated from high school responded more to
the change in enrollment ratio.
These robustness checks are consistent with the main results. Households will in-
crease time and money spent on education, as they gain a better chance of entering college.
Similar to the main results, advantaged groups are more sensitive to the increase in enroll-
ment ratio.
Heterogenous Responses of Di¤erent Groups Additional robustness checks consider di¤erent
age groups. The rst group includes children aged 16 to 19, which are the age of high school
students. The second group includes children aged 12 to 15, which are the age of middle
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school students. The third group includes children aged 7 to 11, which are the age of
primary school students. The fourth group includes children aged below 7 years. Results in
Column 1 to 5 of Table 8, show that the reactions to changes in enrollment ratio do not vary
signicantly across the rst three groups. The coe¢ cients are about 0.4 for the households
with children younger than 7 years old and about 0.8 to 0.9 for the households with children
older than 7 years old. The inuence is similar for households with primary school, middle
school, and high school students. Chinese households prepare for their childrens NCEE
early on. Middle school students compete to enter the best high schools, which usually
have signicantly high college enrollment ratio. Primary school students compete to enter
the best middle school. The competition starts even before primary school. Many children
begin their training in piano, art12, mathematics, and English at about 3 to 4 years old.
The signal e¤ects of NCEE enrollment ratio a¤ect all of the age groups who are going to
take the examination.
In addressing concerns about potential sample selection, Table 7 conditions the analy-
sis sample on gender and household type di¤erence. Column 1 and 2 of Table 7 shows the
gender di¤erences. The coe¢ cient of enrollment ratio is 0.09 for the male sample and 0.06
for the female sample, which means that college expansion will widen the gender gap on hu-
man capital investment. In addition, NCEE gives "bonus points" to a minority. Columns 3
and 4 of Table 7 show that a minority family will reduce investment on education investment
12The NCEE give extra credit to students with special skill level in sports, music and art. For example,
NCEE will give 10 bonus points to the students with the qualication for the grade nine in piano-playing.
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as enrollment ratio increases.
Household Reactions on Other Education Chance I check for other education chance prox-
ies on education spending. I regress on local middle school, high school, and local college
enrollment ratios, which are dened by the number of students enrolled in the school level
divided by the number of students who graduated from lower-level local schools. For exam-
ple, high school enrollment ratio is dened as the number of students enrolled in the local
high school level divided by the number of students who graduated from the local middle
school. I nd that the college enrollment ratio has the largest e¤ects among the school
levels. Other school level enrollment ratios have smaller or insignicant e¤ects on education
spending share. With the competition for high schools, middle schools, and primary schools
are among students within the same county or city, the provincial-level enrollment informa-
tion of these school does not have signicant e¤ects on householdseducation investment
decisions.
Table 10 reports the e¤ect of the enrollment ratio of di¤erently-ranked colleges on
education spending. Rank 1 colleges include the top 112 colleges or universities belong to
the 211 projects13. The coe¢ cient of rank 1 college enrollment ratio is 0.06, and that of
four year college enrollment ratio is 0.04. The enrollment ratio of rank 1 colleges has a
greater e¤ect than other four-years colleges but less than the average. The enrollment ratio
of three years colleges has greater e¤ects on household education investment because three
13The 211 Project is a strategic cross-century project formulated by the Chinese government for the
implementation of the strategy of invigorating the country through science, technology and education.
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year college accept more students than others.
2.9 Mechanism
Change of Education Return The return to college education has increased after the 1990s.
College expansion leads to a higher portion of the population receiving better education,
which potentially changes the return to college education. According to the signaling func-
tion of education, college expansion may reduce the return to college education. I check for
the change of the return to education at the di¤erent periods. Table 11 reports the results:
the coe¢ cients on the return to the college education are about 0.3 before 1998, 0.6 between
1998 and 2004, and 0.9 after 2004. The coe¢ cients on the return of a high school degree are
about 0.3 before 1998, 0.4 between 1998 and 2004, and 0.5 after 2004. By considering at
the education gain of the di¤erent periods, I nd that the college education gain increased
from 0.3 before 1998 to 0.9 after 2004. In addition, I regress on rural and urban household
separately. The coe¢ cient are about 0.4 for rural household and 0.8 for urban household.
The college education gain in urban area is larger than the one in rural areas. The return
to college education increased after the college expansion. The result may be caused by the
rapid economic growth and transition of the economic structure.
E¤ects of Public Education Spending Public education spending may substitute or com-
plement private education spending. Table 12 reports the inuence of public education
investment on education spending. I regress the teacher student ratio of di¤erent school
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level and the intersection with the enrollment ratio. The coe¢ cient of high school teacher
student ratio shows that high school teacher student ratio reduces household education
spending, which suggests that the public education on high school spending may substitute
private education spending. However, public spending on primary schools shows a reverse
direction. It shows the complementary e¤ects of the public education of primary school
on private education spending. The coe¢ cients of the intersection between the enrollment
ratio and teacher-student ratio are only signicant in the middle school teacher-student
ratio, which means that a middle school teacher-student ratio that is higher may reduce the
e¤ects of the college expansion on private education investment. Higher public education
spending may crowd out private education spending.
Signal E¤ects of NCEE Enrollment Information The enrollment information cannot change
the number of students takeing the NCEE. Another test is the signal e¤ect of the enrollment
information. I regress the number of students who took the NCEE and the number of
students who chose two of the big majors-the arts and human sciences major, and the
engineering and sciences major. Columns 1 to 3 of Table 14 show that NCEE enrollment
ratios has no e¤ects on the number of NCEE takers. However, the enrollment ratio of
di¤erent major may change students choice of major. In particular, higher enrollment
ratio in the arts and human sciences major and lower enrollment ratio in the engineering
and sciences major will encourage more students to choose the art and human sciences
major. In addition, because most of the choices in major are made in the rst or second
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year of high school, which is one or two year before the exam, the major enrollment ratio
in two years before the exam will have greater e¤ects than the ratio in the current year or
the previous year. The enrollment ratio information cannot a¤ect the number of students
taking the NCEE but can a¤ect their choices in major.
Factors A¤ecting Enrollment Ratio The population of age cohort determines the number of
NCEE takers. As more students graduate from high school, more students take the NCEE
and more students are enrolled through NCEE. In summary, the overall enrollment ratio
decreases as more students take the NCEE. As more graduates graduate from high school,
the college enrollment ratio decreases.
The number of local college enrollment number has greater e¤ects on local enrollment
ratio than the number of student enrollment in neighboring province. I add the number of
local college enrollment and the number of student enrollment in neighboring provinces in
the regression. Columns 4 to 6 of Table 13 report the results and show that high college
enrollment in local and neighboring provinces increases the number of students taking and
enrolled through the NCEE. The number of local college enrollment have much bigger e¤ects
than the number of enrollment in neighboring province.
Long Term E¤ects on Individual Income and Education I estimate the long term e¤ects on
individual income level and education level. Using CHNS data, I select the observations with
income and education information after turning 18 years old, and household information
before turning 18 years old. I control for individual characteristics variables after turning 18
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years old, such as age, age square and gender; household characteristics before age 18, with
household income, asset level, number of elders, number of children, number of laborers,
highest education year level, and rural Hukou dummy. The results are shown in Table 15.
The e¤ect of high enrollment ratio in education level is shown in Columns 6 to 10
of Table 15. Columns 6 and 7 shows that the coe¢ cient of enrollment ratio is about 0.056,
which means that 1% increase in enrollment ratio will increase peoples individual education
level by 0.056% after provincial xed e¤ects are controlled for. Columns 8 to 10 shows that
the average e¤ects are weakened by the heterogeneous e¤ects. Columns 8 and 9 show that
high college enrollment has greater e¤ects on increasing the education level of rural students
or the students coming from households with high school degree holder. Column 10 shows
that a high number of college enrollment increases the education level of the households.
But the e¤ect is less for the households with higher income level.
The e¤ect of high enrollment ratio on individual income is shown in Columns 1 to 5
of Table 15. Columns 1 and 2 show that on average, a high number of college enrollment
increases annual individual income. The coe¢ cient of enrollment ratio without provincial
xed e¤ects controlled for is higher than the one where the xed e¤ects are controlled for.
Regional inequality widens the income disparity caused by enrollment quota di¤erences.
When provincial xed e¤ects are controlled for, the coe¢ cient of enrollment ratio is ap-
proximately 3, which means that a 1% increase in enrollment ratio will increase peoples
individual income by 3%. Columns 3 to 5 reveals that the coe¢ cients of the intersection
between the enrollment rate and endowment level or household variables are insignicant,
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which indicates limited heterogeneous e¤ects.
People in provinces with more college seats tend to gain a higher income level because
college expansion increases individual income. NCEE college enrollment rules widen the
regional income gap. College expansion has greater e¤ects on advantaged households, which
enlarges the human capital and income disparity within each province.
2.10 Conclusion
The NCEE enrollment system and the rapid college expansion in China provide an
excellent opportunity to deepen our understanding of the manner in which households with
heterogeneous talent and endowments compete for di¤erent levels of college seats. The
NCEE enrollment system has the same seat allocation rule as AA, which is based on the
region rather than on race or other demographic characteristics. In addition, enrollment
history and enrollment rate are publicly known to all households and students. The rapid
college expansion that happened after 1998 enables a natural experiment to investigate to
the e¤ect of the increase in college enrollment rate on household education investment. I use
the number of colleges, the number of new colleges, and the number of college enrollment
in neighboring provinces as instrument variables for the enrollment ratio of a province.
I use the education spending share, time spent studying after school, and dropping out
before nishing high school as the proxies of household education investment. I nd a large,
positive, and signicant e¤ects of high enrollment ratio that encourage household education
investment. I also nd that the advantaged households with higher income levels, better
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education levels, and urban Hukou are more sensitive to the increase in the number of
enrollment.
The encouraging e¤ects of the increase in enrollment that are found in the current
study imply that an AA policy and college expansion encourage targeted householdseduca-
tion investment. However, the heterogeneous response of households shows that the policy
encourages the advantaged households more than others. The nding implies advantaged
households in the targeted group gain higher human capital level and benet more from
the policy. The reverse AA which gives more college seats to more advantaged provinces,
widens human capital disparity among regions and the AA will increase the human capital
disparity within regions.
Interestingly, AA no only a¤ects the householdseducation investment, but it could
also create a number of socioeconomic implications including social mobility, economic
inequality, and human capital distribution among group. Assessing the e¤ect of AA on
these socio-economic issues will be a promising direction for future research.
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CHAPTER 3.
HOW DOES ONLINE PIRACY AFFECT FILM REVENUE IN CHINA?
The impact of online piracy on genuine products sales is under debate, because
researchers cannot nd representing proxies to evaluate piracy levels. In Chapter 3, I
estimate the impact of online piracy on moviesbox o¢ ce performances in China from 2006
to 2013 using a unique dataset that reports the pirating data for 1,039 wide-release movies
from several le-sharing websites. Using these piracy-level proxies and Chinese box o¢ ce
data, I estimate that movie piracy caused substantial box o¢ ce losses, that the substitution
elasticity of the consumption of pirated movies on consumption in theaters was small, and
that government anti-piracy policies reduced box o¢ ce losses, but only in the short term.
I estimate that the average revenue loss caused by piracy was about 30 percent.
3.1 Introduction
The media industries believe that copyright infringement causes billions of dollars
in losses. the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) estimated that piracy costs
the U.S. movie industry some $20.5 billion per year in 2011. The industries, they contend,
fallaciously assume that every person who pirates a work would have otherwise purchased it
at full price (Lee, 2006). How much does online piracy a¤ect the sale of genuine products?
The di¢ culties of observing piracy behavior, the sample bias caused by special study groups
and the correlation between product sale and the intensity of piracy make this a hard
question to answer.
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In this article, I evaluate the substitution e¤ects of the pirated movies on their
genuine counterparts, using the di¤erence between a movies theatrical release date and the
date on which the pirated version appears as the proxy for piracy duration (piracy lag),
and the number of searches for movies to pirate on search engines as the proxy for piracy
intensity (piracy movie search amount). Both proxies could represent the piracy level of the
whole population. The setting I consider is one in which online movies provide consumers
a low-cost, low-quality alternative to the movies at theaters, and theaters adjust the ticket
price according to the demand change caused by this alternative. The later the pirated
movie is available, the more consumers lose patience waiting for the free movie. In my
estimates, I nd that in China, pirated movies caused box o¢ ce losses of 65 percent, and
daily revenue loss of about 70 percent. The paper also nds that only a small portion of
Chinese Internet users are a¤ected by piracy variation, which suggests that the substitution
elasticity of pirated movies on theater movies is very small in China.
To structure my empirical analysis, I develop a partial equilibrium model with two
types of movie supplies with di¤erent quality, prices, and frames. Theaters adjust the price
of movies according to quality and piracy supply. Because of preference heterogeneity, con-
sumers with a high willingness to pay purchase the tickets for high-quality theater movies.
By assuming a waiting cost, given the ticket price, the later a pirated movie comes out, the
more consumers choose to watch the movie in theaters. The model makes the following pre-
dictions: First, piracy resources reduce theater attendance, but increase the overall movie
audience. Second, if the majority of the population cannot access theater movies, even if
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the piracy level is high in this market, the substitution elasticity of a given movies piracy
level on its box o¢ ce is low.
To evaluate the impact of pirated movies and to test the prediction of the theoretical
framework, I have constructed, based on Internet sources, a new dataset with thousands of
movies of the following data: overall box o¢ ce revenues weekly boxo¢ ce revnenues, and
daily box o¢ ce information in each theater of a theater chain; prices, movie characteristics,
global release schedules, the number of searches for movies on search engines, pirated movie
versions, and available time on piracy websites in China. The dataset consists of 1,039
movies that were in wide release from 2006 to 2013. Data on piracy resources are rarely
available to collect, especially since most of the piracy websites created before 2010 were
shut down in a series of anti-piracy actions, and the survivors have strict membership
registration systems and are open only to registered members. I found the seven websites1
with pirated movies uploaded before 2006 and purchased memberships in them in order to
collect information about their piracy activities. I use the information to construct piracy
proxies.
I use two empirical approaches to estimate the impact of piracy. First, I use reduced
form methods to get the elasticity of box o¢ ce revenue in relation to the level of piracy. To
deal with the potential endogeneity caused by the correlation between movie quality and
supply gap, I use the governments anti-piracy policies which shut down the main movie
websites and cut the supply of pirated movies in the short term as the natural experiment to
1The Chinese government shut most of them down in anti-piracy movements campaigns in 2014 and 2015.
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estimate the revenue loss caused by piracy in the DID regressions. The number of searches
for the name of a movie on search engines, which represents piracy intensity, is positively
correlated to the movies quality and its box o¢ ce revenue. I use the number of searches
conducted before the free piracted movie is available as the instrument variable of piracy
intensity to get an unbiased estimation. Secondly, I use the theoretical model to make a
structural estimation of the parameters. I use the estimated model parameters to make
some predictions and nd that the average box o¢ ce could increase by about 30 percent if
the piracy supply were permanently cut o¤.
3.2 Literature Review
A large theoretical literature (Novos &Waldman, 1984; Johnson, 1985; Takeyama,
1997; Yoon, 2007; Belleamme & Peitz, 2014; Bae & Choi, 2006) has argued that the
availability of a pirated good reduces a rms prots. The degree to which piracy a¤ects
social welfare, however is still uncertain. In a static model, piracy is harmful to rms, but
benets consumers in the short term (Belleamme and Peitz, 2010). Many studies nd that
piracy increases consumer welfare by providing productsinformation (Peitz & Waelbroeck,
2006; Gopal, Bhattacharjee & Sanders, 2006), reducing consumption cost (Ahn & Yoon,
2009) and exhibiting nextwork e¤ects (Belleamme, 2003; Belleamme & Peitz, 2014). In
the long term, changes in prots typically decrease rmsincentives to provide high-quality
products (Novos & Waldman, 1984; Bae & Choi, 2006), but do encourage more varieties
((Johnson, 1985). In this article, without considering the long-run supply e¤ects, the static
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model shows that the availability of a pirated good reduces the rms prots, but increases
overall welfare by increasing the number of consumers who are able to watch the movie.
The di¢ culties of observing piracy activities present the most serious obstacles to
estimating losses due to piracy. Piracy websites make great e¤orts to hide piracy resources
from governments, which are required by copyright laws to shut down the websites for these
piracy activities. Most piracy websites have some mechanisms to avoid these problems.
For example, some le-sharing websites have strict membership systems. Only members
can access their piracy resources, and its hard to become a member. Legal penalties for
individual copyright infringement also give the users of pirated products incentives to hide
their piracy behavior. From 2003 to 2006, for example, the Recording Industry Association
of America sued more than 20,000 music fans for le sharing (Lambrick, 2009).
Given the di¢ culty of observing the illegal activities, empirical studies have used
a small groups piracy level or other indirect methods to evaluate overall piracy levels.
Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) monitor an online service to develop product-specic
measures of downloading activity over time. They use instrument variables (such as le
size or German school holidays) in order to deal with a potential positive correlation due
to unobserved heterogeneity; they nd no displacement of music sales by piracy.
Some studies use individual-level survey data to ask whether persons who also engage
in more unpaid consumption engage in more or less paid consumption. Rob and Waldfogel
(2004) conduct a survey of university students and nd that each album download reduces
purchases by about 20 percent. Some studies examine whether products that are more often
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downloaded tend to be purchased more or less. Milot (2014) investigates the concept of lost
sales at the box o¢ ce related to the unauthorized downloading of "Cam" copies (clandestine
video recordings of lms made during projections in theaters) of widely released movies at
a popular BitTorrent website and nds that the unauthorized downloading of Cam movies
has no important e¤ects on the box o¢ ce sales of individual movies. The low quality of
Cam movies means that they are not a good substitute for high-quality movies in theaters.
In my article, I estimate the box o¢ ce loss caused by TS versions and DVD versions with
better quality and enough piracy supply variation.
There are concerns regarding the generalizability of the results and selection bias
caused by the sample. Surveys or website tracking can cover only a very small segment
of the population. Without complete knowledge of the distribution of products in the
population through piracy as well as legal consumption, the piracy level estimated by the
methods above can hardly represent the total piracy intensity. In addition, most estimations
have an unresolved simultaneity problem since, in the data, the people who download a lot
of music les also tend to be heavy purchasers of music (Liebowitz, 2008). The biased
sample underestimates the true totals. In addition, most studies evaluate the short-term
substitution e¤ects of piracy products and genuine products. A large portion of consumers
are not reacting to piracy variation and only choose piracy products in the short term,
possibly switching to legal products in the long term.
The time di¤erence between the two supplies is a proxy for piracy level without a
sample bias problem. The digital piracy products supply to the global market at same time.
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Once the rst pirated resource comes out on one website, other websites copy and share
it. Ma, Montgomery, Singh, and Smith(2011) use the availability of pre-release movies as a
piracy level proxy to estimate moviespiracy loss. Their results show that pre-release piracy
reduce box o¢ ce revenue by 8 percent. The current article uses proxies similar to those
used in the two studies above. In Ma et al. (2011), only a very small portion of movies in
the US market have a pre-release version. In contrast, I use the time di¤erence between the
two supplies with enough variations to evaluate the problem. The supply method solves the
generalizability problem, but cant show the intensity of piracy behavior. This article uses
the number of searches for free movies on search engines as the piracy intensity proxy.
The article contributes to a growing literature that attempts to estimate the impact
of piracy resources on the sale of legal products. A distinguishing feature of my approach
to evaluating piracy loss is the use of a structural model to quantitatively study the roles
played by the mechanism in explaining the observed e¤ect. An advantage of this approach
is that it is likely to improve external validity: an estimated model can be used to inform
quantitative predictions about the impact of free piracy resources on legal products in
di¤erent industries and countries.
3.3 Background
In this section I discuss some of the essential background features of the Chinese
motion picture market, piracy websites, and the data collected in order to analyze how
pirated movies change the sales of legal products.
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China, the second largest motion picture market in the world, generated $6.78 billion
in box o¢ ce revenues in 2016. It has about six hundred million Internet users and a 44.1
percent internet penetration rate. Thousands of websites and numerous peer-to-peer le-
sharing networks, FTP services, and free video websites make copyrighted works available
for free to Internet users in China (Priest, 2006). The majority of the population, especially
the segment living in small cities and rural areas, has no theaters nearby. Most Internet
users in China turn to free online movies as the rst choice for movie viewing, and their
piracy behavior could hardly be relatively large" enough to be punished by law, which is
considered an important reason for the high piracy level in China (Priest, 2006). There are
strict censorship systems2 and protectionism in the Chinese lm industry. All screenplays
in China must be approved by the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television
(SARFT). Foreign producers can enter the Chinese market only by importing their movies
as quota movies,3 or as movies co-produced with local producers.4 Foreign movies could
be imported through buyout,5 but this only allows the producers to sell the copyright
to the Chinese distributor; they cannot participate in distribution. SARFT also blocks
2The Chinese State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) is re-
sponsible for censoring any materials that o¤end the sensibilities of the Chinese government or Chinese
cultural standards. In 2001, the SARFT issued mandatory guidelines for lm content that highlights 31
categories of prohibited content ; including violence, pornography, and anything else that may incite ethnic
discrimination or undermine social stability."
3The quota was 20 until 2013, when it was raised to 34.
4There are strict requirements on movie content and investment share. The key requirements are that
one or more Chinese production entities accredited by the SARFT must be participants; at least one third
of cast members must be from the mainland; and the story must have enough Chinese elements.
5A buyout movie is a foreign movie acquired by a Chinese local distributor at a xed price to be released
in China (Chinalmbiz, 2012).
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foreign movies during the peak season to increase the market share of domestic movies
(McCutchan, 2013). Censorship and policies of protectionism cause release delays which
reduce the time lag between piracy supply and theater supply and at times make pirated
movies available earlier than theatrically released movies. In China, the absence of legal
DVD sales and on-demand Internet streaming media, such as Netix, means that the box
o¢ ce is almost the only revenue resource for producers and distributors, which makes it is
easier to capture the direct piracy loss in this market.
The level of copyright infringement in China is widely regarded as one of the worst
in the world. A 2009 survey by the EntGroup6 shows about 98 percent of Chinese Internet
users have used the Internet to access movies and that free movies from the Internet are
the rst choice of about 80 percent of users. The piracy resource comes mainly from foreign
piracy websites and some theaters in China. The piracy websites upload the movies or links
to the movies on their webpages as soon as they get access to them. The websites also check
the quality and label the version of these movies. Di¤erent versions of pirated movies are
marked as Cam, TS, BD, DVDscr, R5, HD, or Blueray, depending on piracy method and
quality. The Cam version, which appears online after the rst preview or premiere of the
lm and has very low quality, has no substitution e¤ects on theaterically released movies
(Milot, 2014). The TS version is a copy shot in an empty cinema or from the projection
booth with a professional camera mounted on a tripod and is directly connected to the
sound source. The TS versions quality is much better than the Cam version and clear
6EntGroup, Inc. is a consulting rm that specializes in the Chinese movie industry.
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enough to watch. It appears online several days to weeks after the rst preview or premiere
of the lm. I dene DVD version as any DVDscr, BD, R5, HD or Blue ray versions
that come from DVD resources and are of higher quality than the TS version. This article
estimates the box o¢ ce loss caused by the TS and DVD versions. The Chinese government
rarely makes e¤orts to punish individualspiracy activities, but has launched occasional
campaigns against infringers in response to pressure from foreign and domestic copyright
owners (Priest, 2006). Its typical action is to shut down major piracy websites and prohibit
illegal DVD sales on the street. When these campaigns end, however, new piracy websites,
come out to replace the old ones. Most of the current piracy websites were founded after
2010. The survivors of these campaigns usually have strict membership systems and allow
only members to access piracy resources. I bought memberships in six websites and collected
piracy information from them.
3.4 Data
The data for this study has three parts: box o¢ ce data, piracy level data, and lm
characteristics data.. The box o¢ ce dataset has three parts: the moviesoverall, weekly,
and daily box o¢ ce revenues at each theater. The moviesoverall box o¢ ce data are from
SARFT, which collects this data directly from the automatic ticketing system of each theater
for the theaters that use this system.7 These data pertain 1,039 movies in wide release from
7The theaters without an automatic system report their box o¢ ce to SARFT every month. In order
to prevent the hiding of box o¢ ce sales, SARFT requires theaters to provide paper receipts with movie
information to consumers. The real income received by the theater (rather than the ticket price) from
discount tickets, group tickets, and theater VIP tickets are counted in the box o¢ ce. The box o¢ ce is the
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2006 to 2012. Figure 26 reports summary statistics for the wide-release moviesbox o¢ ce
revenue by year. It shows that from 2006 to 2013 the median box o¢ ce increased. The
daily box o¢ ce data are from the Wanda Theater Chain the biggest theater chain in China
with 15 percent of market share. The data are from December 2011 to June 2013.8 Table
21 shows that the movies are allocated an average of 6.48 screens in each theater every day.
The average daily audience is 225 people. The average price is 60 yuan.9 Daily box o¢ ce is
14,984 yuan. Chinas weekly box o¢ ce data are from the Pacic Website and EntGroup.10
980 movies have weekly box o¢ ce data. Hong Kong box o¢ ce data is from Box O¢ ce Mojo.
This companys international section covers weekly and historical box o¢ ce information for
Hong Kong.
Piracy-level data comprise the second part of the data. Figure 25 provides an example
of these methods, using them to estimate the piracy level of the movie Hunger Games
(2012).11 This gure shows the opening delay, the date that the pirated version of the movie
appeared, and the number of searches. There is a time lag between the US opening day
and the Chinese opening day, which is called "opening lag." Between the two opening days,
money received by the theater chain, rather than the consumers payment. The two values are di¤erent
because some consumers buy tickets from ticketing websites that charge an extra fee (around 10 percent).
8Wanda posted each movies daily box o¢ ce data from its ticketing system. Because the Wanda ticketing
system doesnt count price deal, the average price in this data is higher than the real average price.
9Usually, in Chinese theaters, the half-price ticket is about 25 to 40 yuan. The ordinary movies price is
about 60 to 70 yuan. The price of a new blockbuster is about 80 to 90 yuan. 3D and IMAX movie are more
than 100 Yuan.
10 I choose two resources, because, although Pacic was the rst box o¢ ce website to exist in China, it
stopped providing box o¢ ce data in 2010.
11The lms US release date was March 23, 2012. Its Chinese release date was June 14, 2012.
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there are TS versions and DVD versions of the movies available dates. The gap between the
date the pirated version uploaded online and the movies release date in China is the t,
which is called "TS lag" and "Clear lag." The number of searches for "the hunger games
download" on Baidu after the day the TS version became available can also be a proxy for
piracy level. Searching after the TS available is a proxy for an attempt to pirate movies,
which is called "name download search amount." The movies opening date information
comes from Mtime.12 I collected the available piracy date from six Chinese online forums
one le-sharing website,13 and an international movie-sharing website.14 On these websites,
one can nd movies with upload date and resource-type information. The earliest one is
the versions date of availability.
Figure 29 shows the distribution of t. "Mainstream"15 movies with very low qual-
ity become available to pirate two months after their release in theaters. The variable "the
number of name download searches" records the number of times that the movie was down-
loaded, according to the Baidu index, a value that means the search amount per ten million
users per day. I collected movie name" and movie name download" (both in Chinese) as
12Mtime, a China-based movie web portal, has dedicated itself to providing four categories of movie
services: Chinas largest movie/TV database, Chinas top movie review and critics service, the only cinema
and show time search engine in China, as well as the largest movie marketing and promotion services
(Chinawhisper, 2012).
13The six forums are UUNiao, Feiniao, Shengchengjiayuan, the Third World, BTbbt, and Zhuzhu. The
le_sharing website is Dygod.
14The Pirate Bay is a website that provides torrent les and magnet links to facilitate peer-to-peer le
sharing using the Bit Torrent protocol (The Pirate Bay, 2013). It provides a movie piracy resources to
Chinese Internet users. Even when the Chinese government blocks this website, Chinas Internet users are
still able use the technique called "Fanqiang" -breaching the Great Firewall of China  to reach the site.
15Mainstream" movies are usually produced for the Communist Party political propaganda.
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the estimation of movie popularity and willingness to download. I use lm name down-
load" between the date of TS availability and the moviesrst showing month as a proxy
for piracy level. In general, after the date of TS movies availability, these attempts success-
fully nd the piracy resources to download. Table 19 provides the summary of the variables
generated from the Baidu index. On average, the search amount of name download" is
35,533. Given the fact that China has 0.6 billion Internet users and Baidu has about 80
percent of the market share, the average download attempt is roughly about 1.5 million. In
the estimation, omitted variables could cause a downward bias. I use the number of searches
for movies name download" before the piracy resource is available as the instrument of
the number of searches for movie name download" after the piracy resource is available.
The number of searches for movies name download" before the piracy resource is available
can be viewed as the willingness to consume a pirated movie, which correlates to the piracy
level, but does not a¤ect box o¢ ce directly. Table 19 shows that the average search number
in the opening week is 11,993, which means that about 0.7 million people try to search for
information about a movie during its opening week.
I obtained the lm characteristics data from Mytime, which contains budget, direc-
tor, actors, and actresses,16 lm length, lm type, producer information, and distributor
information. The Chinese public holiday system17 consists of both solar calendar holidays
16The Chinese director level is ranked by Forbes Celebrity ranking. The foreign director rank is from
the Celebrity Networth website. The ranking of the starring foreign actor and actress is from the Vulture
websites. The authors dene the director, actor and actress level dummies according to these ranks.
17 I get public holiday dates from the Chinese central governments public holiday schedule, and then
generate holiday dummies as season control.
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and lunar calendar holidays. Month or week dummies are no longer enough to capture the
movie season. If a movie is distributed in the period between two weeks before the season
and the end of the holiday, I assume that the movie is distributed during the season and
assign the season a dummy value of 1.
3.5 Model
In this section, I present a partial equilibrium model. The model serves two purposes.
First, it provides an estimation framework that I use to quantitatively assess the substitution
e¤ect of movie piracy on theater movies. Second, it delivers qualitative predictions that I
use to guide my empirical evaluation of the change in piracy supply lag. My interpretation
is that delays in the piracy supply attract more people to watch movies released in theaters.
The economy consists of M consumers and a single theater. The theater and all
the consumers make their decisions simultaneously. In my empirical application, there is
theater supply and piracy supply, with time lag between the supply availability of the two.
Consumers gain utility from watching earlier. Taking movie quality, supply lag, and demand
as given, the theater chooses the optimal price for each movie. Taking the movie quality,
supply lag and price as given, consumers choose the way to watch the movie or not to
watch it. In my empirical application, I work with data (on qualities, supply lag, and box
o¢ ce revenues) that refer to movies. While my empirical setting considers 1,039 movies,
for simplicity, the model is static.
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Consumers have taste indexed by ; with an exponential distribution: f () =
8>><>>:
e ;   0
0; otherwise
.
Only a portion of n consumers can access the movie in theaters, with n 2 [0; 1] ; which cap-
tures theater availability for the population. Movie js ticket price is pj ; the quality is Qj ;
and c is the opportunity cost to watch the movie.  is the discount e¤ect to watch the movie
online, with  < 1, which means that the online version is always of lower quality than the
theater version. tj is the gap between the piracy availability date and the theatrical open-
ing date. To capture the supply time di¤erence, I assume that there are additional costs
to waiting. If theaters distribute the movie earlier than the online resource does (tj > 0),
watching the movie in the theater has an additional benet tj ; otherwise, watching the
movie in the theater has a cost  tj . Qj 2 [Q
 
;
 
Q] and tj 2 [t  ;
 
t]. To simplify the
model, I assume
 
Q= >
 
t; which captures the fact that almost all the movies have piracy
resources within the few months after their release. The consumer is utility 18is:
u (;Qj ; pj ;tj)=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Qj + tj   pj   c; if watched in theater
Qj   c; if watched online
0; otherwise
: (3..1)
Consumers maximize their utility by choosing their method for watching a movie.
Consumer choices, given the taste distribution, are described in Figure 24. The people who
watch the movie in the theater have type ; such that: Qj+tj pj  Qj ; Qj+tj 
pj  c: The people who watch the movie online have type ; such that Qj + tj   pj <
18The utility setting is similar to Yoon (2002), Belleamme (2003), Bae and Choi (2006) and Belleamme
and Peitz (2010). They have utility similar to q   p. I have added some other costs to this model.
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Qj ;Qj  c: The lowest type to watch the movie in the theater is  (pj) =
pj+c tj
(1 )Qj :
In China, the pricing strategy theaters employ is similar to monopoly pricing. Before
its release, each movies distributors negotiate with the theater chain, and determine the
ticket price together. Usually, there is a unique price in one region. Theaters take j ; Qj ,
tj and the consumersreaction as given. The theater incurs no cost to release the movie19.
Choose pj to maximize movie js prot:
 (pj) = max
pj
Mnpj
Z 1
 (pj)
f () d = max
pj
Mnpje
  pj+c tj
(1 )Qj : (3..2)
By the rst-order condition, I get a movies price: pj =
(1 j)Qj
 . People who watch
a movie in the theater have the type:  2
h
1 +
c tj
(1 )Qj ;1
i
. The box o¢ ce revenue of a
movie is:
piracyj =Mn
(1  )Qj

e
 1  c tj
(1 )Qj : (3..3)
The number of theater consumers is: Npiracytheater = Mne
 1  c tj
(1 )Qj :The number of
movie consumers is:Npiracyall = e
  c
Qj : I set a case in which only theater movies are available.
The utility of i to watch movie j is given by:
u (;Qj ; pj ;tj)=
8>><>>:
Qj + 
 
t  pj ; if watched in the theater
c; otherwise
: (3..4)
19The main costs for Chinese theaters are the facility cost and the rent cost. These costs do not a¤ect
certain movies pricing in the short term. In China, distributors dont charge theaters money for movie
copies. There are no xed costs for theaters to show movies. In addition, the marginal cost to show digital
copies of movies is very small. To simplify the model, I assume that the marginal cost is 0.
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In this case, I get that a movies box o¢ ce without piracy is no_piracyj =Mn
Qj
 e
 1  c 
 
t
Qj ;
a movies price is pno_piracyj =
Qj
 ; and the number of audience members for a movie without
piracy is Nnopiracytheater =Mne
 1  c l
 
t
Qj :
Proposition 11 The box o¢ ce of theaters is strictly increasing in tj and n:(See Appen-
dix for proof)
The later a pirated movie comes out the more people get tired of waiting for free
movies and choose to watch it in a theater. So, a larger a pirated movies availability gap
of pirated movies results in a higher box o¢ ce. The more people who can access theaters
means that more people are potential theater movie consumers.
Proposition 12 Nall > nN

all > N
nopiracy
theater > N

theater :When free movies are available,
among the population who can access theaters, there are fewer people going to theaters and
the price is lower. Based on the two facts above, the box o¢ ce revenue is lower when
free movies are available. Among the n population who can access theaters, more people
watch movies when free movies are available. In addition, even if the population can access
theaters, movie audiences (for both pirated and theater movies) are larger than without
piracy.(See Appendix for proof)
More people watch movies when free movies are available. Even if no piracy ex-
isted and everyone could access theater, not all movie consumers watch in the theater when
free movies are available. In addition, there is 1   n population that cannot access the-
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aters. Peoples piracy behavior wont a¤ect theatersbox o¢ ce unless theaters are available
to them. In reality, I can only observe MNpiracytheater and p
piracy
j : The real revenue loss is:
MNnopiracytheater p
nopiracy
j  MNpiracytheaterppiracyj :
Proposition 13 Among the n population that can access theaters, theaterspiracy loss on
these people is strictly decreasing in tj : Decreasing tj decrease the number of people who
watch movies in theaters. The change of tj does not a¤ect the overall number of audience
members.(See Appendix for proof)
tj captures the di¤erences of the suppliesavailability time. The piracy loss vari-
ation caused by it is a short-term loss. tj doesnt a¤ect the overall number of audience
members and just changes the proportion of people watching in theaters. Good movies can
always attract a certain audience size, but the later the pirated movie comes out, the more
the audience loses patience and goes to a theater.
3.6 Empirical Results
The theoretical prediction provides explanations for the reaction of theaters to changes
in supply and demand and the impact of a changing piracy supply lag on box o¢ ce revenues.
I use both structural estimation and linear regressions to evaluate loss due to piracy. To
relate the static model to my empirical setting, I take the simplest possible approach and
assume that all players make their decisions simultaneously. This means that I do not take
into account the dynamic price change and use only the average price in the rst week as
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the proxy for a movies price.
Structural Estimation In this section, I use a structural model to evaluate the parameters
of the theoretical model and consider welfare implications based on the model.
I obtained the marginal substitution rate of the consumption of pirated movies on the
consumption movies in theaters from the linear models. Both the demand piracy products
and the demand for legal product are determined by movie quality, which means the linear
model may have simultaneous problems. The structural model with the equations of both
the quality e¤ects on piracy demand and the quality e¤ects on legal products demand,
rather than estimating the marginal e¤ects in equilibrium, is estimating the two demands
separately and evaluating the substitution rate of the two products without simultaneous
bias.
In the linear model, I estimate the impact of the supply change of the piracy prod-
ucts on the demand for their theatrically released counterparts. The theory model, however,
predicts that movies with di¤erent qualities may have di¤erent substitution e¤ects between
the two. The structural model takes heterogeneity into consideration. Based on the para-
meters of the structural model, I can check the substitution rate between the two products
and the e¤ects of the supply of piracy products on the demand for theaterically released
movies based on di¤erences in movie quality.
The linear model can obtain only the marginal e¤ects of the supply of or demand
for piracy products on the demand for their genuine counterpart, by xing market size,
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the supply of legal products and other exogenous factors. The information from the linear
model is not enough to enable a welfare analysis and policy experiment. In the structural
model, with the assumptions and the parameters from the estimation, I can estimate the
e¤ects of the xed factors on the demand of both the legal and piracy products, and on the
substitution rate between the two products. From the estimation, I can make the welfare
evaluation and policy experiment.
In the structural estimation, however, I need to make some assumptions to close the
function forms. For example, in the structural model, I assume that the ticket price is a
constant for each movie, which ignores theatersreactions to the demand change and causes
the estimation bias in the substitution rate. But in the linear regression, I am able to use the
information from the daily box o¢ ce data to control for these e¤ects. These assumptions
of the structural model could cause a di¤erent estimation bias from the linear estimation.
Both the linear estimation and the structural estimation have their own disadvantages and
advantages. I therefore show the results of both linear and structural models.
I collected data on the average ticket prices in the rst week, which allow me to exploit
theaters reactions to changes in demand; I also collected movie-rating data from move-
rating websites, which are used as a proxy for overall consumers. The following parameters
c, ,  and  in the theoretical model are estimated in this part. In the data, Qj is proxied
by the rating on Mtime; pj is proxied by the price in the opening week; tj represented
TS lag; and Npiracyall is proxied by the number of people rating each movie on Douban. In
the data, there are 793 movies with all the information. I get the following functions from
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the model: Npiracyall = Me
  c
Qj ;piracyj = nPje
 1  c ltj
(1 )QjM and pj =
(1 j)Qj
 : Because
the price proxy is not the real average price, pj = p
1st week
j + "1 =
(1 j)Qj
 + "1; "1 is the
measurement error.
Besides the four parameters mentioned above, there are also two things unknown M
and n in the model. All three functions can be tranformed to linear functions, given the
exponential taste distribution characters. In the linear regression, I can use year dummies
to capture the e¤ects of these unknown parameters and variables. I use the number of
people rating on Douban as the proxy for Npiracyall . I assume that N
piracy
all and NDouban
have the following relationship: Rt  Npiracyall = NDouban, where Rt is the ratio of Douban
members among the overall movie consumers: Because both the number of active Douban
members and the movie market were changing every year, Rt changes every year. By this
assumption, I get: lnNDouban   lnRt = lnNpiracyall + "2; "2 is the measurement error of the
number of audience members.
By the three equations, I get following linear functions: lnNDouban =   c  1Qj +
Dummiest and ln
piracy
j = ln pj   c(1 )  1Qj +

(1 ) 
tj
Qj
+ Dummiest + "3:The error
term "3 is the unobserved factors captured by the unobserved demand shock. In the rst
equation,M and lnRt are captured byDummiest and the constant. In the second equation,
M and n are also captured by Dummiest and the constant. From the functions above, I
can estimate the four parameters c, , and . I therefore get three linear equations with
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error terms:
pj = ' Qj + "1 (3..5)
lnNDouban = 1  1
Qj
+ 2Dummiest + "2 (3..6)
lnpiracyj = C + 1 ln p  2 
1
Qj
+ 3 
tj
Qj
+ 4Dummiest + "3 (3..7)
Assuming that all the error terms satisfy strict exogeneity, I use the OLS method to
estimate the coe¢ cients of the functions above. The rst equation is estimated separately;
the second and the third are estimated jointly. I estimate both models simultaneously, while
accounting for the correlated errors, which can lead to e¢ cient estimates of the coe¢ cients
and standard errors. The coe¢ cients are:
^
' = 5:36;
^
1 = 9;
^
2 =
c
(1 ) = 3:70; and
^
3 = 0:0007. Then, I get c = 19:8;  = 0:004; = 0:13 and  = 0:3:
I assume that the market size was M  n=20,000,000 in 2013, which is proportional
to the overall number of screens20. By no_piracyj = Mn
Qj
 e
 1  c 
 
t
Qj , I predict the box
o¢ ce with piracy, without piracy and the piracy products. Table 20 presents the the
results. The estimate of piracy loss is about 30 percent, on average, and if a pirated movie
is available before release, the average loss will be 32 percent In general, I t the mean
and standard deviation of box o¢ ce revenue and price well. The estimated model is able
to t basic patterns, when the assumed market size is 20,000,000. In Figure 3, however,
the distribution of real box o¢ ce revenue is atter than predicted. Table 20 presents the
sample t for the box o¢ ce and price. The averages of the predicted box o¢ ce and price
20The number of screens was about 18,000 in 2013; 13,000 in 2012; 9,200 in 2011; 6,200 in 2010; 4,700 in
2009; 4,000 in 2008; 3,500 in 2007; 3,000 in 2006.
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are a little lower than those in the real data, and both standard errors of predicted value
are lower.
Linear Regression Using two reduced-form specications, I evaluate box o¢ ce losses. The
rst specication is based on three levels of box o¢ ce factors. The main specication is:
lnijt = 0 + 1pirate_levelijt + Xi + Yj + Zt + "ijt; (3..8)
where ijt is movie is box o¢ ce revenue in region j at time t; pirate_levelijt denotes movie
is piracy level before and during the movies showing period; Xi denotes is attributes, such
as lm types, producer and distributor information, season, home country, movie length, lm
rating on Mtime and Douban, director level, super star number, and the number of searches
on Baidu for the movies name; Zt is the time characteristics; Yj is region characteristics or
theater dummies.
t as the proxy for piracy level The results of specication 1 are presented in Table 21.
I use TS lag as the rst piracy proxy. The rst column controls only for year dummies.
Without controlling for other variables, the coe¢ cient of the piracy level is about 0.0003 and
is insignicant. After controlling for the Douban rate, lm types, producer and distributor
information, and season, the coe¢ cient jumps to 0.0004. After controlling for the detailed
rating information on Mtime, I nd that the coe¢ cient increases to about 0.0005. This
change is due to the fact that t has a negative correlation with movie quality, which
is shown on the 9th column of Table 27. Given the positive correlation between movie
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quality and t, the estimated loss is the lower bound of estimations in this article. This
results suggests that if the t increases by ten days, then the box o¢ ce will decrease by
0.5 percent. Given the huge range of the opening lag, with an opening lag over 1000 days
for some movies, the coe¢ cient of t is very small. I regress one dummy whether the t is
smaller than 0 on the box o¢ ce. I nd that if the t is smaller than 0, then the box o¢ ce
loss could be 32.2 percent of the total revenue. In addition, I also use clear lag and opening
lag as the proxies of t; the results of which are presented in columns 5 and 6 of Table 21.
The coe¢ cient means that if the clear resource comes out 100 days earlier, the box o¢ ce
revenue will be lower by 4.7 percent. If the opening lag is 100 days bigger, the box o¢ ce
revenue will be 6 percent lower.
As I control more variables, the coe¢ cient of t becomes smaller, which suggests
that the omitted variables cause a downward bias. Both Chinese movie consumers and the
SARFT prefer foreign movies that atter China. Such movies may have an easier time
entering the quota list and passing censorship, which leads to both a short release delay
and high box o¢ ce revenue. Daily data tend to reduce the endogeneity problems, because
they estimate the box o¢ ce di¤erence caused by piracy within the same movie. Columns 8
and 9 of Table 21 present daily box o¢ ce results. The available TS dummys coe¢ cient is
-0.729. The results mean that TS resources will decrease daily box o¢ ce by 72.9 percent.
I also add the interactions between the number of days and piracy lag and nd that as the
number of days increases, the piracy loss declines.
The Chinese government has made some moves towards anti-piracy laws in order
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to shut down piracy websites. From August to October 2007, for example, in response to
pressure from the US government, the Chinese government shut down 339 websites, and
handled 1,001 piracy cases, which is two times more than in previous two years. These
impacts reminded me to use DDD to do the estimation. There are three dimensions in this
model: mainland or not, government control period or not, and high piracy level or not. A
total of seven dummies are needed to estimate in the DDD regression.
lnijt = 0 + 1Dc Dml Dt<0 + 2Dml + 3Dt<0 (3..9)
+ 4Dc + 5Dc Dml + 5Dc Dt<0
+ 5Dl Dt<0 + Xi + Yj + Zt + "ijt:
In the equation, Dc is the control period dummy; Dml is the treated dummy; and
Dt<0 is the piracy level dummy. Here, I use the availability of the TS version before the
theatrical release as the piracy level. Xi denotes movie is attributes, and Yj denotes region
js attributes. Dc Dml Dt<0 captures the e¤ect of the movement.
The control group is the Hong Kong market, which has an independent legal system
and a government that is relatively independent from mainland China. According to an
industry associations research, Hong Kong is the region with the lowest piracy level in
the world.21 The Hong Kong motion picture market was not a¤ected by these impacts. I
use three periods as the treatment periods, the month after December 7, 2009 (when the
21Hong Kongs video piracy level was only about 20 percent in 2004 (Chinas was 93 percent). Because
the government of Hong Kong has taken steps towards ghting piracy, the piracy level in Hong Kong has
continued to drop over the last ten years.?
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Chinese government closed more than 500 BT websites); the 100 days after July 14, 2006
(when the Chinese government took a 100-day movement against piracy); and one month
after January 23, 2011 (when the Chinese government closed the P2P le-sharing websites).
One problem with this Hong Kong box o¢ ce data is that the movie characteristics data
include only the 467 movies that have been shown in the Hong Kong market, which is less
than half of the movies released during this period.
Table 23 presents DDD specications results.22 I dene the two treatment periods to
determine whether these anti-piracy movements have short- and long-term e¤ects. The rst
period is from the beginning of the anti-piracy e¤orts to six months later. The government
e¤orts did have some e¤ect in reducing box o¢ ce loss caused by piracy in the six-month
period. To check whether the anti-piracy policies have long-term e¤ects, I extend the control
period to one year. The coe¢ cient ofDcDmlDt<0 becomes insignicant in the one-year
period regression. The insignicant results of the one-year regression indicate that, in the
long run, when new websites and new technologies replace the old ones the piracy supply
return. Without legal actions prohibiting individualsdownloading behavior, Internet users
can always nd new websites or new technologies to replace those that have been banned.
In the rst specication, the estimation of t is downward-biased due to omitted variables.
In the DDD regression, the correlation between unobserved quality and t is captured
by the region di¤erence and period di¤erence, which solves the endogenous problem. The
coe¢ cients suggest that the policies will decrease the piracy loss caused by TS availability
22A detailed explanation of the DDD results is shown in the appendix.
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before theatrical release by about 65 percent in the half-year range. The estimated piracy
loss is bigger than the rst specication and proves that the results of the rst specication
are downward-biased.
"Name download" search amount on Baidu Next, I use the number of name download"
searches on Baidu as a proxy to evaluate piracy intensity. Omitted variables also a¤ect this
estimation. Unobserved qualities of the pirated movies may increase both piracy intensity
and the number of audience members. An instrument is needed to solve this problem.
In this article, I use the number of searches for movie name download" before the piracy
resource is available as the instrument of the number of searches for movie name download"
after the piracy resource is available. The number of searches for movie name download"
before the piracy resource is available can be viewed as the willingness to pirate a movie,
which correlates to piracy level, but does not a¤ect box o¢ ce directly. The high willingness
before TS availability could be transmitted to the period after TS availability, which is
supported by the 5th and 6th columns of Table 26. After controlling for the number of
"movie name download" searches before and after opening, which are proxies for popularity
level, this concern is no longer a threat to the instrument. Table 22 presents the result using
the number of movie name download" searches as the piracy proxy. The result shows that
the search download attempt increased by one in the rst four weeks of showing. This
correlates to a 10 percent drop in box o¢ ce revenue.
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From this result, we know that only a small portion23 of searching is done by marginal
consumers choosing between the free movie and the big screen. The remaining searches did
not a¤ect box o¢ ce revenue but were conducted by Internet users who always choose free
movies over theater viewing. This conclusion requires some assumptions. First, the marginal
consumers have the same ability to search as other Internet users. If they need more
attempts than others to get the free movie links, this result is under-estimated. Nevertheless,
even if there are di¤erences in searching abilities, the di¤erences in searching for free movies
between the two kinds of Internet users are small because it is easy to nd the pirated movie
once it is available. The piracy link spreads rapidly on these free movie websites once the
resources come out. Second, these results ignore the social network e¤ects of piracy. More
people get the free movie from peer-to-peer sharing.
3.7 Discussion
The Welfare Implications Watching movies for free online is the only choice for most Internet
users are able to access movies in China. In the model only the n population can access
theaters. They react to a short-term piracy level variation, and I nd that n is very small in
China. Screen number, theater location, and ticket price are the major factors determining
23Baidu has 80 percent of the market share. There are 600,000,000 Internet users in China. The average
number of searches is about 30,000, which means that for every 10,000,000 Baidu users, there are 30,000
attempts to search the free movies online. So, the average number of searches is about 30,000 times 50 (the
market share times Internet users number, then divided by 10,000,000). The average number of searches #
is therefore 1,500,000. The average box o¢ ce revenue is about 50,000,000, which means that the average
number of audience members is 1,000,000 given that the average price is about 50. This means that if the
number of searches increases by 1,500,000, then the number of theater goers decreases by 100,000. Put
another way, only about 100,000 people among the 1,500,000 Internet users are theater viewers.
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the availability of theatrically released lms. Before 200924, most people in China (especially
the ones in small cities and rural areas) did not have access to movies in theaters. Even
today, very few rural areas have theaters. The number of screens showing lms in China
has increased from about 1,000 in 2002 to 20,000 in 2014. At the same time, the annual box
o¢ ce increased from 0.95 billion yuan in 2002 to 21.7 billion yuan in 2014. The elasticity of
box o¢ ce revenue over the number of screens is 0.468, which suggests that about half of the
movies box o¢ ce growth could be attributed to the growth in the number of screens. In
addition, the ticket price is too high in comparision with other nations. The average price
is 37 yuan (China Mainland Motion Picture Market report, 2013) which accounts for about
4 percent of the average monthly income of the urban population. This high price deters
people from watching movies in the theaters.
In the model, even in the n population, piracy resources will increase the movies
overall number of audience members. Quotas and censorship limit the number of lms that
can be shown in theaters, by which n equals 0. Even if the movies cannot be shown on
theater screens, Chinese Internet users can still nd them online. To some extent taking the
absence of legal DVD sales into consideration, policies such as censorship and quotas lead
to a situation in which unpaid online movies are the only option Chinese Internet users have
for watching certain movies. Given this circumstance, piracy provides consumers with more
choices, in spite of the governments attempts at control. In China, there are incredibly long
lists of banned movies. But all of them can be found on Chinas Internet. In this market,
24The Chinese government began to subsidize the building of theater chains in small cities in 2009.
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which the government controls so tightly, piracy allows more people to watch movies and
diversies peoples choices, which leads to welfare improvement. This model, however,
has not considered the long-run supply change caused by piracy. In the long run, it may
decrease producersincentive to supply movies. As Zhang (2012) mentions, Chinas entire
population may benet from piracy; however, people attribute the relative lack of creative
productivity in China to piracy. The overall welfare inuence is thus still uncertain, as the
previous literature concludes(Hinnosaar, 2002).
The Policy Implications Quota and censorship also constrain the motion picture market
in China. The quantity and quality of the movies in the market are inuenced by the
governments preferences. The 9th column of Table 27 suggests thatt is determined mainly
by the opening lag, which is caused by censorship and protectionism. The elimination of
"unsuitable content" through censorship increases the opening lag by 69 days, on average,
according to the estimation in the 7th column of Table 30. Most movies with an opening
lag are imported movies, which have higher average quality compared to domestic movies.
Because of the quotas, most foreign movies are buyout movies,25 which have very long
opening delays. Good-quality foreign movies therefore usually have a long opening lag,
which could indicate a positive relation between opening lag and the Douban rate quality
indicator. The positive correlation between opening lag and movie quality also suggests that
the main results of t are the low boundary of piracy loss. Governments protectionism
25Aside from the time loss caused by censorship, distributors also spend some time monitoring for movies
box o¢ ce performances in foreign markets in order to determine which movies to purchase.
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and censorship indirectly cause greater piracy loss.
TheatersReaction to Piracy By adding price and screen allocation into the daily regression,
the coe¢ cient of TS availability decreases from -0.729 to -0.172. Theaters drop the price
and the number of screens26 allocated to the movies when piracy resources are available.
The di¤erence between the two coe¢ cients means that some of the loss of the box o¢ ce
sales is caused by theaters themselves because they allocate fewer screens to the movie when
they know that the pirated movie is available online. Theatersreactions to the demand
change caused by piracy also contributes to the decrease in moviesbox o¢ ce revenue. The
13th and 14th columns of Table 27 present the theatersreaction to piracy. As mentioned
above, theaters decrease allocated screens and the price of the movies being pirated. This
result may answer the question as to why most movies in China have very short opening
periods compared with a market less vulnerable to piracy. As time passes, the movies being
pirated more are less likely to entice consumers to spend their money at the theatre. In
the rst column of Table 27, I nd that a high piracy level decreases a movies opening
week numbers. The short showing period prevents consumers who are insensitive to the
latest movie news from watching these movies in theaters. Theatersreactions caused by
the limitation of the numbers of screens and market structure magnify piracy loss. Reacting
quickly to change in demand and supply increase theatersrevenues and decrease the movies
overall box o¢ ce revenues.
26For most theaters in China, people can book the ticket one or two days in advance.
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Full Substitution in the Short Term In the second and third columns of Table 27, I regress
the piracy level on the number of people rating the movie on Douban and Mtime, which are
proxies for the overall number of audience members. I nd that the piracy level does not
a¤ect the rating number on the two websites. The results indicate that the overall number
of audience members is determined solely by movie quality and is not a¤ected by piracy
level. Internet users will always choose to watch a good movie, by whatever means are
available. The way they choose to watch the movie, especially for the marginal consumers,
depends mainly on the piracy resources available. The early free movies online pull just the
marginal consumers out of the theater. In other words, Internet users will always switch
to the free version online, especially if the movies are o¤ of the big screen or not shown in
theaters. t has no e¤ects on the overall number of consumers, which is consistent with
the models conclusion.
3.8 Conclusion
This article has attempted to estimate the substitution e¤ects of pirated movies- the
free online movies available on peer-to-peer le-sharing websites- on theater movies. Using
newly-constructed data collected from piracy websites in China as well as search engine
data, I constructed two proxies: the time lag between piracy supply and legal supply, and
the number of searches on the search engine Baidu, to evaluate the piracy level. I found a
signicant causal e¤ect of piracy level on box o¢ ce revenue in China: The results of the
structural estimation show that the average piracy loss is 30 percent in this market and that
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pirated movies that become available before theatrical release reduce a movies box o¢ ce
by 32 percent. OLS results imply that pirating before a day decreases the daily revenue by
about 70 percent on average. The DID results imply that the anti-piracy actions that shut
down the major websites could increase the box o¢ ce of movies released in the period by
about 70 percent, but the e¤ects disappear in the long run. Protectionist and censorship
policies cause major release delays in this market, which cause an earlier piracy supply
relative to theater supply and lead to a higher piracy level.
The second aim of this article was to reveal the mechanism by which piracy activities
a¤ect box o¢ ce revenue. Box o¢ ce losses caused by piracy are substantial. Substution
elasticity, however, is small. My instrumental variable results on the number of movie
searches on Baidu, based on a plausibly exogenous instrument, nd a small e¤ects, and
only a small portion of the free movie search attempts are made by marginal consumers
who are choosing between watching big-screen movies and watching free movies. The rest
of the piracy attempts are committed by the Internet users who cannot access theaters at
all. The absence of legal products makes piracy products the sole choice for most of Chinas
population. Besides the rst-order loss caused by demand decreasing, theaters also adjust
the price and screen allocation to the demand change; this behavior accounts for three
quarters of the box o¢ ce change.
A limitation of the present study is its focus, due to data constraints on the long-
run supply change caused by piracy. Without considering the long-term supply e¤ects,
pirated movies increase social welfare. The governments protectionism and censorship
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policies reduce the quality and quantity of the supply of movies to theaters and indirectly
cause piracy losses. In the static model, the producerspiracy losses will be transferred
to consumers, thus a¤ecting their welfare. Taking low theater coverage rates and policy
restrictions into consideration, just in the short term, piracy diversies consumerschoices,
allows more people to watch movies, and improves overall welfare. Piracy may reduce
social welfare, however, by reducing the producersincentive to produce movies. Evaluating
piracys long-term welfare e¤ects is a promising direction for future research.
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Figure 1 Female working time by age 
 
Note: Data from CHNS. The first graph is the female working time of urban area. The 
second one is the female working time of rural area. In the figures above, I normalize the 
overall time equal to 1. Assume each individual can have 14 hours to work at most each 
day. I define working time = (annual work month/12) × (daily work hour/14) × (weekly 
work day/7). 
Figure 2 Wage structure by age cohort in simulation 
 
Note: The money unit is Yuan. The first graph represents the benchmark wage structure. 
I get the wage structure from CHNS data 2006-2011. The average wage rates of two 
households are always smaller than the care service. The second graph is the wage structure 
2. In the wage setting, the wage growth rate by age is from the wage structure of 2000-
2004. 
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Figure 3  Average income transfer and support by age 
  
Note: Data from CHARLS 2008-2013. The first graph is the money transfer decisions. The 
second graph is the support decisions. The money unit is Yuan. Age is grandparents’ age. 
Transfer is the sum value of the gift, regular monetary in-kind support, and non-regular 
monetary in-kind support. The care hour is the average hour to take care of grandchildren 
or taken care by children per year. The working hour is the average working hour of 
grandparents. 
 
Figure 4 Average death rate by age 
 
Note: The death rates are from the National Population and Reproductive Health Science 
Data Center of China. The value is the average death rate of the age cohort. 
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Figure 5 Simulation results: working hour by age 
 
Note: Data from CHNS. Results of the first graph are from simulation. The parameters 
are following benchmark setting: care service subsidies are 0; inheritance tax is 0; 
mandatary retirement age is 10; the wage rate is given by wage structure 1 (shown in the 
first graphs of Figure 1); 42% are type 1 and 58% of households are type 2; grandparents’ 
initial saving is 375,000; and I normalize the overall time to 1. The second graph compares 
the labor supply by age from simulation and data. The simulation result is using a contract 
with benchmark setting.  
Figure 6 Simulation results: Average asset level by age 
 
Note: Money unit is Yuan. The parameters are following benchmark setting: care service 
subsidies are 0; inheritance tax is 0; mandatary retirement age is 10; the wage rate is given 
by wage structure 1 (shown in the first graphs of Figure 1); 42% are type 1 and 58% of 
households are type 2; grandparents’ initial saving is 375,000; and I normalize the overall 
time to 1. The first graph is the simulation results of the asset level by age. The second 
graph compares the asset level by age from simulation and data. The data is from CHNS 
2006-2011. The simulation result is using a contract with benchmark setting.  
 
148 
Figure 7 Simulation results: Net transfer from parent to grandparent 
 
Note: The money unit is Yuan. Transfer and care support value is defined by net transfer 
plus labor support value. Labor support value is defined by the support hour time support 
opportunity cost. Money unit is Yuan. The parameters are following benchmark setting: 
care service subsidies are 0; inheritance tax is 0; mandatary retirement age is 10; the wage 
rates are given by wage structure 1 (shown in the first graphs of Figure 1); 42% are type 
1 and 58% of households are type 2; grandparents’ initial saving is 375,000; and I normalize 
the overall time to 1. 
 
Figure 8 Experiment: grandparent initial saving is 125,000 
 
Note: The money unit is yuan. In this part, I have changed grandparents’ initial savings 
from 375,000 in benchmark to 125,000. The first graph is transfer value information. The 
second graph is the labor supply information. Except grandparents’ initial savings, the rest 
of parameters is following benchmark settings. 
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Figure 9 Simulation results: Labor supply of different types of households 
 
Note: I compare the labor supply of the households with different types of preference on 
child care and elder care. In Graph 1, both households are type1. In Graph 2, both 
households are type2. The money unit is Yuan. In the contract, 33.64% of the pair of 
parents and grandparents is both type 1 preference; and 17.64% are both type 2 preferences. 
Except the preference setting, the rest of parameters is following benchmark settings. 
 
Figure 10 Policy experiment: Child/elder care subsidy and labor supply 
`  
Note: Results from simulation. Both households are in a contract. There are care service 
subsidies on both child care and elder care service. Except for the car service subsidies 
setting, the rest of parameters is following benchmark settings. 
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Figure 11 Policy experiment: Labor supply after Delay retirement age 
 
Note: Results from simulation. Both households are in a contract. In this part, I move the 
mandatory retirement age from 9 in benchmark to 10. Both households retire later for one 
period. In the first graph, except for the setting of mandatory retirement age, the rest of 
parameters is following benchmark settings. In the second graph, the wage rates are given 
by wage structure 2. Except for the setting of mandatory retirement age and wage rates, 
the rest of parameters is following benchmark settings. 
 
 
Figure 12 Policy experiment: Labor supply and saving with Inheritance tax 
     
Note: Results from simulation. Both households are in a contract. In this part, I move the 
mandatory retirement age from 9 in benchmark to 10. Both households retire later for one 
period. Except for the setting of mandatory retirement age, the rest of parameters is 
following benchmark settings. The first graph shows the result of the labor supply. The 
second graph shows the result of the savings. 
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Figure 13 timeline of NCEE 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14 # of exam takers and # of student enrolled in NCEE 
 
Note: Data from Chinese Educational Testing Yearbook  2010 
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Figure 15 Urban-Rural Disparities in High School Promotion Rate 
 
Note: data from china national statistical bureau 
 
 
Figure 16 Score distribution of Yunnan in 2014 
 
 
Note: Data from Yunnan Provincial Department of Education 
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Figure 17 College seat allocation example 
 
Note: the X axis is the talent and the Y axis is the cumulative distribution. The blue line 
is the uniform seat distribution of p in the whole sample. The red line is the seat 
distribution in group 0.  
 
 
 
Figure 18 Example: Human capital investment level 
 
Note: the X axis is the talent and Y axis optimal human capital level. 
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Figure 19 Enrollment rate of different school level in China 
 
Note: In the figure above, the enrollment ratio means that the number of students enrolled 
in a certain level school to the number of people at the age to enter the school. In 1986, 
the Chinese began to provide nine-year compulsory education. After that, the primary 
school enrollment rate kept at about 100%, and the middle school enrollment rate increase 
from 70% to about 98%. The high school enrollment rate increased from 23% to about 
75%, and college enrollment rate increase increased from 3% to 23%. 
 
Figure 20 College enrollment rate  
 
Note: Data from Chinese Education Yearbooks.  College enrollment rate is defined by the 
number of students enrolled in college divided by the number of students that took the 
exam by year and province 
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Figure 21 College enrollment rate   
 
Note: Data from Chinese Educational Testing Yearbooks. College enrollment rate is defined 
by the number of students enrolled in college divided by the number of students graduated 
from high school. 0 is the sample before 1998; 1 is the sample between 1998 and 2002; 3 is 
the sample between 2003 and 2008; 4 is the sample after 2009. 
 
Figure 22 High school enrollment ratio 
 
Note: Data from China Education Yearbook. High school enrollment rate means the 
number of students enrolled in high school divided by the number of students graduate 
from middle school) by year and province. 0 is the sample before 1998; 1 is the sample 
between 1998 and 2002; 3 is the sample between 2003 and 2008; 4 is the sample after 2009. 
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Figure 23 Middle school enrollment rate 
 
 
Note: Data from Chinese Education Yearbook. Middle school enrollment rate is defined by 
the number of student enrolled by middle school divided by the number of students 
graduated from primary school by year and province. Group 0 is the sample before 1998; 
group 1 is the sample between 1998 and 2002; group 2 is the sample between 2003 and 
2008; group 3 is the sample after 20. 
 
Figure 24 the Consumers’ Choices  
 
Notes: The y axis is the utility value. The x axis is the personal taste.  uonline  is the utility 
value of watching  movie j online given different taste level θ. utheater is the utility of 
watching the movie j in the theater. Given the value of the two function if both utility 
values are smaller than 0, the consumer will not watch the movie. If watching movie online 
brings higher utility than watching in theaters and not watching the movie, consumer will 
choose to watch online; if watch movie in theater has higher utility than watching online 
and not watching the movie, the consumer will watch movie in theater.  
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Figure 25 The Hunger Games Baidu Search 
 
Notes: The data is from Baidu search data. The x axis is the day. The y axis is the search 
amount on Baidu. The number means the daily search amount per 10 million users. “The 
Hunger Games Download” search amount means the daily search amount of “The Hunger 
Games Download” (饥饿游戏下载) in Chinese.  “The hunger game” search amount means 
the daily search amount of “The Hunger Games Download” (饥饿游戏) in Chinese. In this 
graph, the opening lag equals to the Chinese Opening day(the red line) minus the US 
opening day(the black line). TS/Clear lag equals the Chinese Opening day minus the 
TS(the green line)/ the DVD availability(the blue line) day. The Baidu search amount 
variable defined in the paper is the overall “The Hunger Games Download” search amount 
from the TS available day to the two weeks after China opening. 
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Figure 26 Predicted box office from estimation 
 
Notes: The data is from the real box office data and the estimation result. It used the 
subsample of the observations with weekly price information. The solid line is from the 
real box office data. The line of “market size=20m” is the predict box office assuming 
market size equaling to 20million. The line of “market size=10m” is the predict box office 
assuming market size equaling to10 million. The line of “market size=15m” is the predict 
box office assuming market size equaling to15 million.  
Figure 27 The Box Office Distribution Over Year 
 
Notes: The mainland box office data is from the Chinese mainland box office data set. The 
mainland box office value is 10,000 Yuan (about 1,500~1,600 US Dollar). The box office 
data is from the Hong Kong box office data set. The Hong Kong box office value is 10,000 
Hong Kong dollars. The upper line means the upper adjacent value. The lower line means 
the lower adjacent value. The upper hinge of the box means the 75th percentile value. The 
lower hinge of the box means the 25th percentile value. The middle line of the box means 
the median value. 
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Figure 28 Opening Lag Distribution 
 
Notes: The data is from the movie characteristic data set. The sample is from the movies 
with positive opening lag (433 from 1040 movies). The x axis is valued in days. 
   
Figure 29 Pirate Resource Available Day Lag 
 
Notes: The data is from the movie characteristic data set. The x axis is valued in days.  
In the graph, “-100” means the value is smaller than 100 days; “100” means the value is 
larger than 100 days.  
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Table 1 Individuals and Household characteristics 
Variable Mean SD N Variable Mean SD N 
CHNS Data 
working (age 24 to 60) 62% 0.49 11906 working time 0.34 0.13 8927 
education year (age 24 to 60) 7.54 4.67 11906 annual HH income 3537
8 
44957 10102 
HH food and durable good 
consumption (age larger than 45) 
2016
1 
30270 20161 working income rate 3311
0 
41474 8927 
HH food and durable good 
consumption 
3177
4 
60717 53483 working income 1190
2 
12467 8927 
rural HH 80% 0.4 11906 HH net non-working 
income 
2749
5 
36770 31186 
child care time 0.45 0.51 17128 Leisure 0.43 0.37 79613 
house value (age larger than 45) 4025
06 
72452
9 
7967 Asset level (age larger 
than 45) 
4985
64 
10292
26 
7967 
house value 3646
09 
68492
9 
21366 Asset level 4552
23 
98672
2 
21366 
child taken care by outside service 19% 0.39 8,543 hour/day taken care by 
outside service 
2.66 4.54 1,623 
CHARLS Data 
education year 4.97 4.33 22768 rural HH 78% 
 
22768 
working 0.19 0.39 22768 eldest child’s annual 
income 
3490
8 
39943 7142 
HH food and durable good 
consumption 
2313
1 
66379 38177 total HH annual income 2461
8 
69178 31186 
HH consumption 3031
6 
72578 31186 total HH annual working 
income 
1219
7 
48741 31186 
asset level 4232
70 
44702
81 
9368 total HH health spending 2275 8882 31186 
house value 3090
35 
37384
49 
9368 transfer from child last 
year 
71% 
 
22,228 
money value from child last year 1537 3,477 22,228 transfer from parent last 
year 
2%  22,228 
child care hour last week 29 28 22,228 transfer to child last year 31%  22,228 
money value from other relatives last 
year 
459 1,962 22,228 transfer to child last year 26%  22,228 
parent care hour last week 8.73 26.89 22,228 transfer to parent last 
year, age<60 
0.15 0.15 35,877 
child care hour last week 31 30 22,228 transfer to parent last 
year, age<60 
0.11 0.12 8,877 
Note: The money unit is Yuan. I define working as the people have any kind of income 
from farming, fishing, gardening, and business. I define migration as whether the people 
live in the same city or town. Retirement income is the sum value of pension and retirement 
subsidy. Consumption in CHNS data is all the spending on food and durable goods. 
Consumption in CHARLS data is all the spending on foods, durable good, clothes, traffic 
and other consumptions.  
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Table 2 estimated parameters 
Parameter Definition Method Mean SE 
η Mean utility weight on leisure Two stage GLS 0.88 (0.02) 
ξη The variance of utility weight on leisure Two stage GLS 0.78  
α Mean utility weight on child care Two stage GLS 0.31 (0.01) 
ξα The variance of weight on child care Two stage GLS 0.12  
γ Mean utility weight on elder care (64-72) Two stage GLS 0.06 (0.01) 
ξγ The variance of utility weight on elder care (64-72) Two stage GLS 0.04  
γ Mean utility weight on elder care (73-80) Two stage GLS 0.20 (0.02) 
ξγ The variance of utility weight on elder care (73-80) Two stage GLS 0.05  
γ Mean utility weight on elder care (after 81) Two stage GLS 0.52 (0.06) 
ξγ The variance of weight on elder care (after 81) Two stage GLS 0.73  
ρ Type 1 probability GMM 0.42  
η1 Type1 utility weight on leisure GMM 0.75  
η2 Type2 utility weight on leisure GMM 0.97  
α 1 Type1 utility weight on child care GMM 0.73  
α 2 Type2 utility weight on child care GMM 0.01  
γ 1 Type1 utility weight on child care (64-72) GMM 0.14  
γ 2 Type2 utility weight on child care (64-72) GMM 0.00  
γ 1 Type1 utility weight on child care (73-80) GMM 0.35  
γ 2 Type2 utility weight on child care (73-80) GMM 0.09  
γ 1 Type1 utility weight on child care (after 81) GMM 0.81  
γ 2 Type2 utility weight on child care (after 81) GMM 0.31  
ι Substitution rate of child/elder care from market and relatives MLE 2.51 (0.79) 
φ Correlation between mother and grandmother’s wage rate Correlation 0.46  
β Discount factor Literature 0.97  
R Real interests rate From data 1.01  
wp0 Initial wage rate of mother OLS 55457 (21072) 
wg0 Initial wage rate of grandmother OLS 59519 (22383) 
π1 Wage growth rate by age OLS 0.056 (0.04) 
π₂ Wage growth rate by age square OLS -0.0008 (0.00006) 
Note: The data estimating income, child care and leisure parameters are from CHNS 2006-
2011. Data estimating elder care parameters are from CHARLS 2008-2011. The money 
unit is Yuan. I use GMM methods to estimate the two type preferences. The interest rate 
is taken from World Bank, which is the average interest rate from 2006 to 2012. 
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Table 3 Actual vs. predicted choices and select measures 
 Data Contract Autarky case 
Parents’ working time 0.36 0.34 0.33 
Parent’s working time (before 40) 0.37 0.36 0.27 
Parent’s working time (After 40) 0.35 0.34 0.38 
Parents’ leisure 0.43 0.44 0.37 
Grandparents’ working time 0.23 0.27 0.34 
Grandparents’ leisure 0.47 0.49 0.45 
Child care from outside service 19% 17% 26% 
Child care by grandparents 56% 62% 0 
Elder care from parents 58% 63% 0 
Elder care from outside service 7% 9% 100% 
Transfer from parents last year 31% 34% 0 
Transfer to parents last year 20% 13% 0 
Grandparents’ saving 423,270 378,515 318,080 
Parents’ saving 375,412 345,710 367,777 
Note: The information of working, leisure, child care, and saving of data is from CHNS. 
Elder care information is taken from CHARLS. The prediction values are taken from 
simulation. Money unit is Yuan. The parameters are following benchmark setting: care 
service subsidies are 0; inheritance tax is 0; mandatary retirement age is 10; the wage rate 
is given by wage structure 1 (shown in the first graphs of Figure 1); 42% are type 1 and 
58% of households are type 2; grandparents’ initial saving is 375,000; and I normalize the 
overall time to 1. The second graph compares the labor supply by age from simulation and 
data. The simulation result is using a contract with benchmark setting. 
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Table 4 Province level education resource information 
Stats mean sd N 
GDP per capital(Yuan) 2549.7 6324.85 1978 
Population (*10000) 3427.91 2357.93 1888 
Education Fund (*10000Yuan) 2671233 2665574 512 
National education budget (*10000 Yuan) 1695296 1775728 512 
Tuition income(*10000Yuan) 423943 475143.1 512 
Local college # 48.91 30.58 864 
New college students # (*10000) 10.02 11.02 864 
College student # (*10000) 14.76 28.29 2054 
College graduate # (*10000) 18.21 12.04 288 
College teacher # (*10000) 1.29 1.66 2054 
High school # 487.91 242.38 864 
New high school student # (*10000) 17.4 15.23 864 
High school student # (*10000) 48.87 43.42 864 
Middle school # 566.1 1133.3 2054 
New Middle school student # (*10000) 36.51 31.81 2054 
Middle school student # (*10000) 145.9 146.32 2054 
Middle school graduate # (*10000) 32.71 30.16 2054 
Middle school teacher # (*10000) 10.02 13.05 2054 
Primary school # 36600 8.11 2054 
New Primary school student # (*10000) 51.55 33.87 2054 
Primary school student # (*10000) 343.69 254.38 2054 
Primary school graduate # (*10000) 69.94 88.89 2054 
Primary school teacher # (*10000) 15.28 10.46 2054 
High school graduate # (*10000) 14.49 13.53 864 
High school teacher # (*10000) 1.29 1.66 2054 
Note: Data from China’s national statistical bureau. Money unit is Yuan.  
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Table 5 Enrollment information 
Stats mean sd N 
NCEE enrolled # (*10000) 15.8 15.12 1215 
NCEE taken # (*10000) 65.79 2189.39 1535 
Humanities exam taker # (*10000) 2.33 2.86 1215 
Humanities exam enrolled # (*10000) 5.22 4.94 1023 
Science exam taker # (*10000) 4.22 3.87 1535 
College # of the provinces 91.08 43.28 329235 
New college # of the r province in last year 3.23 5.33 329235 
New college # of the province in last 3 years 6.94 8.91 329235 
New college # of the province in last 5 years 12.2 12.46 329235 
Science exam enrolled # (*10000) 9.3 5.2 1535 
Rank 1 college enrolled # (*10000) 18118.17 10943.54 863 
Rank 2 college enrolled # (*10000) 30726.38 23048.6 863 
Rank 3 college enrolled # (*10000) 20292.98 8606.91 863 
Rank 4 college enrolled # (*10000) 70142.03 90726.96 863 
New college # of neighbor province in last 3 years 34.47 34.68 329235 
New college # of neighbor province in last 5 years 58.87 47.48 329235 
New student # of   neighbor province in last year (*10000) 70.49 67.08 329235 
New college # of neighbor province in last year 16.94 21.92 329235 
Note: The NCEE has four big majors- science and engineering, humanities, art and sports. 
Each student could only take one of them. All the four majors have three mandatory 
subjects: Chinese, Mathematics, and a foreign language—usually English. The students of 
the science and engineering major need to choose one to three from Physics, Chemistry, 
and Biology. The students of the humanities major need to choose one to three 
from History, Geography, and Political Education. There are 4 ranks of college: key 
universities, regular four year universities, regular three year universities, other regular 
three year universities and technical colleges. The higher ranking college enrolls students 
first. After the higher level finishes their enrollment, the next level college begins their 
enrollment. The university rank is also well known to everyone.  
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Table 6 Individual and Household Characteristics 
Stats mean sd N 
Study hour after school 555.19 2401.83 22532 
Child work before 16 0.14 0.35 48305 
Leave School Before 18 0.26 0.44 68963 
Leave School Before High School 0.35 0.48 95305 
Good School Performance 0.42 0.49 48305 
Bad School Performance 0.02 0.13 48305 
Age 33.81 28.78 317919 
Female 0.46 0.5 317919 
Household income 119754 967336 148027 
Rural household 0.22 0.42 317919 
# of kids 0-6 0.23 0.51 83138 
# of kids 6-12 0.32 0.6 83138 
# of kids 12-15 0.2 0.45 83138 
# of kids 15-18 0.61 0.87 83138 
# of people 16-60 2.18 1.28 83138 
# of people >60 0.35 1.1 83138 
Education Spending 0.23 0.51 45466 
Education year 7.16 4.37 315339 
Communist Party Member 0.09 0.29 209216 
Minority 33.81 28.78 315917 
Note: The household and individual data is from Chinese Household Income Project. The 
data were collected through a series of questionnaire-based interviews conducted in rural 
and urban areas in 1988, 1995, 2002, 2007 and 2008. Individual respondents reported on 
their economic status, employment, level of education, sources of income, household 
composition, and household expenditures. Study hour is the annual study hour at home.  
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Table 7 Main results  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Education spending/household income 
College Enrollment Ratio(province level) 0.279*** 0.0893*** 0.0788*** 0.0710*** 0.0825*** 
 
(0.00358) (0.00970) (0.0107) (0.00998) (0.0105) 
Rural*College Enrollment Ratio 
  
-0.0227** 
  
   
(0.0103) 
  
College Enrollment Ratio*HH With High School 
Degree 
  
 0.0556*** 
 
    
(0.00855) 
 
Household income*College Enrollment Ratio 
    
9.55e-07* 
     
(5.44e-07) 
Household income 
    
-4.24e-
06***      
(3.21e-07) 
age 
 
0.00804*** 0.00804*** 0.00826*** 0.00779*** 
  
(0.00135) (0.00135) (0.00135) (0.00132) 
age square 
 
-
0.000244**
* 
-
0.000245**
* 
-
0.000254**
* 
-
0.000236**
*   
-5.06E-05 (5.06e-05) (5.05e-05) (4.96e-05) 
female 
 
-0.00183 -0.00183 -0.00182 -0.00166 
  
(0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00111) 
Rural HH 
 
-0.0804*** -0.0754*** -0.0658*** -0.0371*** 
  
(0.00759) (0.0186) (0.00777) (0.00756) 
HH asset 
 
0** 0** 0** 0 
  
(0) (0) (0) (0) 
# of people age<6 
 
0.000958 0.000950 0.000647 0.000780 
  
(0.00123) (0.00123) (0.00123) (0.00121) 
# of people 5<age<12 
 
0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0110*** 0.0109*** 
  
(0.000877) (0.000877) (0.000875) (0.000860) 
# of people 11<age<16 
 
0.0117*** 0.0117*** 0.0119*** 0.0122*** 
  
(0.00101) (0.00101) (0.00101) (0.000993) 
# of people 15<age<18 
 
0.00211*** 0.00211*** 0.00230*** 0.00296*** 
  
(0.000703) (0.000703) (0.000701) (0.000692) 
# of people  19<age<45 
 
-
0.00770*** 
-
0.00770*** 
-
0.00747*** 
-
0.00598***   
(0.000959) (0.000959) (0.000958) (0.000943) 
# of people  45<age<61 
 
-
0.00482*** 
-
0.00482*** 
-
0.00489*** 
-0.00177 
  
(0.00109) (0.00109) (0.00109) (0.00108) 
# of people  age>60 
 
-
0.00454*** 
-
0.00455*** 
-
0.00447*** 
-
0.00283***   
(0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00105) 
The highest education level in the HH 
 
0.00225*** 0.00225*** 0.000665** 0.00263*** 
  
(0.000216) (0.000216) (0.000279) (0.000212) 
Household with Communism Party Member 
 
0.00267* 0.00269* 0.00236 0.00377** 
  
(0.00158) (0.00158) (0.00158) (0.00155) 
Household with minority 
 
0.00425* 0.00427* 0.00332 0.00174 
  
(0.00230) (0.00230) (0.00230) (0.00226) 
Household with migrant 
 
-0.0133 -0.0133 -0.0133 -0.0213 
  
(0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0135) 
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Household with people  working in state own firm 
 
0.00533** 0.00532** 0.00457* 0.00480** 
  
(0.00245) (0.00245) (0.00245) (0.00241) 
Household with people  working in foreign firm 
 
-0.0220*** -0.0221*** -0.0235*** -0.0159*** 
  
(0.00539) (0.00539) (0.00537) (0.00528) 
Household with people  working in government 
 
-
0.00658*** 
-
0.00657*** 
-
0.00778*** 
-0.00148 
  
(0.00184) (0.00184) (0.00184) (0.00181) 
Year dummies 
 
Control Control Control Control 
Province dummies 
 
Control Control Control Control 
Province*rural dummies 
 
Control Control Control Control 
Constant -
0.0260**
* 
0.0798*** 0.0746*** 0.0794*** 0.113*** 
 
(0.00125) (0.0192) (0.0259) (0.0193) (0.0189) 
Observations 28,169 28,169 28,169 28,169 28,169 
R-squared 0.177 0.261 0.261 0.265 0.290 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The household and 
individual data is from Chinese Household Income Project.   
168 
 
Table 8 2SLS results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Household education spending/household income 
  OLS 2SLS 
Enrollment Ratio 0.0893*** 0.0823*** 0.0909* 0.413*** 0.0854*** 0.0544*** 0.0823*** 
 
(0.00970) (0.0199) (0.0496) (0.0677) (0.0116) (0.0205) (0.0212) 
Rural*College 
Enrollment Ratio 
   
-0.361*** -0.0203* 
  
    
(0.0632) (0.0112) 
  
College Enrollment 
Ratio*HH With 
High School Degree 
   
 
 
0.0721*** 
 
      
(0.00909) 
 
Household 
income*College 
Enrollment Ratio 
      
1.46e-06** 
       
(6.57e-07) 
Control other 
variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0798*** 0.113*** 0.106*** 0.119*** 0.185*** 0.116*** 0.0393* 
 
(0.0192) (0.0230) (0.0408) (0.0229) (0.0565) (0.0226) (0.0208) 
Observations 28,169 28,169 28,169 28,169 28,169 28,169 28,169 
R-squared 0.261 0.293 0.293 0.293 0.292 0.297 0.293 
Instrumental 
variables 
 New college 
#  of 
neighbor 
province 
Enrolled 
student # of 
neighbor 
provinces' 
colleges 
Both Both Both Both 
First stage t test 
 
 F(4, 
28106)=26.4
5 
Prob>F=0.0
000 
F(1, 28108) 
=3.34 
Prob>F=0.067
7 
F(6, 28105) 
=20.36 
Prob>F=0.000
0 
   
Tests of over 
identifying 
restrictions: 
 
 Sargan 
statistic: 
25.614 
Chi-sq(2) P-
val =0.0000 
Sargan 
statistic: 
30.415 
Chi-sq(3) 
P-val =0.0000 
Sargan 
statistic: 
34.512 
Chi-sq(4) P-
val= 0.0000 
   
Tests of 
endogeneity of: 
enrollment ratio          
 
 Endogeneity 
test : 0.791                        
Chi-sq(1) P-
val = 0.3739 
Endogeneity 
test:
0.019 
Chi-sq(1) P-
val= 
0.8907 
Endogeneity 
test :                             
1.945 
Chi-sq(1) P-
val =   
0.1631 
   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The instrumental 
variables “New college #  of neighbor province” are College # of neighbor provinces, New 
college #  of neighbor province in last year, New college #  of neighbor province in last 
3 year and New college #  of neighbor province in last 5 year. The instrumental variables 
“enrolled student # of neighbor provinces' colleges” is enrolled student # of neighbor 
provinces' colleges.  
 
  
169 
 
Table 9 the first stage of 2SLS results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Household education 
spending/household income 
College enrollment Ratio 
College # of neighbor provinces -
0.000154**
* 
 
-
0.000127**
* 
-
0.000537
*** 
 
-
0.000579
***  
(1.57e-05) 
 
(1.75e-05) (7.92e-
06) 
 
(8.83e-
06) 
New college #  of neighbor province in 
last year 
-
0.00206*** 
 
-
0.00219*** 
-
0.0144**
* 
 
-
0.0142**
*  
(0.000427) 
 
(0.000428) (0.000216
) 
 
(0.000216
) 
New college # of neighbor province in last 
3 year 
0.00114*** 
 
0.00168*** 0.00419*
** 
 
0.00333*
**  
(0.000428) 
 
(0.000455) (0.000216
) 
 
(0.000230
) 
New college # of neighbor province in last 
5 year 
2.36e-05 
 
-0.000138 0.00173*
** 
 
0.00198*
**  
(0.000252) 
 
(0.000256) (0.000128
) 
 
(0.000129
) 
Enrolled student # of neighbor provinces' 
colleges 
 
-
0.000189* 
-
0.000596**
* 
 
-
0.00208*
** 
0.000936
*** 
  
(0.000103
) 
(0.000171) 
 
(5.95e-
05) 
(8.62e-
05) 
The college #  of the province in last year -7.59e-05 
 
1.95e-05 -
0.00502*
** 
 
-
0.00517*
**  
(0.000144) 
 
(0.000147) (7.30e-
05) 
 
(7.41e-
05) 
New college # of the province in last 1 
year 
-0.000622 -
0.00247**
* 
-0.00151 -
0.0113**
* 
-
0.0251**
* 
-
0.00990*
**  
(0.000899) (0.000868
) 
(0.000933) (0.000454
) 
(0.00049
9) 
(0.000471
) 
New college # of the province in last 3 
year 
0.00586*** 0.00478**
* 
0.00693*** 0.0331**
* 
0.0282**
* 
0.0314**
*  
(0.00111) (0.00105) (0.00115) (0.000559
) 
(0.00060
5) 
(0.000579
) 
New college # of the province in last 5 
year 
-
0.00515*** 
-
0.00404**
* 
-
0.00577*** 
-
0.0199**
* 
-
0.0145**
* 
-
0.0189**
*  
(0.000766) (0.000717
) 
(0.000786) (0.000387
) 
(0.00041
2) 
(0.000397
) 
Enrolled student # of the province's 
colleges in last year 
-0.0115*** -0.00340 -0.0124*** -
0.0367**
* 
0.0121**
* 
-
0.0353**
*  
(0.00264) (0.00214) (0.00265) (0.00133) (0.00123
) 
(0.00134) 
Control other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.275*** 0.185*** 0.269*** 1.567*** 0.860*** 1.577*** 
 
(0.0292) (0.0186) (0.0292) (0.0147) (0.0107) (0.0147) 
Observations 28,169 28,169 28,169 28,169 28,169 28,169 
R-squared 0.291 0.291 0.292 0.920 0.897 0.921 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1。 The control variables 
are same as the regression of the main results. 
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Table 10   Other education investment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Study hour after school Hour taken care of children 
  2SLS 2SLS 
College Enrollment Ratio 7.573*** 7.975*** 10.72**
* 
1.201*** 1.665** -0.906 
 
(2.549) (2.554) (3.069) (0.35) (0.69) (1.17) 
College Enrollment Ratio*Rural 
 
-5.416** 
  
-0.374 
 
  
(2.381) 
  
(0.48) 
 
College Enrollment Ratio*HH With High 
School Degree 
  
3.546* 
  
3.110** 
   
(1.927) 
  
(1.37) 
Other variables Control Control Control control control control 
Constant -1.904 -2.485 -3.865 -25.25 -29.21 -64.82 
 
(2.941) (2.951) (3.147) (85.94) (88.04) (177.70) 
Observations 5,555 5,555 5,555 9,635 9,635 9,635 
R-squared 0.127 0.128 0.128 0.196 0.159 0.178 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Quit school before graduate from 
high school 
Entertainment min per week 
  Probit  2SLS  
college enrollment ratio -0.121 -3.749*** 0.257 -5,755** -14,184 -8,555** 
 (0.26) (0.44) (0.26) (2,927) (8,724) (4,039) 
college enrollment ratio*rural hukou  5.125***   5,737  
  (0.47)   (5,540)  
college enrollment ratio*household with high 
school educated 
  -
1.058**
* 
  807.3 
   (0.18)   (759.9) 
Other variables Control Control Control control control control 
Constant 3.783*** 5.665*** 3.828**
* 
19,821 -385,703 -239,862 
 (0.52) (0.55) (0.53) (321,038
) 
(521,544
) 
(415,278
) 
Observations 48,675 48,675 48,675 10,993 10,993 10,993 
R-squared    0.347 0.248 0.285 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The sample is 7-19 years old. Study hour is the 
annual study hour at home. The dummy quit school before graduating from high school is the dummy that people quit 
or graduate before they get high school degree. Work dummy is defined by whether the people work or not. House work 
hour is the weekly house work hour. The control variables are same as main results regression. 
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Table 11 Robustness check on different age groups   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age group  Age 7-19 age 16-19 age 12-15 age 7-11 age<7 
College 
enrollment ratio 
0.0893*** 0.0794*** 0.0964*** 0.0847*** 0.0464*** 
 
(0.00970) (0.0174) (0.0182) (0.0148) (0.0148) 
Other variables Control Control Control Control Control 
Constant 0.0798*** 0.637** -0.0119 0.0702 -0.0332 
 
(0.0192) (0.310) (0.221) (0.0490) (0.0240) 
Observations 28,169 9,690 8,967 9,512 8,079 
R-squared 0.261 0.272 0.264 0.275 0.252 
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Age group  Age 7-19 age 7-11 age 12-15 age 16-19 
Middle school 
enrollment ratio 
-
0.0282**
* 
  
-0.0338*** 
  
 
(0.00622
) 
  
(0.00944) 
  
High school 
enrollment ratio 
 
0.0393*
** 
 
 0.0156 
 
  
(0.0083
9) 
 
 (0.0153) 
 
Local college 
enrollment ratio 
  
0.0293**
* 
 
 
0.0250* 
   
(0.0108)  
 
(0.0204) 
Other variables Control Control Control Control Control Control 
Constant 0.167*** 0.136**
* 
0.131*** 0.158*** 0.0248 0.643** 
 
(0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0192) (0.0476) (0.222) (0.311) 
Observations 28,169 28,169 28,169 9,512 8,967 9,690 
R-squared 0.260 0.260 0.259 0.273 0.262 0.271 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The control variables 
are the same as the regression of the main results. Middle school enrollment ratio is the 
number of new middle school students divided by the number of primary school graduate 
student in the year. High school enrollment ratio is the number of new high school 
students divided by the number of middle school graduate students in the year. Local 
college enrollment ratio is the number of new college students divided by the number of 
high school graduate student number in the year. Middle school enrollment ratio is the 
number of new middle school students divided by the number of primary school graduate 
student in the year. High school enrollment ratio is the number of new high school 
students divided by the number of middle school graduate student in the year. Local 
college enrollment ratio is the number of new college students divided by the number of 
high school graduate students in the year.  
 
 
Table 12 robust check on different type of households 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLE
S 
Education spending/household income 
 female male Minority Not 
minority 
HH with 
high 
school 
HH without 
high 
school 
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degree degree 
enrollment 
ratio 
0.0600** 0.0939*** -0.138** 0.0471** 0.141*** 0.0458 
 
(0.0256) (0.0285) (0.0672) (0.0206) (0.0330) (0.0352) 
Other 
variables 
Control Control Control Control Control Control 
Constant 0.0591** 0.104** 0.113** 0.144*** -0.0686* 0.138*** 
 
(0.0285) (0.0474) (0.0491) (0.0237) (0.0400) (0.0289) 
Observation
s 
13,555 14,614 2,512 25,657 23,813 15,387 
R-squared 0.290 0.300 0.318 0.296 0.249 0.216 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)  
VARIABLE
S 
Education spending/household income 
Income 
percentile 
0-20 
percentile 
20-40 
percentile 
40-60 
percentile 
60-80 
percentile 
80-100 
percentile 
 
enrollment 
ratio 
-0.0501** -0.103 0.688*** 0.148*** 0.0336*  
 (0.0216) (0.0902) (0.208) (0.0321) (0.0299)  
Other 
variables 
Control Control Control Control Control  
Constant 0.221 0.422*** -0.174** -0.0702** 0.0180  
 (0.244) (0.0729) (0.0853) (0.0324) (0.0444)  
Observation
s 
30,296 15,853 27,706 42,710 42,551  
R-squared 0.213 0.238 0.148 0.145 0.129  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The control variables 
are same as the regression of the main results. Minority is the households belonged to the 
minority races. High school degree household is the household where at least one person 
has a high school or higher degree level. No high school degree household is the household 
without anyone with at least high school degree.  
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Table 13 Other NCEE enrollment variables 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Education spending/household income 
All college enrollment ratio 0.0901*** 
  
 
(0.00951) 
  
Rank 1 college enrollment ratio 
 
0.0628** 
 
  
(0.0256) 
 
4 years college enrollment ratio 
  
0.0447** 
   
(0.0178) 
Other variables Control Control Control 
Constant 0.111*** 0.162*** 0.169*** 
 
(0.0189) (0.0196) (0.0183) 
Observations 28,169 28,169 28,169 
R-squared 0.290 0.288 0.288 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The control variables 
are same as the regression of the main results. Rank 1 colleges are the top 112 colleges or 
universities belong to the 211 Project. The 211 Project is a strategic cross-century project 
formulated by the Chinese government for the implementation of the strategy for 
invigorating the country through science, technology and education. The variable is defined 
by the number of students enrolled by 211 universities divided by the number of students 
that took the NCEE in the same year of the same province.  
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Table 14 Return to education 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Log(individual income) 
  All Before 
1998 
1998-
2004 
After 2004 Rural Urban 
People with college education 0.675*** 0.311*** 0.632*** 0.913*** 0.439*** 0.797*** 
 
(0.0249) (0.0557) (0.0533) (0.0358) (0.0695) (0.0260) 
People with high school 
education 
0.401*** 0.338*** 0.449*** 0.460*** 0.369*** 0.484*** 
 
(0.0161) (0.0297) (0.0324) (0.0254) (0.0248) (0.0210) 
People with middle school 
education 
0.173*** 0.255*** 0.182*** 0.200*** 0.146*** 0.255*** 
 
(0.0130) (0.0241) (0.0265) (0.0205) (0.0168) (0.0211) 
age 0.0948**
* 
0.133*** 0.0844**
* 
0.0722*** 0.107*** 0.0703*** 
 
(0.00380) (0.00665) (0.00797) (0.00653) (0.00528) (0.00494) 
age square -
0.00115*
** 
-
0.00161*
** 
-
0.00104*
** 
-
0.000826*
** 
-
0.00135*
** 
-
0.000795*
**  
(4.58e-
05) 
(8.35e-
05) 
(9.73e-
05) 
(7.60e-05) (6.38e-
05) 
(5.91e-05) 
female -0.246*** -0.173*** -0.246*** -0.220*** -0.247*** -0.252*** 
 
(0.0104) (0.0191) (0.0212) (0.0162) (0.0147) (0.0132) 
rural hukou -0.525*** -0.473*** -0.686*** -0.404*** 
  
 
(0.0124) (0.0218) (0.0252) (0.0200) 
  
Province dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes 
   
Yes Yes 
Constant 7.844*** 4.879*** 6.994*** 8.043*** 7.142*** 8.156*** 
 
(0.0893) (0.136) (0.163) (0.145) (0.125) (0.114) 
Observations 48,590 13,475 13,279 21,836 30,441 18,149 
R-squared 0.393 0.141 0.174 0.179 0.296 0.486 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample is people 
aged 20 to 60. I define rural people as the people in rural Hukou and urban people as the 
people in urban Hukou. 
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Table 15 the influence of local public education level 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Education spending/household income 
College enrollment ratio 0.0662*
** 
0.0432* 0.0863*
** 
0.210**
* 
0.109*
** 
0.0597
*  
(0.0175) (0.0244
) 
(0.0183) (0.0429
) 
(0.014
1) 
(0.035
4) 
high school teacher student ratio -
0.447**
* 
-
0.530**
* 
    
 
(0.0997) (0.117) 
    
high school teacher student ratio*enrollment 
ratio 
 
0.239 
    
  
(0.178) 
    
middle school teacher student ratio 
  
-0.0166 0.564**
* 
  
   
(0.106) (0.211) 
  
middle school teacher student 
ratio*enrollment ratio 
   
-
1.718**
* 
  
    
(0.538) 
  
primary school teacher student ratio 
    
0.659*
** 
0.362 
     
(0.138) (0.241
) 
primary school teacher student 
ratio*enrollment ratio 
     
0.941 
      
(0.626
) 
Other variables Control Control Control Control Contro
l 
Contr
ol 
Age group 16-19 year old  12-15 year old 7-12 year old 
Constant 1.506**
* 
1.606**
* 
0.611* 0.766** 0.0664 0.0531 
 
(0.390) (0.397) (0.314) (0.318) (0.186) (0.186
) 
Observations 9,690 9,690 8,967 8,967 11,664 11,664 
R-squared 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.313 0.313 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The control variables 
are same as the regression of the main results. The education level is the provincial 
education level. For example high school teacher student ratio is defined by the number of 
high school teacher divided by number of high school student.   
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Table 16 factors affect enrollment ratio 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES # of 
student 
 taken 
NCEE 
# of 
student 
 enrolled  
by NCEE 
Enrollme
nt 
 ratio 
# of 
student 
 taken 
NCEE 
# of 
student 
 enrolled  
by NCEE 
Enrollme
nt 
 ratio 
# of 
studen
t 
taken 
NCEE 
# of 
studen
t 
enrolle
d by 
NCEE 
Enrollm
ent 
ratio 
high school graduate 
# 
0.897*** 0.524*** -
0.00756*
** 
0.911*** 0.524*** -
0.00742*
** 
0.857*
** 
0.492*
** 
-
0.00783*
**  
(0.0353) (0.0163) (0.00081
4) 
(0.0342) (0.0163) (0.000810
) 
(0.036
3) 
(0.017
4) 
(0.00081
9) 
local college enroll # 0.252*** 0.398*** 0.0134**
* 
0.0296 0.381*** 0.0111**
* 
0.707*
** 
0.483*
** 
0.0254**
*  
(0.0488) (0.0235) (0.00113) (0.0554) (0.0267) (0.00131) (0.086
4) 
(0.038
8) 
(0.00193
) 
log(GDP) -0.577** 0.0833 0.150*** -1.504*** 0.0579 0.138*** -
1.060*
** 
0.210* 0.152*** 
 
(0.282) (0.118) (0.00647) (0.298) (0.119) (0.00693) (0.277
) 
(0.119
) 
(0.00618
) 
log(population) 0.458 -0.790*** -
0.0668**
* 
1.165*** -0.750*** -
0.0609**
* 
0.542 -
0.448*
* 
-
0.0359**
*  
(0.459) (0.141) (0.00988) (0.440) (0.144) (0.00975) (0.542
) 
(0.190
) 
(0.0118) 
neighbor province 
enroll # 
   
0.0568*** 0.00420 0.000598
*** 
   
    
(0.00746) (0.00321) (0.000175
) 
   
high school employer  
# 
      
-
0.0913 
-
0.505*
** 
0.00299 
       
(0.223
) 
(0.106
) 
(0.00503
) 
high school teacher  
# 
      
-
1.085*
* 
0.614*
** 
-
0.0638**
*        
(0.477
) 
(0.226
) 
(0.0107) 
Method Random 
 effects 
Random 
 effects 
Random 
 effects 
Random 
 effects 
Random 
 effects 
Random 
 effects 
Rando
m 
effects 
Rando
m 
 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Constant 1.068 3.555*** 0.0629 -0.113 3.305*** 0.0733 4.163 1.644 -0.0782 
 
(3.769) (1.113) (0.0810) (3.553) (1.129) (0.0784) (3.978
) 
(1.391
) 
(0.0868) 
Observations 999 999 999 999 999 999 999 999 999 
Number of province 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regression is on 
the provincial level. Other variables contain GDP, population, local primary school teacher 
student ratio, local middle school teacher student ratio, and local high school teacher 
student ratio.  
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Table 17 Signal effect of enrollment information 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES # of student taken 
NCEE 
# of NCEE taker 
choose art and human 
sciences major 
# of NCEE taker 
choose engineering and 
sciences major 
NCEE enrollment ratio at t -
0.151 
-
0.136 
-
0.135 
      
 
(1.12
1) 
(1.12
0) 
(1.12
3) 
      
NCEE enrollment ratio at t-1 
 
-
1.263 
-
1.261 
      
  
(1.09
4) 
(1.09
1) 
      
NCEE enrollment ratio at t-2 
  
0.014
6 
      
   
(1.13
1) 
      
Enrollment ratio of art and 
human sciences at t 
   
0.523*
* 
0.611*
* 
0.573*
* 
0.140 0.127 0.112 
    
(0.238
) 
(0.251
) 
(0.244
) 
(0.235) (0.238) (0.236) 
Enrollment ratio of engineering 
and sciences at t 
   
-0.365 -0.416 -0.438 -
0.0464 
-
0.0376 
-
0.0454     
(0.269
) 
(0.282
) 
(0.274
) 
(0.265) (0.267) (0.265) 
Enrollment ratio of art and 
human sciences at t-1 
    
-
0.736*
** 
-
0.546*
* 
 
-
0.0067
5 
0.0589 
     
(0.249
) 
(0.244
) 
 
(0.236) (0.236) 
Enrollment ratio of engineering 
and sciences at t-1 
    
0.798*
** 
0.653*
* 
 
-
0.0715 
-0.119 
     
(0.280
) 
(0.274
) 
 
(0.266) (0.265) 
Enrollment ratio of art and 
human sciences at t-2 
     
1.584*
** 
  
0.891*
**       
(0.240
) 
  
(0.232) 
Enrollment ratio of engineering 
and sciences at t-2 
     
-
0.951*
** 
  
-
0.800*
**       
(0.272
) 
  
(0.264) 
Year dummies contr
ol 
contr
ol 
contr
ol 
contro
l 
control contro
l 
control control control 
Province dummies contr
ol 
contr
ol 
Cont
rol 
contro
l 
control contro
l 
control control control 
Other variable contr
ol 
contr
ol 
Cont
rol 
contro
l 
control contro
l 
control control control 
Constant 27.50
*** 
28.51
*** 
28.71
*** 
19.40*
* 
8.280*
** 
6.979*
** 
44.03*
** 
44.07*
** 
33.87*
**  
(5.80
7) 
(5.87
3) 
(5.88
6) 
(7.938
) 
(0.887
) 
(0.906
) 
(7.830) (7.825) (4.115) 
Observations 1,214 1,213 1,212 1,022 1,021 1,020 1,022 1,021 1,020 
R-squared 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.670 0.640 0.660 0.788 0.788 0.791 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regression is on 
the provincial level. Other variables contain GDP, population, local primary school teacher 
student ratio, local middle school teacher student ratio, and local high school teacher 
student ratio. 
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Table 18 Individual income, education and college enrollment ratio (2SLS regression) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Log(Education years) 
The college enrollment at age 18 3.765**
* 
2.990**
* 
2.103**
* 
1.641**
* 
0.0373 0.0564* 0.640 -0.405** 
 
(0.661) (0.695) (0.329) (0.231) (0.0310) (0.0296) (0.414) (0.189) 
The college enrollment at age 18*Rural  
Hukou 
 
 -0.596**    -0.764*  
  
 (0.271)    (0.449)  
The college enrollment at age 18*HH with 
 high school degree 
 
  -0.146    0.500* 
  
  (0.125)    (0.260) 
Province dummies  Control Control Control  Control Control Control 
Province dummies*Rural Hukou  Control Control Control  Control Control Control 
Province characters Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control 
Individual characteristics Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control 
Household characteristics before age 18 Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control 
Year dummies Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control 
Constant 0.143 0.617 0.634 0.921 2.707**
* 
2.738**
* 
2.315**
* 
2.842**
* 
 (1.529) (1.542) (0.883) (0.874) (0.0638) (0.0671) (0.259) (0.102) 
Observations 5,569 5,569 5,569 5,569 10,979 10,979 10,979 10,979 
R-squared 0.221 0.202 0.203 0.202 0.157 0.062 -0.126 -0.551 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample selected 
is the people have both income information after 18 years old and household characteristics 
before 18 years old. Individual characteristics variables contain age, age square and gender. 
Household characteristics before age 18 contain household income, asset level, number of 
elders, and number of children, number of labor, highest education year, and rural Hukou 
dummy.  Province characters contain GDP, population, high school student teacher rate, 
middle school student teacher rate, and primary student teacher rate. 
  
179 
Table 19 The Summary of Box Office and Other Information, Study Sample 
 
Box office 
(*10,000Y
uan) 
Douban 
Rate 
Rating # 
on Douban 
Opening day 
lag 
TS day lag Clear version day 
lag 
Hong Kong 
box office 
(*10000 
HKD) 
Mean 5700 5.84 36549 79.066 -75.658 -56.927 138 
SD (12872.44) (1.51) (57295.28) (186.72) (291.88) (294.14) (18778.29) 
Cast  Director level Actor and Actress #(Leading roles) 
Hollywood 
Top 
China 
Top10 
China Top 
30 
China Top 
20 
China Top 30 Hollywood Top 
10 
World Top 
30 
Mean 2% 2% 3% 0.13 0.24 0.04 0.09 
 
Mtime 
rate 
Impression 
rate 
Performanc
e rate 
Director rate Picture rate Music rate Mtime 
rating # 
Mean 6.12 6.27 6.34 6.02 6.44 6.18 5327 
SD (1.66) (1.69) (1.71) (1.75) (1.72) (1.77) (9796.09) 
 Daily 
Screen # 
Daily 
Audience # 
Daily 
occupancy 
rate 
Daily Price Daily box 
office(Yuan) 
Weekly box 
office(*10,000 
Yuan) 
 
Mean 6.48 224.78 17% 59.54 14984 3713  
SD (5.98) (412.77) (0.18) (26.13) (31408.17) (24504.86)  
Varia
ble 
Search # on Baidu of "movie’s name” Search # on Baidu of "movie’s name 
download" 
Time 1 day after 
Opening 
1 day 
before 
Opening 
1 week 
after 
Opening 
S1 week 
before 
Opening 
from TS available to 35 days after opening 
Mean 713 490 11993 2290 35533 
SD (4246.33) (2406.45) (71030.92) (10065.14) (243435.12) 
Film 
Type 
Family Romance Adventure Fantasy Comedy Horror Drama 
Ratio 8.34% 22.94% 19.05% 11.85% 27.68% 20.85% 43.79% 
 Science 
Friction 
Cartoons Crime War Documentary Thriller Children 
Ratio 7.77% 9.95% 8.15% 4.74% 0.85% 3.98% 0.95% 
Film 
Type 
Erotic Martial Stage Western Dance Noir Biography 
Ratio 0.09% 0.95% 0.19% 0.57% 0.95% 0.19% 2.27% 
Film 
Type 
Main 
stream 
3D Imax Import Co-
production 
Musical Action 
Ratio 5.02% 9.10% 4.17% 13.08% 21.99% 1.33% 32.51% 
Film 
Type 
Sports Costume      
Ratio 1.14% 1.90%      
Produ
cer 
China Producer   
 CFGC SFGC Bona Enlight Huayi US big8 HK big10 
Ratio 10.24% 4.36% 5.02% 2.27% 3.41% 11.56% 14.03% 
Distri
butor 
CFGC Huaxia Huayi Bona Enlight   
Ratio 35.73% 25.31% 3.22% 7.96% 3.98%   
Notes: The Chinese director level and the Chinese star rank are from Forbes Celebrity 
rank. The foreign director rank is from Celebrity Networth. The foreign starring actor and 
actress level rank is from VULTURE. The author defines the director, actor and actress 
level dummies by these ranks.  The movie type data is from Mtime. Some movies are 
coproduced by more than two firms. Season is defined by the Chinese central government 
public holiday schedule. The film types are given by Mtime. The US top 10 studios in the 
authors data are 20th Century Fox Studios, Warner Bros Studios, Walt Disney Studios, 
Sony Pictures Studios, Universal Studios, Paramount Studios, New Line Cinema, 
Dreamworks Studios,  MGM Studios,  and Raleigh Studios. The top 10 Hong Kong firms 
are Media Asia Films, Emperor Motion Pictures, China Star Entertainment Group, World 
Wide Pictures, Mei Ah Films Production, Milkyway Image, Jet Tone Film production, 
Golden Harvest Films, Mandarin Films and Shaw Brothers.  
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Table 20 Estimation results 
  Mean SD 
# of the observation in the sample  793  
Box office(*10,000Yuan)  6293.76 (13586.4) 
Mtime rate  6.23 (1.51) 
Price   34.94 (15.03) 
# of Douban rating  39328 (58441.45) 
(1-α)/λ  5.36 (0.09) 
λc/ α  9 (0.51) 
λc/(1-α)  3.7 (0.44) 
λγ/(1-α)  0.0007 (0.0008) 
c(Outside option)  19.8  
γ(Unit waiting cost)  0.004  
λ(Exponential distribution parameter)  0.13  
α (Quality discount )  0.3  
Market size in 2013(by assumption)  20,000,000  
Predict box office  5996.685 (3932.1) 
Predict price  33.5 (8.13) 
Predict box office loss  29.92% (0.17) 
Predict box office loss if piracy movie available 
before opening 
 30.23%  
Notes: Box office, Mtime rate, price and # of Douban rating are from the subsample of 
the overall box office data. Price in the estimation is the average price of the first opening 
week. Only 793 movies have the information. The market size is given by assumption. The 
market size of each year is proportional to the overall screen number. The screen # is 
about 18,000 in 2013; 13,000 in 2012; 9,200 in 2011; 6,200 in 2010; 4,700 in 2009; 4,000 in 
2008; 3,500 in 2007; 3,000 in 2006.  
Table 21 Main Results  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES  Log(box office) 
Sample Overall box office data Weekl
y 
data 
Daily data 
TS lag 0.0003
32 
0.0004
44* 
0.00050
6** 
      
 (0.0003
20) 
(0.0002
55) 
(0.0002
22) 
      
TS available before opening 
 
   -
0.322
*** 
     
   
(0.10
     
181 
6) 
clear day lag 
   
 
-
0.00047
4**  
   
    
 
(0.0002
05)  
   
Opening lag 
     -
0.00060
6*** 
   
      (0.00023
5) 
   
TS available before the week      
 
-
0.168
*** 
  
      
 
(0.04
84) 
  
TS available before the day      
  
-
0.729
*** 
-
0.966*
** 
      
  
(0.01
34) 
(0.015
5) 
TS available before the day 
*day # 
        0.0580
*** 
         (0.001
9) 
Control Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Season Dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Producer & 
Distributor Dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Director & Cast level  
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Film Type Dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Movie Rating   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Week # Dummies       Yes   
Control Day # and Weekday 
Dummies 
       Yes Yes 
Observations 1,039 1,039 1,039 
1,039 1,039 1,039 3,321 
286,1
25 
286,12
5 
R-squared 0.691 0.692 0.69 
0.692 0.691 0.692 0.590 0.336 0.338 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 22 2SLS Regression of “Name Download” Search Amount on Baidu Index  
(1) (2) (3) 
 Log(box office) Log(Baidu download 
Search #) 
 2nd stage of 
2SLS 
OLS 1st stage of 2SLS 
Log(Baidu download search # 
between  
TS day and the 35 day of showing) 
-0.104*** -0.00359  
(0.0352) (0.00995
) 
  
Log(Baidu download search # 
 1 day before TS available) 
  0.00311*** 
  (0.000505) 
Log(Baidu download search 
 14 day before TS available) 
  -0.00235*** 
  (0.000397) 
Control “Movie’s name” search #   Yes Yes  
Control other variables Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,039 1,039 1,039 
R-squared 0.643 0.678 0.262 
F test F(  2,   929) =  24.56, Prob > F =    0.0000 
Over identification test Sargan N*R-sq test  61.390  Chi-sq(2)    P-value = 
0.0000 
Endogeneity test Basmann test   0.035  Chi-sq(2)    P-value = 0.9827 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The authors use the 
same control variables as the main result. The data sample is the overall box office data 
set 
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Table 23 DDD with Hong Kong Market 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Log(box office) 
Control period Definition 
From the 1st day to 6 
months later 
From the 1st day to 12 
months later 
TS available before opening*control 
period*mainland 
0.648* -0.0133 
(0.358) (0.323) 
TS available before opening 0.553** 0.176 
 
(0.194) (0.216) 
TS available before opening*mainland -1.036*** -0.798*** 
 
(0.233) (0.215) 
TS available before opening*control 
period -0.704* 0.232 
 
(0.343) (0.285) 
Mainland 1.255*** 1.128*** 
 
(0.235) (0.248) 
Control period -0.00128 -0.385* 
 
(0.175) (0.218) 
Mainland* Control period -0.113 0.230 
 
(0.176) (0.234) 
Control other variables Yes Yes 
Observations 1,519 1,519 
R-squared 0.632 0.630 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The opening lag is 
given by a different market’s opening lag. The author uses public holiday dummy to replace 
season control in specification1.  The authors add interaction with the year and the 
mainland dummy in the control variables. The three columns definitions are different. The 
column 1 and 4’s periods are from the first day of the action to 1 month later after the 
action. Column 2 and 5’s periods are s from the first day of the action to 6 month after 
the action. Column 3 and 6’s periods are from the first day of the action to 12 months 
after the action. In columns 4-6, the authors have controlled all the dummies and variables. 
We just show the variable of interaction of three dummies’ result. To deal with 
heteroskedasticity, the authors cluster the regressions by regions*year variables. The 
authors assigned a value to give each year in each region. The authors use the same control 
variables as the main result. The data sample is the overall box office data set and the 
Hong Kong box office data set. 
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Table 24 Regression of the Mechanisms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Open 
week # 
Log(Mtime 
rate #) 
Log(Douban 
rate #) 
Log(box office) TS lag Log(box office) 
Method OLS 2SLS OLS   
Sample Overall box office data Foreign 
movie 
TS lag -
0.000693*
* 
-6.39e-05 -0.000185 0.00168
** 
-
0.00051
0** 
-
0.00025
1  
-
0.00101
***  
(0.000310
) 
(0.000227) (0.000235) (0.0007
43) 
(0.0002
08) 
(0.0004
88)  
(0.0002
64) 
#  of Movies released in 
US  
in the global premiere 
week 
     7.529*   
     
(4.443)  
 
TS day lag *douban rate    -
0.00022
2* 
   
 
    (0.0001
19) 
   
 
Log(overall screen  #)       0.468*  
       (0.278)  
Control other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,039 1,039 1,039 1,039 1,039 1039 1,039 362 
R-squared 0.506 0.690 0.736 0.713 0.690 0.215 0.712 0.726 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)  
VARIABLES TS  lag Opening lag Log(box office) Log(scr
een #) 
Log(pri
ce) Log(box office) 
Method OLS  
Sample Overall box office data Daily box office data Hong Kong Data 
Opening lag -0.622***        
 (0.03)        
Douban rate -2.877 9.690***       
 (3.70) (6.735)       
Movie is cut or not  69.11***       
  (19.32)       
TS available before the 
day 
  
-0.172***  
-
0.237**
* 
-
0.0866*
**  
 
   
(0.0057)  
(0.0040
2) 
(0.0056
2)  
 
TS available day # before 
the day 
   -
0.00097
*** 
    
    (1.42e-
05) 
    
TS lag     
  
-
0.00025
1 
 
     
  
(0.0004
88) 
 
Control price and screen 
# 
  Yes      
Control other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 1,039 1,039 286,125 286,125 286,125 286,125 467  
R-squared 0.468 0.384 0.88 0.812 0.342 0.136 0.530  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  In the regressions 
using the overall box office data set and Hong Kong box office data set, the author uses 
the same control variables as the main result.  Hong Kong box office is valued in the Hong 
Kong dollar. The mainland box office is valued in Yuan. In the regressions using daily data 
sample, the authors add day and weekday dummies in other control variables. In addition, 
the authors use the dummy whether or not the day belongs to the season replaced the 
season dummies in the control variables.  Foreign movie means that the movie has no 
producers in China participating in the production process.  
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Table 25  Distributor and Producer's Influence 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Public holiday  Opening lag 
 Hotte
st 
seaso
n 
Publi
c 
holida
y  
Methods Probit OLS  Probit 
 All movies 
Foreign 
movies  All movies 
Producer      Produce nations 
Englight 0.632**  
1.038**
* 6.362 -81.03 USA 
-
0.419
** -0.120 
 (0.264)  (0.397) (46.30) (164.6)  
(0.214
) 
(0.201
) 
Huayi 0.499**  0.597 14.04 3.051 
Hong 
Kong -0.194 -0.181 
 (0.218)  (0.680) (85.43) (161.6)  
(0.211
) 
(0.179
) 
CFGC 0.303**  0.302* -23.81 71.20 Taiwan -0.226 
-
0.539
** 
 (0.135)  (0.159) (19.67) (65.65)  
(0.285
) 
(0.256
) 
US big10 -0.121  -0.131 -32.65 -13.48 Korea 
-
1.261
** 
-
0.987
** 
 (0.140)  (0.180) (20.39) (27.61)  
(0.620
) 
(0.472
) 
HK big10 0.238**  0.369** -17.14 85.54 Japan 0.115 -0.199 
 (0.120)  (0.154) (17.95) (78.44)  
(0.322
) 
(0.294
) 
Distributor       
  
CFGC  0.0556 0.125 -10.77 -82.17*** Russia 
0.006
84 -0.788 
  
(0.0895
) (0.117) (13.79) (26.63)  
(0.577
) 
(0.565
) 
Huaxia  -0.170* 0.0214 
39.34**
* -5.184 France 0.232 0.310 
  (0.100) (0.129) (14.62) (24.95)  
(0.340
) 
(0.291
) 
Huayi  0.557** 0.0320 -48.71 -89.18 England 0.318 
-
0.009
81 
  (0.222) (0.702) (88.32) (170.5)  
(0.204
) 
(0.176
) 
Control other type and cast 
variable   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Control quality vairiables   Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant 
-
0.734**
* 
-
0.641**
* -0.738* 
-
277.0**
* -139.9 Constant 0.473 0.751 
 
(0.0567
) 
(0.0631
) (0.406) (51.87) (118.4)  
(2.334
) 
(1.937
) 
Observations 1,039 1,039 1,039 1,039 432 
Observati
ons 1,039 1,039 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the 6th and 7th 
columns, the authors’ control variables don’t contain season dummies here. Public season 
means whether movies are distributed in public holiday. Hottest season means that whether 
the movies are distributed in National Day, Spring Festival.  The data sample is the overall 
box office data. 
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APPENDIX B 
PROOF 
 
 
The Optimal Choices of Contracts I have three cases here.
The Autarky Case
In autarky case, the only state variable is saving. I get the optimal savings by rst
order conditions:
sit+1 :
1
cit
= 
 
1  %it+1
 @V autpt+1(spt+1 + sgt+1)
@spt+1
(FOC1)
The Full-commitment Case
Using the envelope theorem, I get:
Gt :
@P ft(spt ; s
g
t ; G
t)
@Gt
=  t (ET1)
The rst order conditions for the optimal contract problem are:
T pt :
cgtjz
cptjz
= t (FOC2)
Gt+1jz :
@P f;t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )
@Gt+1jz
=  t (FOC3)
The Non-commitment Case
The rst order conditions for the optimal contract problem are:
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T pt :
cgtjz
cptjz
=
+ {jz
1 + !jz
(FOC4)
Gt+1jz :
@P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )
@Gt+1jz
=  + {jz + jz
1 + !jz + jz
(FOC5)
spt+1 :
1 + !jz
cptjz
=  (1 + !jz) [
 
1  %t+7
 @P t+1(spt+1jz; sgt+1jz; Gt+1jz )
@spt+1jz
+ %t+7
@V autpt+1(s
p
t+1jz + s
g
t+1jz)
@spt+1jz
]
+jz
 
1  %t+7
 @P t+1(spt+1jz; sgt+1jz; Gt+1jz )
@spt+1jz
  @V
aut
pt+1(s
p
t+1jz)
@spt+1jz
!
(FOC6)
and
sgt+1 :
+ {jz
cgtjz
+ jz
 
1  %t+7
 @V autgt+1(sgt+1jz)
@sgt+1jz
=  (1 + !jz) [
 
1  %t+7
 @P t+1(spt+1jz; sgt+1; Gt+1jz )
@sgt+1jz
+ %t+7
@V autpt+1(s
p
t+1jz + s
g
t+1jz)
@sgt+1jz
]
+jz
 
1  %t+7
 @P t+1(spt+1jz; sgt+1jz; Gt+1jz )
@sgt+1jz
(FOC7)
Using the envelope theorem, I get:
Gt :
@P t(spt ; s
g
t ; G
t)
@Gt
=   (ET2)
spt :
@P t(spt ; s
g
t ; G
t)
@spt
=
JX
j=1
ZX
z=1
Rt
p
tj
g
tz
 
1 + !jz
cptjz
  !jz
@vautpt+1(s
p
t ; 
p
jt)
@spt
!
(ET3)
sgt :
@P t(spt ; s
g
t ; G
t)
@sgt
=
JX
j=1
ZX
z=1
Rt
p
tj
g
tz
 
+ {jz
cgtjz
  !jz
@vautgt (s
g
t ; 
g
zt)
@sgt
!
(ET4)
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Proof of Proposition 1 Proof. The Lagrangian of the contract problems is:
L =
JX
j=1
ZX
z=1
ptj
g
tzf[Upt(cpt ; lpt ;Kpt ; Npt ) + 
 
1  %t+9

P f;t+1(spt+1; s
g
t+1; G
f;t+1
jz )
+%t+9V
aut
pt+1(s
p
t+1 + s
g
t+1)] + t
h
ptjUgt(c
g
t ; l
g
t ;K
g
t ; N
g
t ) + 
 
1  %t+9

Gt+1jz  Gt
i
g
The rst order conditions for the optimal contract problem are:
T pt :
cgjz
cpjz
= t
Gt+1jz :
@P f;t+1(spt+1; s
g
t+1; G
t+1
jz )
@Gt+1jz
=  t
Using the envelope theorem, I get:
Gt :
@P f;t(spt ; s
g
t ; G
t)
@Gt
=  t
By the three equation, starting from period 1, I get
@P f;t+1(spt+1; s
g
t+1; G
t+1
jz )
@Gt+1jz
=
@P f;t(spt ; s
g
t ; G
t)
@Gt
and
cgtjz
cptjz
= t
for 8t; gz; pj . The results mean in every state of every period, the consumption ratio equal
to t:
Proof of Proposition 2 Proof. Two Incentive Constraints are not binding at the
same time.
189
By contradiction, I assume two ICs are binding which means:
gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
z; 
p
j ; G
t

= vautgt (s
g
t ; 
g
z);
pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
z; 
p
j ; G
t

= vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
j ):
Exist an allocation with zero transfer and support, and all the decisions are same to autarky
case, satises all the constraints and available in the contract. In this allocation, we have
g

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

= vautgt (s
g
t ; 
g
z); and V autpt+1(s
p
t+1jz + s
g
t+1jz) > V
aut
pt+1(s
p
t+1jz), such that:
Upt(c
p
tjz; l
p
tjz;K
p
tjz; N
p
tjz) + %t+7V
aut
pt+1(s
p
t+1jz + s
g
t+1jz)
+
 
1  %t+7

V autpt+1(s
p
t+1jz) > v
aut
pt (s
p
t ; 
p
jt):
The new contract gives a higher utility to parent without hurting grandparent. Con-
tradict to the old contract is optimal. Two incentive constraints cannot be binding at the
same time.
Two Participation Constraints are not binding at the same time.
By the conclusions above, with
gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
z; 
p
j ; G
t

 vautgt (sgt ; gzt);
pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
z; 
p
j ; G
t

 vautpt (spt ; pjt);
and by the conclusion that two incentive constraints cannot be binding at the same time.
The two participation constraints cannot be binding at the same time. The two equations
JX
j=1
ZX
z=1
ptj
g
tzgt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t


JX
j=1
ZX
z=1
ptj
g
tzv
aut
gt (s
g
t ; 
g
zt);
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and
JX
j=1
ZX
z=1
ptj
g
tzpt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
z; 
p
j ; G
t


JX
j=1
ZX
z=1
ptj
g
tzv
aut
pt (s
p
t ; 
p
j );
have at least one inequality holding. It means at least one participation is not binding. Two
participation constraints cannot be bind at the same time
Proof of Proposition 3 Proof. Dene the spending on child care Kit =
P
j k
j
tw
k
t and elder
care Nit =
P
j n
j
tw
n
t ; with j as the household member. The value of time spending by
individual i is Lit = w
l
itl
j
t , with w
l
it = w
i
t if individual i spends on working or the last unit
of elder/child care is from i; wlit = w
j
t ; if i provides child care, but the last unit is provided
by j; wlit = p; if i provides child care but the last unit is provided by the market. I dene
the overall endowment spending on period ts utility is:
Eit = Rts
i
t +
X
h
wlht + 
i
lt   sit+1   T it
+
X
h

nihw
n
t + k
i
hw
k
t

 
X
l

nilw
n
t + k
i
lw
k
t

; (1)
in which h is the household member belonging to the household i, l is the household member
not belonging to the household i. The rst part, Rtsit +
P
hw
l
ht + 
i
lt is the household
endowment before transfer and support, sit+1 is the saving for the next period. T
i
t is the net
transfer from household i to the other household.
P
h
 
nihw
n
t + k
i
hw
k
t
 Pl  nilwnt + kilwkt 
is the net child care and elder care support from household i to the other household. The
overall household consumption Cir is the households overall spending on food, clothes,
tra¢ c, durable goods, utility, fuel, entertainment, education, beauty, and other consumption
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goods. From the theoretical model, I get:8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
Cir =
Eit
1++t+t
Kit =
Eitt
1++t+t
Nit =
Eitt
1++t+t
Lit =
Eit
1++t+t
(2)
DeneAt = (1 + t + t + t)+
 
1 + t+8 + t+8 + t+8

; $ =
+{jz
1+!jz
; and t = min fwgt ; wpt ; potg :
The hour of elder care from market is:
not =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
t+8$Et
Atpt
; if pt < w
p
t
(t+8$+t)Et
Atpt
  1; if pt  wpt&(
t+8$+t)Et
Atw
p
t
< 1
0; otherwise
The hour of elder care from parent is:
npt =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
t+8$Et
Atw
p
t
; if pt  wpt&(
t+8$+t)Et
Atw
p
t
< 1
maxf0; 1  tEt
Atw
p
t
g; if pt  wpt&(
t+8$+t)Et
Atw
p
t
< 1
0; otherwise
The hour of child care from market is:
kot =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
tEt
Atpt
; if pt < w
p
t ; pt < w
g
t
(t+$t+8)Et
Atpt
  1; if (t+t+8)Et
Atw
g
t
 1&wpt  pt  wgt&(
t+$t+8+t)Et
Atw
g
t
< 2
(t+t)Et
Atpt
  1; if (t+t)Et
Atw
p
t
 1&wgt  pt  wpt&(
t+$t+8+t)Et
Atw
p
t
< 2
(t+$t+8+t)Et
Atpt
  2; if (t+$t+8+t)Et
Atw
g
t
 2&pt = max fpt; wgt ; wpt g
Et($t+8+t)
Atpt
  1; if Et
Atw
g
t
 
$t+8 + t

> 1&pt < w
p
t&pt  wgt
0; otherwise
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The hour of child care from parent is:
kpt =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
tEt
Atw
p
t
; if (t+t)Et
Atw
p
t
< 1&pt  wgt  wpt
max
n
0; 1  tEt
Awptt
o
; if (t+t)Et
Atw
p
t
 1&pt  wgt  wpt
max

0;
(t+$t+8)Et
Atw
p
t
  1

; if (t+$t)Et
Atw
g
t
 1&pt  wpt  wgt&(
t+$t+8+t)Et
Atw
g
t
< 2
0; otherwise
The hour of child care from grandparent is:
kgt =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
tEt
Atw
g
t
; if
(t+$t+7)Et
Atw
g
t
< 1&pt  wpt  wgt
1  $t+7Et
Atw
g
t
; if
(t+$t+7)Et
Atw
g
t
 1&pt  wpt  wgt
(t+t)Et
Atw
p
t
  1; if (t+t)Et
Atw
g
t
 1&pt  wgt  wpt&(
t+$t+7+t)Et
Atw
p
t
< 2
0; otherwise
The leisure of the parent is:
lpt =
8>><>>:
1; if tEtAtt  1
tEt
Att
; otherwise
The leisure of the grandparent is:
lgt =
8>><>>:
1; if
$t+8Et
Att
 1
$t+8Et
Att
; otherwise
If pt = minfwpt ; wgt ; ptg; npt = kpt = kgt = 0; if wpt = minfwpt ; wgt ; ptg and t+7 > 0 (t > 0),
npt > 0 (k
p
t > 0); if w
g
t = minfwpt ; wgt ; ptg and t+7 > 0 (t > 0), npt > 0 (kpt > 0).
Lemma 1
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Lemma 14 With more overall saving, at least one household gets a higher ex-ante utility
value. If spt+1jn + s
g
t+1jn < s
p
t+1jm + s
g
t+1jm, then
Gt+1jn  Gt+1jm ;
and
P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn )  P t+1(spt+1jm; sgt+1jm; Gt+1jm );
cannot happen at the same time.
Proof. Toward contradiction, assume in an optimal contract, exists two states such
that:
spt+1jn + s
g
t+1jn < s
p
t+1jm + s
g
t+1jm;
Gt+1jn  Gt+1jm ;
and
P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn )  P t+1(spt+1jm; sgt+1jm; Gt+1jm ):
The consumption choice and saving choice with saving spt+1jn and s
g
t+1jn are still avail-
able at with saving spt+1jm and s
g
t+1jm: Setting, s
p0
t+1jm = s
p
t+1jm+s
g
t+1jm sgt+1jn; sg
0
t+1jm =
sgt+1jn; G
0
t+1
jm = G
t+1
jn , without changing any variables on time t, I have P
t+1(sp
0
t+1jn; s
g0
t+1jn; G
t+10
jn ) >
P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn ). The new PCs hold, because
Gt+1jn = G
t+10
jm  V autgt+1(sg
0
t+1jm) = V
aut
gt+1(s
g
t+1jn):
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Without changing current consumption, new ICs also hold. In the interior region that IC
is binding, xed gzt, as 
p
jt increase or decrease, I get
p

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

= vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
jt);
and
p

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt + ; 
p
jt; G
t

= vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
jt + );
which means
1
cpauttjz
=
@vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
jt)
@pjt
=
@p

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

@pjt
=
1
cptjz
;
and
1
cpauttjz
=
@vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
jt)
@spt
=
@p

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

@spt
=
1
cptjz
:
The marginal utility on saving of contract and autarky are equal, when IC is binding. It
means when a IC with saving spt+1jn and s
g
t+1jn is binding, the contract value are still equal
to the autarky value as saving increase and new IC is binding. When a IC with saving
spt+1jn and s
g
t+1jn is not binding, contract value may increase less than autarky value. But
when the two are equal, the contract value and autarky value will keep equal as saving
increase. The new IC is still holding. All the new ICs in period t are holding, I get
P t+1(sp
0
t+1jn; s
g0
t+1jn; G
t+10
jn )  V autpt+1(sp
0
t+1jm): In addition, the new ICs are satised because
the utility values at period t are unchanged and the utility values in period t+1 increased.
The new allocation is feasible and will increase two householdsutility. Contradict to the
contract is optimal.
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If spt+1jn + s
g
t+1jn < s
p
t+1jm + s
g
t+1jm; I cannot get:
Gt+1jn  Gt+1jm ;
and
P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn )  P t+1(spt+1jm; sgt+1jm; Gt+1jm );
at the same time. In an optimal contract, if more overall saving means at least one household
is better o¤ ex-ante.
Lemma 2
Lemma 15 With a bigger income shock, at least one household gets a higher ex-post utility
value. If gmt > 
g
nt, then
pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

 pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

;
and
gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

 gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

;
cannot happen at the same time. If pmt > 
p
nt, then
pt
 
sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
mt; G
t
  pt  sgt ; spt ; gzt; pnt; Gt ;
and
gt
 
sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
mt; G
t
  gt  sgt ; spt ; gzt; pnt; Gt ;
cannot happen at the same time.
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Proof. Fixed pjt; for 8 gmt > gnt,
pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

 pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

;
and
gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

 gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

;
cannot happen at same time. If gmt > 
g
nt, all allocation in state n is also available on state
m. If, I have:
pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

 pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

;
and
gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

 gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

;
by changing contract choice in state m to the contract choice to state n, will increase at
least one households utility value, without hurting the other. In addition, the new ICp and
PCs are unchanged and the new ICg holds, because
vautgt (s
g
t ; 
g
nt)  vautgt (sgt ; gmt)  gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

 gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

:
The new allocation is feasible and will increase two householdsutility. Contradiction to
the contract is optimal.
Use the same method, I can prove that xed gz; for 8 pmt > pnt,
pt
 
sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
mt; G
t
  pt  sgt ; spt ; gzt; pnt; Gt ;
and
gt
 
sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
mt; G
t
  gt  sgt ; spt ; gzt; pnt; Gt ;
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cannot happen at the same time.
Lemma 3
Lemma 16 When ones incentive constraint is binding, the marginal utility of autarky
value and contract values on saving are the same, and the marginal utility on saving and
income shock are equal in both autarky case and contracts. If parents incentive constraint
is binding, then
@vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
jt)
@spt
=
@vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
jt)
@pjt
=
@pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

@pjt
=
@pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

@spt
:
If grandparents incentive constraint is binding, then
@vautgt (s
g
t ; 
g
zt)
@gzt
=
@vautgt (s
g
t ; 
g
zt)
@sgt
=
@gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

@gzt
=
@gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

@sgt
:
In the interior region that IC is binding, xed gzt, as 
p
jt increase or decrease,
pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

= vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
jt);
and
pt

sgt ; s
p
t + ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

= vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
jt + ):
I get
@vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
jt)
@pjt
=
@pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

@pjt
;
then
1
cpauttjn
=
1
cpauttjm
=
1
cptjm
=
1
cptjmn
:
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The marginal utilities on saving of contract and autarky case are equal, when IC is binding.
It means when a IC is binding, the contract value is still equal to the autarky value as saving
increasing and new IC is binding. When we increase or decrease saving in the interior region
that IC is binding,
pt
 
sgt ; s
p
t + ; 
g
zt; 
p
lt; G
t

= vautpt (s
p
t + ; 
p
lt);
with  is number small enough. In the interior region that IC is not binding,
pt
 
sgt ; s
p
t + ; 
g
zt; 
p
lt; G
t

> vautpt (s
p
t + ; 
p
lt):
A marginal value plt between such that,
pt
 
sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
lt; G
t

= vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
lt):
 is number small enough, such that
pt
 
sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
lt   ;Gt

> vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
lt   ):
I get
pt
 
sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
lt; G
t
  pt  sgt ; spt ; gzt; plt   ;Gt
> vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
lt)  vautpt (spt ; plt   );
which means
@pt
 
sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
lt   ;Gt

@
 
plt   
 < @vautpt (spt ; plt   )
@
 
plt   
 :
Because
@vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
jt)
@pjt
=
@vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
jt)
@spt
;
199
and
@pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

@pjt
=
@pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

@spt
;
as saving increase. As plt increases by ; with
@pt
 
sgt ; s
p
t + ; 
g
zt; 
p
lt; G
t

@spt
=
@vautpt (s
p
t + ; 
p
lt)
@spt
;
I get:
pt
 
sgt ; s
p
t + ; 
g
zt; 
p
lt; G
t

= vautpt (s
p
t + ; 
p
lt):
As plt decrease by ; with
@pt
 
sgt ; s
p
t   ; gzt; plt; Gt

@spt
<
@vautpt (s
p
t   ; plt)
@spt
;
I get
pt
 
sgt ; s
p
t   ; gzt; plt; Gt

> vautpt (s
p
t   ; plt):
Increase or decrease saving and consumption by the same amount will keep the new IC
holding.
Proof of Proposition 4 Proof. Toward contradiction assume  @P
t+1(spt+1jz ;s
g
t+1jz ;G
t+1
jz )
@Gt+1jz
<
cgtjz
cptjz
:
By the rst order condition,
+ {jz + jz
1 + !jz + jz
=  @P
t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )
@Gt+1jz
;
and
cgtjz
cptjz
=
+ {jz
1 + !jz
;
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I get
+ {jz + jz
1 + !jz + jz
<
+ {jz
1 + !jz
:
It means jz > 0; jz = 0. Parents participation constraint is binding and grandparents
participation constraint is not binding, such that:
Gt+1jz  V autgt+1(sgt+1jz);
P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )  V autpt+1(spt+1jz):
In addition, all parents incentive constraints at time t+1 are binding. Otherwise, each
contract value is no less than autarky value. As one incentive constraint not binding, the
ex-ante contract value P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz ) must be larger than autarky case, con-
tradict to participation constraint binding. If parents incentive constraint is binding, by
Propostion 2, grandparents parents incentive constraint is not binding and with the La-
grangian multiplier equal to zero.
cgt+1nm
cpt+1nm
=
+ {jz + jz
1 + !jz + jz + !t+1nm
 + {jz + jz
1 + !jz + jz
:
Exist an a¤ordable allocation to improve both householdsutilities without violating all the
constraints. 9 ";  and ; all are number small enough with cgt;jz = cgt;jz   ", cpt;jz = cpt;jz + ",
sgt+1jz = s
g
t+1jz + , s
p
t+1jz = s
p
t+1jz   , cgt+1nm = cgt+1nm + , and cpt+1nm = cpt+1nm    for
any m and n. Leave other variables unchanged, such that:
JX
m=1
ZX
n=1
pt+1n
g
t+1m
 
ln
 
cgt+1nm + 
  ln  cgt+1nm
= ln

cgt;jz

  ln

cgt;jz   "

:
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Because +{jz+jz1+!jz+jz >
+{jz
1+!jz
;and " and  are small enough,
1 + !jz
+ {jz
"
cgt;jz
> 
 
1  %t+9

Rt
1 + !jz + jz
+ {jz + jz

JX
m=1
ZX
n=1
pt+1n
g
t+1m
cgt+1nm
:
In addition, " and  are small enough, I get:
ln

cpt;jz + "

  ln

cpt;jz

=
1 + !jz
+ {jz
"
cgt;jz
;
and
JX
m=1
ZX
n=1
pt+1n
g
t+1m

ln
 
cpt+1nm
  ln  cpt+1nm   
 1 + !jz + jz
+ {jz + jz

JX
m=1
ZX
n=1
pt+1n
g
t+1m
cgt+1nm
:
which means:
ln

cpt;jz + "

  ln

cpt;jz

> 
 
1  %t+9

Rt
JX
m=1
ZX
n=1
pt+1n
g
t+1m

ln
 
cpt+1nm
  ln  cpt+1nm    :
Setting spt+1jz such that P
t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )  V autpt+1(spt+1jz): The new allocation
satises all incentive constraints, because no one is worse o¤ than the old allocation.
Gt+1jz > G
t+1
jz  V autgt+1(sgt+1jz); because  is a number small enough. All the PCs are sat-
ised. By Lemma 3, increasing or decreasing saving and consumption by a same amount,
the contract value and autarky value will keep equal as saving increase, and all the new ICs
and PCs are still holding.
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In addition, because the overall savings and overall consumption doesnt change, the
new allocation is feasible. The new allocation gives parent higher utility without hurting
grandparent. Contradiction to the old allocation is from optimal contract.  @P
t+1(spt+1jz ;s
g
t+1jz ;G
t+1
jz )
@Gt+1jz
<
cgtjz
cptjz
cannot happen. Use the same method, I can prove  @P
t+1(spt+1jz ;s
g
t+1jz ;G
t+1
jz )
@Gt+1jz
>
cgtjz
cptjz
can-
not happen.
I then want to prove
@P t+1(spt+1jz ;s
g
t+1jz ;G
t+1
jz )
@Gt+1jz
=
JP
m=1
ZP
n=1
pt+1n
g
t+1m=c
p
t+1mn
JP
m=1
ZP
n=1
pt+1n
g
t+1m=c
g
t+1mn
:
By the rst order conditions, I get:
1 + !jz
cptjz
=  (1 + !jz) [
 
1  %t+7
 @P t+1(spt+1jz; sgt+1jz; Gt+1jz )
@spt+1jz
+%t+7
@V autpt+1(s
p
t+1jz + s
g
t+1jz)
@spt+1jz
]: (3)
and
+ {jz
cgtjz
=  (1 + !jz) [
 
1  %t+7
 @P t+1(spt+1jz; sgt+1jz; Gt+1jz )
@sgt+1jz
+%t+7
@V autpt+1(s
p
t+1jz + s
g
t+1jz)
@sgt+1jz
]: (4)
By
1 + !jz
cptjz
=
+ {jz
cgtjz
;
and
@V autpt+1(s
p
t+1jz + s
g
t+1jz)
@spt+1jz
=
@V autpt+1(s
p
t+1jz + s
g
t+1jz)
@sgt+1jz
;
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I get:
@P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )
@spt+1jz
=
@P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )
@sgt+1jz
: (5)
In addition, by Envelope theorem, I get:
@P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )
@spt+1jz
=
JX
m=1
ZX
n=1
pt+1n
g
t+1m
2664
1
cpt+1mn
+!t+1mn

1
cpt+1mn
  @v
aut
pt+1(s
p
t+1jz ;
p
t+1j)
@spt+1jz

3775 : (6)
Two cases exist: !t+1jz = 0 or !t+1jz > 0. If !t+1mn > 0; then
pt

spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t+1
jz

= vautpt+1(s
p
t+1jz; 
p
jt+1);
and
1
cpt+1mn
=
@vautpt+1(s
p
t+1jz; 
p
jt+1)
@spt+1jz
:
Both cases have
!t+1mn
 
1
cpt+1mn
  @v
aut
pt+1(s
p
t+1jz; 
p
jt+1)
@spt+1jz
!
= 0;
and
@P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )
@spt+1jz
=
JX
m=1
ZX
n=1
pt+1n
g
t+1m
cpt+1mn
:
I get:
@P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )
@sgt+1jz
=
JX
m=1
ZX
n=1
pt+1n
g
t+1m
2664
+{jz
1+!jz
1
cgt+1mn
+t+1mn

1
cgt+1mn
  @v
aut
gt+1(s
g
t+1jz ;
g
zt+1)
@sgt+1jz

3775 : (7)
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Two cases exist: t+1jz = 0 or t+1jz > 0. If t+1mn > 0; then
g

spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; 
g
z; 
p
j ; G
t+1
jz

= vautgt+1(s
g
t+1jz; 
g
t+1z);
and
1
cgt+1jz
=
@vautgt+1(s
g
t+1jz; 
g
zt+1)
@sgt+1jz
:
Both cases have
t+1mn
 
1
cgt+1mn
  @v
aut
gt+1(s
g
t+1jz; 
g
zt+1)
@sgt+1jz
!
= 0;
and
@P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )
@sgt+1jz
=
JX
m=1
ZX
n=1
+ {jz
1 + !jz
pt+1n
g
t+1m
cgt+1mn
:
In addition, by
@P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )
@Gt+1jz
=
+ {jz
1 + !jz
;
and
cgtjz
cptjz
=
+ {jz
1 + !jz
;
I get:
cgtjz
cptjz
=
@P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )
@Gt+1jz
=
JX
m=1
ZX
n=1
pt+1n
g
t+1m
cpt+1mn
=
JX
m=1
ZX
n=1
pt+1n
g
t+1m
cgt+1mn
: (8)
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Corollary 1
Corollary 17 Before the last period, the Lagrangian multipliers associated with partic-
ipation constraints always equal to 0. For 8 gzt and pjt; t+{jz+jz1+!jz+jz =
t+{jz
1+!jz
. If t<T,
jz = jz = 0.
Proof. From Proposition 4, I get
cgtjz
cptjz
=  @P
t+1(spt+1jz ;s
g
t+1jz ;G
t+1
jz )
@Gt+1jz
, which means
+{jz
1+!jz
=
+{jz+jz
1+!jz+jz
:
By Lemma 1 at most one PC is binding before period T, if jz > 0, then jz = 0; if
jz > 0, then jz = 0. Only when jz = jz = 0, I can get
+{jz+jz
1+!jz+jz
=
+{jz
1+!jz
:
Lemma 4
Lemma 18 Fixed the consumption ratio, with a bigger income shock, both households will
get bigger ex-post utility values. Fixed
cgtjm
cptjm
=
cgtjn
cptjn
= t, if 
g
mt > 
g
nt; then
pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

> pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

;
and
gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

> gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

;
for 8pj ; if pkt > plt; then
pt
 
sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
kt; G
t

> pt
 
sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
lt; G
t

;
and
gt
 
sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
z; 
p
k; G
t

> gt
 
sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
z; 
p
l ; G
t

:
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for 8 gz.
Proof. Toward contradiction, assume gmt < 
g
nt; and pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

 pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

.
By Lemma 2, I get gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

> gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

. By equation 5, I
get:
@P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )
@spt+1jz
=
@P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )
@sgt+1jz
:
Dene with 
tjz =
n
nptjz; k
g
tjz; T
p
tjz; s
g
t+1jz; h
g
tjz; n
m
tjz; s
p
t+1jz; h
p
tjz; k
p
tjz; k
m
tjz
o
. By Proposition
4, the problem is equivalent to solveing:
max

tjz
pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

+ gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

:
Subject to promise constraints and participation constraints. If  is xed, as spt+1jz+ s
g
t+1jz
increase, by Lemma 2, both P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz ) and G
t+1
jz will increase. In addition,
with
@P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )
@sgt+1jz
= 
@Gt+1jz
@sgt+1jz
;
and
@P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )
@spt+1jz
= 
@Gt+1jz
@spt+1jz
;
as  xed, I get:

@Gt+1jz
@sgt+1jz
=
@Gt+1jz
@spt+1jz
:
If
@P t+1(spt+1jn;s
g
t+1jn;G
t+1
jz )
@spt+1jn
>
@P t+1(spt+1jm;s
g
t+1jm;G
t+1
jm )
@spt+1jn
, I get
Gt+1jm < G
t+1
jn ;
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and
P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn ) < P
t+1(spt+1jm; s
g
t+1jm; G
t+1
jm ):
There are two cases.
Case 1 when spt+1jn+s
g
t+1jn spt+1jm+sgt+1jm
First, I get
@P t+1(spt+1jn;s
g
t+1jm;G
t+1
jz )
@sgt+1jn
<
@P t+1(spt+1jm;s
g
t+1jm;G
t+1
jm )
@sgt+1jn
.
If I have:
@P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jz )
@sgt+1jn
 @P
t+1(spt+1jm; s
g
t+1jm; G
t+1
jm )
@sgt+1jn
;
and
spt+1jn + s
g
t+1jn  spt+1jm + sgt+1jm:
I can get 
cgt;jm
 
cgt;jn
:
By Proposition 4, and
@P t+1(spt+1jz ;s
g
t+1jz ;G
t+1
jz )
@Gt+1jz
= ; as P t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz ) in-
crease or decrease, Gt+1jz should also increase or decrease. With s
p
t+1jn + s
g
t+1jn  spt+1jm +
sgt+1jm; I get:
Gt+1jm  Gt+1jn ;
and
P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn )  P t+1(spt+1jm; sgt+1jm; Gt+1jm ):
However with spt+1jn+ s
g
t+1jn  spt+1jm+ sgt+1jm; without changing the decisions variable on
period t, changing the saving decisions on state m spt+1jm and s
g
t+1jm equal to s
p
t+1jn and
sgt+1jn and promised value G
t+1
jm equal to G
t+1
jn , will increase both householdsutility level
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without violate the incentive and participation constraint. Contradiction to the contract is
optimal on state m. By
cgtjn  cgtjm;
and
@P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jm; G
t+1
jz )
@sgt+1jn
 @P
t+1(spt+1jm; s
g
t+1jm; G
t+1
jm )
@sgt+1jn
:
I get
gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

 gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

;
which contradict to gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

> gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

. So I get
@P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jm; G
t+1
jz )
@sgt+1jn
<
@P t+1(spt+1jm; s
g
t+1jm; G
t+1
jm )
@sgt+1jn
:
Second, I get
@P t+1(spt+1jn;s
g
t+1jn;G
t+1
jn )
@spt+1jn
>
@P t+1(spt+1jm;s
g
t+1jm;G
t+1
jm )
@spt+1jm
. If
@P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn )
@spt+1jn
 @P
t+1(spt+1jm; s
g
t+1jm; G
t+1
jm )
@spt+1jm
;
and
spt+1jn + s
g
t+1jn  spt+1jm + sgt+1jm;
by Equations 3 and 4, I get 1
cpt;jm
 1
cpt;jn
.
If
@P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn )
@spt+1jn
 @P
t+1(spt+1jm; s
g
t+1jm; G
t+1
jm )
@spt+1jm
;
and
P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn ) < P
t+1(spt+1jm; s
g
t+1jm; G
t+1
jm );
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by Lemma 3 I get Gt+1jn < G
t+1
jm :
To get gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
n; 
p
j ; G
t

> gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
m; 
p
j ; G
t

; I have cgtjn > c
g
tjm: However, by
cptjn  cptjm and cgtjn > cgtjm; I get
cgtjm
cptjm
<
cgtjn
cptjn
; which contradict to
cgtjm
cptjm
=
cgtjn
cptjn
= . I get
P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn )  P t+1(spt+1jm; sgt+1jm; Gt+1jm );
and
pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

> pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

;
which contradict to
pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

< pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

:
With the two equations, I get:
@P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jz )
@sgt+1jn
  @P
t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn )
@spt+1jn
<
@P t+1(spt+1jm; s
g
t+1jm; G
t+1
jz )
@sgt+1jn
  @P
t+1(spt+1jm; s
g
t+1jm; G
t+1
jm )
@spt+1jm
:
Contradiction to both sides equal to 0. In the optimal contract, spt+1jn + s
g
t+1jn > s
p
t+1jm +
sgt+1jm.
Case 2 When spt+1jn+s
g
t+1jn> s
p
t+1jm+s
g
t+1jm
By assumption spt+1jn + s
g
t+1jn > s
p
t+1jm + s
g
t+1jm, and lemma 1, I get
Gt+1jn > G
t+1
jm ;
and
P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn ) > P
t+1(spt+1jm; s
g
t+1jm; G
t+1
jm ):
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By Equations 3 and ??, I get cgtjn > c
g
tjm and c
p
tjn > c
p
tjm. Both households have higher
utility on state m. Fixed
cgtjl
cptjl
= , both pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

and gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

are
strictly increasing on gzt. I get Use the same the method, I can prove that xed
cgtjl
cptjl
= ,
both gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

and pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

are strictly increasing on pjt:
Proof of Proposition 5 Proof. I use three steps to prove the lemma.
Step 1 Dene boundary for full risk sharing.
First, I dene the upper bounds
I dene the marginal value of income shock given income shock pjt, cause parent
incentive constraint binding. 9 a number gkt 2

g1t; 
g
Zt

(gkt can be a shock or not) such
that satises that:
cgtjk
cptjk
= ;
and
pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
k; 
p
j ; G
t

= vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
j ):
Given pj ; 8 gzt < gkt, such that the
cgtjk
cptjk
< ;8 gzt > gkt, such that the
cgtjk
cptjk
 :
For any pjt; the marginal value 
g
kt only exists once at most. By Lemma 3, xed
cgtjl
cptjl
= , pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

is strictly increasing on gzt. v
aut
pt+1(s
p
t ; 
p
jt) is a constant,
given pjt: Only one number satises pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

= vautpt+1(s
p
t ; 
p
jt). For any 
p
jt; the
marginal value gkt only exists once at most.
Second, I dene the lower bounds.
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Dene another marginal value 9glt 2

g1t; 
g
Zt

(can be a shock or not) such that:
cgtjl
cptjl
= ;
and
gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
lt; 
p
jt; G
t

= vautgt (s
g
t ; 
g
lt):
Fixed pjt; if 
g
zt > 
g
lt,
cgtjl
cptjl
> ; and gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
lt; 
p
jt; G
t

= vautgt (s
g
t ; 
g
lt). Use the same
method above, I can prove the uniqueness of the marginal value.
Step 2 within the boundaries, full risk sharing
For 8gzt 2

gkt; 
g
lt

, both pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

and gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

decreasing
on gzt. The substitution rate of the marginal utility is a constant, with
 @P
t+1(spt+1jz; s
g
t+1jz; G
t+1
jz )
@Gt+1jz
=
cgtjz
cptjz
= :
Both households have lower utility values, as one gets a smaller income shock. Both pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

and gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

are strictly decreasing on gzt.
Step 3 beyond the boundaries, partial risk sharing
For 8gzt 2

g1t; 
g
kt

,
cgtjz
cptjz
< .
If
cgtjz
cptjz
=
+{jz
1+!jz
  = c
g
tjl
cptjl
, with grandparents incentive binding, I get:
gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

= vautgt (s
g
t ; 
g
zt) < v
aut
gt (s
g
t ; 
g
kt) < gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
kt; 
p
jt; G
t

;
pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

> vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
jt) = pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
kt; 
p
jt; G
t

:
It means if set
cgtjz
cptjz
= , decrease cgtjz and G
t+1
jz will increase pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

with
pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

> vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
jt): Contradiction to the conclusion of Lemma 2 that
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pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

is strict increasing on gzt; when
cgtjz
cptjz
= .
cgtjz
cptjz
<  means parents
incentive constraint binding. Use the same method, I can prove 8gzt 2

glt; 
g
Zt

;
cgtjz
cptjz
> ,
with grandparents incentive constraint binding.
Proof of Proposition 6 Proof. In the full risk sharing region dened by proposition 5, there
is cgtjn=c
p
tjn = c
g
tjm=c
p
tjm: I then want to prove when one IC is binding, if 
g
mt < 
g
nt, then
cgtjn=c
p
tjn > c
g
tjm=c
p
tjm.
When ICp is binding
I want to prove, xed pjt; if 
g
mt < 
g
nt, then c
g
tjn=c
p
tjn > c
g
tjm=c
p
tjm. Grandparents
incentive constraints are not binding in both cases, with {jn = {jm = 0: Parents incentive
constraints are binding, such that:
pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

= pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

= vautpt+1(s
p
t ; 
p
jt)
By Lemma 2, I get:
gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

> gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

:
Then I will prove that if cptjn > c
p
tjm, then
Upt(c
p
tjn; l
p
tjn;K
p
tjn; N
p
tjn) > Upt(c
p
tjm; l
p
tjm;K
p
tjm; N
p
tjm):
Dene t = min fwgt ; wpt ; potg, t = min fwpt ; potg. By the utility form, in the optimal con-
tract, I get:
1
cit
=
t
Kitt
=
t
tN
i
t
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If cptjn > c
p
tjm, then
Upt(c
p
tjn; l
p
tjn;K
p
tjn; N
p
tjn) > Upt(c
p
tjm; l
p
tjm;K
p
tjm; N
p
tjm):
If cgtjn > c
g
tjm, then
Ugt(c
g
tjn; l
g
tjn;K
g
tjn; N
g
tjn) > Ugt(c
g
tjm; l
g
tjm;K
g
tjm; N
g
tjm):
In the interior region that IC is binding, xed gz, as 
p
j increase or decrease,
pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

= vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
jt);
and
pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt + ; 
p
jt; G
t

= vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
jt + ):
I get
@vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
jt)
@pjt
=
@pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
zt; 
p
jt; G
t

@pjt
;
then
1
cpauttjn
=
1
cpauttjm
=
1
cptjm
=
1
cptjmn
:
I get
 
1  %t+8

P t+1(spt+1jm; s
g
t+1jm; G
t+1
jm ) + %t+8V
aut
pt+1(s
p
t+1jm + s
g
t+1jm)
=
 
1  %t+8

P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn ) + %t+8V
aut
pt+1(s
p
t+1jn + s
g
t+1jn) (9)
and
Upt(c
p
tjn; l
p
tjn;K
p
tjn; N
p
tjn) = Upt(c
p
tjm; l
p
tjm;K
p
tjm; N
p
tjm): (10)
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If spt+1jn + s
g
t+1jn  spt+1jm + sgt+1jm, by Equation 9, I get:
P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn )  P t+1(spt+1jm; sgt+1jm; Gt+1jm );
and
Gt+1jn  Gt+1jm :
By gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

> gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

, I get
Ugt(c
g
tjn; l
g
tjn;K
g
tjn; N
g
tjn) > Ugt(c
g
tjm; l
g
tjm;K
g
tjm; N
g
tjm);
and
cgtjn > c
g
tjm:
I get:
cgtjn=c
p
tjn > c
g
tjm=c
p
tjm;
and
@P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn )
@Gt+1jn
 @P
t+1(spt+1jm; s
g
t+1jm; G
t+1
jm )
@Gt+1jm
:
Contradiction to Proposition 4.
8gmt; gnt 2

glt; 
g
Zt

, if gmt < 
g
nt; then s
p
t+1jn + s
g
t+1jn > s
p
t+1jm + s
g
t+1jm. With
spt+1jn + s
g
t+1jn > s
p
t+1jm + s
g
t+1jm, assume c
g
tjn=c
p
tjn  cgtjm=cptjm. By Equation 9, I get:
cgtjn  cgtjm;
and
P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn ) < P
t+1(spt+1jm; s
g
t+1jm; G
t+1
jm ):
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If spt+1jn + s
g
t+1jn > s
p
t+1jm + s
g
t+1jm, by Equation 9, I get G
t+1
jn  Gt+1jm . It means:
@P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn )
@Gt+1jn
>
@P t+1(spt+1jm; s
g
t+1jm; G
t+1
jm )
@Gt+1jm
:
Contradictioj to Proposition 4. 8gmt; gnt 2

glt; 
g
Zt

, if gmt < 
g
nt, then s
p
t+1jn + s
g
t+1jn >
spt+1jm + s
g
t+1jm and c
g
tjn=c
p
tjn > c
g
tjm=c
p
tjm: I get c
g
tjn > c
g
tjm:
When ICg is binding
I then want to prove that xed pjt, 8gmt; gnt 2

g1t; 
g
kt

, if gmt < 
g
nt, c
g
tjn=c
p
tjn >
cgtjm=c
p
tjm. Grandparents incentive constraints are not binding in both cases, with {jn =
{jm = 0: Parents incentive constraints are binding:
gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

= gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

and
pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

> pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

Otherwise, all the allocation in state n is available at state m, and Pareto improvement
exists for the contract at state n. Contradict to the contract is optimal. By Equation 9, I
get:
1
cgauttjn
=
1
cgauttjm
=
1
cgtjm
=
1
cgtjmn
:
If gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

= gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

, I get Gt+1jn = G
t+1
jm . If s
p
t+1jn + s
g
t+1jn 
spt+1jm + s
g
t+1jm, by Equation 6, I get
P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn )  P t+1(spt+1jm; sgt+1jm; Gt+1jm ):
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Dene the total endowment by Equation 1, such that
Etjz   spt+1jz   sgt+1jz
= cgtjz
 
1 + t+6 + t+6 + t+6

+ cptjz (1 + t + t + t)
Because state n has more endowment, Etjn > Etjm. With s
p
t+1jn+s
g
t+1jn  spt+1jm+sgt+1jm
and cgtjn = c
g
tjm, I get c
p
tjn > c
p
tjm:
cgtjn=c
p
tjn > c
g
tjm=c
p
tjm
@P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn )
@Gt+1jn
<
@P t+1(spt+1jm; s
g
t+1jm; G
t+1
jm )
@Gt+1jm
Contradiction to Proposition 4. 8gmt; gnt 2

g1t; 
g
kt

, if gmt < 
g
nt; then s
p
t+1jn + s
g
t+1jn >
spt+1jm + s
g
t+1jm.With s
p
t+1jn + s
g
t+1jn > s
p
t+1jm + s
g
t+1jm, by Equation 9,
P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn ) > P
t+1(spt+1jm; s
g
t+1jm; G
t+1
jm )
I get
@P t+1(spt+1jn; s
g
t+1jn; G
t+1
jn )
@Gt+1jn
>
@P t+1(spt+1jm; s
g
t+1jm; G
t+1
jm )
@Gt+1jm
:
By Equations 8, I get cptjn > c
p
tjm:
8gmt; gnt 2

g1t; 
g
kt

, if gmt < 
g
nt, then
spt+1jn + s
g
t+1jn > s
p
t+1jm + s
g
t+1jm
and
cgtjn=c
p
tjn > c
g
tjm=c
p
tjm
Using the same methods, I can prove xed gzt, 8pmt < pnt, cgtnz=cptnz  cgtmz=cptmz.
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Corollary 2
Corollary 19 Fixed pjt; if 
g
mt > 
g
nt; then !jn  !jm and jn  jm. Fixed gzt; if
pmt > 
p
nt; then !jn  !jm and jn  jm:
Proof. By Proposition 6, with
cgtjz
cptjz
=
+{jz
1+!jz
;
cgt
cpt
is decreasing on pj and increasing
on gz: By Proposition 2 at most one IC is binding. When {jz > 0; !jz = 0; when !jz > 0;
{jz = 0:
gmt < 
g
nt;
cgtjm
cptjm
=
+{jm
1+!jm
 +{jn1+!jn =
cgtjn
cptjn
: We have either
{jn  {jm > 0
!jn = !jm = 0
or
{jn = {jm = 0
!jm  !jn > 0
or
{jn  {jm = 0
!jn  !jm = 0
{jz is increasing on gzt; and !jz is decreasing on 
g
z. Use the same method, I can prove {jz
is decreasing on pjt and !jz is increasing on 
p
j .
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Proof of Proposition 7Proof. Prove as grandparent gets bad income shock, both households
will have lower utility values and consumption at time t.
Step 1: From the proof of Proposition 6, I get in the region with ones incentive
constraint binding, big shock has no e¤ect on the utility value of the household with incentive
constraint binding and will increase the other households utility level. Otherwise, exist a
feasible Pareto improvement for the optimal contract. In the region with partial risk sharing,
as one gets bad income shock, both householdsutility value and consumption at time t
will decrease.
Step 2: From the proof of Lemma 4, in the region that no incentive constraints
binding, as one gets bad income shock two households utility value will decrease. The
lemma means in full-commitment, because the consumption ratio is xed, as one gets bad
income shock, two households utility value and consumption at time t will decrease.
Step 3: Then, I need to prove that for two income shocks belonged to di¤erent
regions, the relationship still holds. Fixed pjt; if 
g
nt > 
g
kt > 
g
mt,
g

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

 g

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

;
p

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

 p

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

;
and
cpjn  cpjm; cgjn  cgjm:
gkt is the marginal value dened by Proposition 5.
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First, with gkt > 
g
mt and 
g
kt  gnt, parents incentive constraint is binding. With
pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

 pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
kt; 
p
jt; G
t

= vautpt (s
p
t ; 
p
jt)
and
cpjn = c
p
jk:
By the conclusion of step 1, gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

 gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
kt; 
p
jt; G
t

and cgjn > c
g
jk.
By the conclusion of Step 2, I get
gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

 gt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

;
pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
nt; 
p
jt; G
t

 pt

sgt ; s
p
t ; 
g
mt; 
p
jt; G
t

;
and
cpjn  cpjm; cgjn  cgjm:
Use the same methods, I can prove as the parent gets a smaller income shock, both house-
holds will have lower utility values and consumption.
Calculation of the Household Death Rate I get average people death rate by age from
government population statistics. In the data, female death rate is pf and male death rate
is pm at age  : In the model, each period has 4 years. The death rate household in period t
is dened as that for the household with at least one household member alive in period t-1,
the probability everyone die in period t. I use two steps to calculate the household death
rate. In step one, I get the individual death rate in each period. The death rate, I get is
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the probability that all household will die in the four years. In household i, wifes death
rate is %wit and husbands death rate is %
h
it, which is dened as
%hit =
4t+3X
{=4t
24pm{ { 1Y
'=1
 
1  pm'
35 ;
and
%wit =
4t+3X
{=4t
24pf{ { 1Y
'=1

1  pf'
35 :
In step two, I get the household death rate of each period. In period t, the probability both
husband and wife are alive is

i;bt =
tY
=1
h
1  %hi

(1  %wi )
i
;
the probability only wife alive is

i;wt =
tX
{=1
24%h{ tY
=1
(1  %wi )
{ 1Y
'=1

1  %h'
35 ;
the probability only husband alive is

i;ht =
tX
{=1
24%w{ tY
=1

1  %hi
 {Y
'=1
 
1  %w'
35 :
So household is death rate in period t+1 is given by:
	it+1 =

i;bt %
h
it+1%
w
it+1 +

i;w
t %
w
it+1 +

i;h
t %
h
it+1

i;bt +

i;w
t +

i;h
t
(11)

i;bt + 

i;w
t + 

i;h
t is the probability that household i still has at least one people alive in
period t. 
i;bt %
h
it+1%
w
it+1 is the probability that both household members die at period t+1
when both households members alive at period t. 
i;wt %
w
it+1 is the probability that wife
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dies in t+1 when only wife alive at period t. 
i;ht %
h
it+1 is the probability that husband
dies at t+1 when only husband alive in period t. With death rate data from the National
Population and Reproductive Health Science Data Center of China, I get the estimated
household death rate by using the equations above. Figure 9 in the Appendix shows the
estimated household death rate for each period. The individual death rate before age 40 is
almost zero. I assume that the death rate in the age 21 is 1 and the parents death rate
before age 14 is 0.
GLS Estimation on Preference Parameters Given the linear relationship between the spend-
ing in each term, I use two steps generalized least squares regression (GLS) to get parame-
ters. In the rst step, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to get the parameters
and denote the vector of all parameter values as t = (t; t; )
0. I dene the vector of
dependent variables yi, the vector of independent variables xi = Cii  I3, the vector of error
term, ui = (ui1; ui2; ui3)
0, with ui1 = Kit   tCit ; ui2 = Nit   tCit ; and ui3 = Lit   Cit :
Correspondingly, moments for household i are thus given as
yi = itxi + ui = (t + it)xi + ui: (12)
I use OLS regression to get
~
it =
 
xTi xi
 1
xTi yi. With the distribution of
~
it, I get the
sample mean
~
tand the sample variance
~
t of
~
it:
In the second step, I use a generalized least squares estimation to get the best lin-
ear unbiased estimator of the random coe¢ cient regression models. Using the variance
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estimated from the rst step, I dene the weight
~
wi =
~
t: Using GLS regression, I get
~

g
it =

xTii
~
w
 1
i xi
 1
xTi w
 1
i yi: (13)
I then get the sample mean
~

g
t and sample variance 
g
t of
~

g
it, in which
~

g
t captures the
average utility weight in each utility term and gt captures the heterogeneous preference
distribution.
The GMMEstimation of Two-Types Models The two types are specied as 1it =

1it; 
1
it; 
1
it
	
and 2it =

2it; 
2
it; 
2
it
	
. I dene
 

i
t =
it
1+i+it+
i
t
;
 

i
t =
it
1+i+it+
i
t
; and
 

i
= 
i
1+i+it+
i
t
;
with i 2 f1; 2; gg. I draw N (N=10,000) pair of gi ; git and git from the parameter distrib-
ution of the GLS distribution. I dene the sample means: t =
NX
i=1
 

g
it
N ; t =
NX
i=1
 

g
it
N ; and
t =
NX
i=1
 

g
it
N . I dene the sample variances: 
2
t =
NX
i=1

 

g
it t
2
N 1 ; 
2
t =
NX
i=1

 

g
it t
2
N 1 ; and
2t =
NX
i=1

 

g
it t
2
N 1 . I dene the sample covariance: qt =
NX
i=1

 

g
it t

 

g
it t

N 1 : I draw N
(N=10,000) pair of gi ; 
g
it and 
g
it from the parameter distribution of the GLS distribution.
I dene the sample means it = (
i
t; 
i
t; 
i
t); the sample variances 
i
t =
 
it; 
i
t; 
i
t

and the sample covariance qit =
 
qit; q
i
t; q
i
t

; for
 

i
t:The probability that iis type 1 is
 and that i is type 2 is 1   : The probability that iis type 1 is  and that i is type 2 is
1  : Dene  =  ; 1i ; 1it; 1it; 2i ; 2it; 2it, and Yt =  gt; gt; gt; gt; gt; gt; qgt, I get
the moments m() = 1T
PT
t=1 g(; Yt), such that:
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t = 
 

1
it + (1  )
 

2
it (14)
t = 
 

1
it + (1  )
 

2
it (15)
t = 
 

1
it + (1  )
 

2
it (16)
2t = 

 

1
it  
 

g
t
2
+ (1  )

 

2
it  
 

g
t
2
(17)
2t = 

 

1
it  
 

g
t
2
+ (1  )

 

2
it  
 

g
t
2
(18)
2t = 

 

1
it  
 

g
t
2
+ (1  )

 

2
it  
 

g
t
2
(19)
and
qit = 
21t
1
t + (1  )2 2t2t +  (1  )1t2t + 2t1t] (20)
Dene the GMM estimator is:
^
 = argmin

 
1
T
TX
t=1
g(; Yt)
!T
^
W
 
1
T
TX
t=1
g(; Yt)
!
(21)
I use two-step GMM to solve the problems:
In the rst step, take
^
W = I (the identity matrix), I compute preliminary GMM
estimate
^
(1) by equation 21. This estimator is consistent for , although not e¢ cient.
In the second step, I dene
^
W T

^
(1)

=
 
1
T
TX
t=1
g(
^
(1); Yt)
!T  
1
T
TX
t=1
g(
^
(1); Yt)
! 1
(22)
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as the weighting matrix, to estimate  in equation 21. The estimator will be asymptotically
e¢ cient.
F test of Two-Type Models I calculate the average weight of spending on child care with
continuous type
 

g
t . I dene the F statistic:
F =
NX
i=1
 

g
it  
 
it
2
2t (N   2)
(23)
Here,
 
it and
 
i are the categories it and i t in. For example, % is the probability that
 = 1 and  is the  percentile. I dene
 
it

= 1 if it > ; otherwise
 
it

= 2. N is
the number of the observations.
Use the same methods, I dene the F statistic of leisure, elder care weights at di¤erent
age.
MLE Estimation of Substitution Rate Assume "it = w
i
t   pt; where "it satises normal
distribution, with "it~N(0;
): Let 
 
wit   pt

denotes the cumulative distribution function.
Then the log-likelihood function is:
lnL() =
nX
i=1

oit ln
 
wit   pt

+
 
1  oit

ln
 
1    wit   pt (24)
By using maximum likelihood estimation to estimate the probit model, I can get the substi-
tution rate between the outside market care service and the household care service. Using
the market service price and the substitution rate, I get the real market care price.
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Proof of proposition 9 Proof. First, s() must be continuos value:
By contradiction, assume 91; 2 and there is a hole between s(1) and s(2) with
s(2) > s(1): It means 8 2

 ;
 


; s() =2 (s(1); s(2))
In this condition, 9s(2) = s(2)  "; " is small enough, such that ij(s(2); ) >
ij(s
(2); )
There must be
@ij(s
(2);)
@s(2)  0; otherwise if
@ij(s
(2);)
@s(2) < 0; I can get 
i
j(s
(2); ) >
ij(s
(2); );contradiction.
I get
@U
h
P ij (s
(2)); s(2)
i
@s
+
@U
h
P ij (s
); s
i
@P ij
@P ij
@s
  2  0
By the concavity of U, I get:

U

P ij (s
(2)); s(2)
  C(2; s(2))  U P ij (s(2)); s(2)  C(2; s(2))
=
24@U
h
P ij (s(2)); s(2)
i
@
~
s
+
@U
h
P ij (s); s
i
@P ij
@P ij
@
~
s
  2
35 " > 0;
9~s 2 [s(2); s(2)] > 0:In which,
@U
h
P ij (s(2)); s(2)
i
@
~
s
+
@U
h
P ij (s); s
i
@P ij
@P ij
@
~
s
>
@U
h
P ij (s
(2)); s(2)
i
@s
+
@U
h
P ij (s
); s
i
@P ij
@P ij
@s
 2
; by the concavity of U.
Contradict to s(1) and s(2) are equilibrium value. The function is continuos.
Second, the , s() must be strict decreasing on 
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By contradiction, assume 91; 2; with 1 = 2  "; " is small enough. In the equilib-
rium, s(2) > s(1):
By the concavity of U, we have

UP ij (s
(2)); s(2)  C(1; s(2))
  U P ij (s(1)); s(1)  C(1; s(1))
=
264@U
h
P ij (
~
s);
~
s
i
@
~
s
+
@U
h
P ij (
~
s);
~
s
i
@P ij
@P ij
@
~
s
  2
375 > 0
Contradict to s(1) and s(2) are equilibrium value. The function is continuos.
Proof of proposition 10 Proof. Given the utility function, in the nal equilibrium, s() is
continuos and strict decreasing on :
Without quota, for individual with talent ; I have the number of people with type
lower than his type in the equilibrium is:1   Fall(). In the equilibrium, Pwi (s()) =
(1  ) e 1+e 0: and Pwi (s( )) = 0; P
w
i (s
(
 
)) = 1: In the nal equilibrium s () is:
s () =
h
(1  ) e 1 + e 0
i

 1

In the all pay auction, all individuals payo¤ is 0 in the equilibrium.
Assume in the equilibrium, 90; st ij(s(0); 0) > 0:
9 00 ; 00 = 0 + "; ; " is small enough and s(00) = s(
0
)  ;  is small enough.
And s(
00
) = s(0) + ;  is small enough. Such that
h
U
h
P ij (s
(
00
)); s(
00
)
i
  C(00 ; s(00))
i
  U P ij (s(1)); s(1)  C(1; s(1))
=
24@U
h
P ij (s(2)); s(2)
i
@
~
s
+
@U
h
P ij (s); s
i
@P ij
@P ij
@
~
s
  2
35 ("+ )
227
and 9~s 2 [s(2); s(2)] > 0:In which,
@U
h
P ij (s(2)); s(2)
i
@
~
s
+
@U
h
P ij (s); s
i
@P ij
@P ij
@
~
s
>
@U
h
P ij (s
(2)); s(2)
i
@s
+
@U
h
P ij (s
); s
i
@P ij
@P ij
@s
 2
Contradict to s(
00
)and s(
0
)are equilibrium value. ij(s
(0); 0) = 0: Given the
strict decreasing property, the optimal s is given by
@U
h
P ij (s
()); s()
i
@s
+
@U
h
P ij (s
); s
i
@P ij
@P ij
@s
= 
The lower  is, the higher s and p people get. The college seat allocation function is:
Pwi (s) = F
 1
P (G
w
all(s)); i 2 f0; 1g
and
P qi (s) = F
 1
P (G
q
i (s)); i 2 f0; 1g
which means in each tournament, the reverse rank of talent are exactly same to the rank of
college seats. The lower  is, the higher s and p people get.
Without quota, for individual with talent ; I get the number of people with type
lower than his type in the equilibrium is:1  Fall(). In the equilibrium,
Pwi (s
()) = (1  ) e 1 + e 0
I get Pwi (s
( )) = 0; and P
w
i (s
(
 
)) = 1: In the nal equilibrium s () is:
s () =
h
(1  ) e 1 + e 0
i

 1
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With quota, assume the seat is given to the group 0, with distribution
F0(p) = p
 ;
and
F1(p) = p  p :
 > 1 means 0 is the disadvantage province with higher portion of students ending up with
lower p than 1. Otherwise, 0 is the advantage province with higher portion of students
ending up with higher p than 1. For an individual with talent ; the number of people with
type lower than his type in the equilibrium is: 1  Fi(): I get:
P q0 (s
()) = e 0 = p
and
P q1 (s
()) = e 1 =
p  p
1  
In the equilibrium, I get:
s0 () = e
 0
 
 1

In the all pay auction game, all individuals payo¤ is 0 in the equilibrium.
Proof of proposition 11Proof. Denes () = s0 () s () =

e 
0
   (1  ) e 1 + e 0  1 :
If  > 1; I get s () > 0;every one in group 0 will take more s than the case without
quota case.
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If  < 01 ;I get s () < 0; every one in group 0 will take less s than the case without
quota case.
If  2
h
0
1
; 1
i
; I get lim!0s () = +1 and lim!1s () =  1. In addition, s
is a continuos function with @s()@@ < 0 for 8 2 [0;1] : 9 2 [0;1] ; such that s () = 0:
I get s () > 0, if  <  and s () < 0, if  > : Anyone one in group 0 with  larger
than incentive will take more s than the case without quota case. anyone one in group 0
with  smaller than incentive will take less s than the case without quota case.
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